Merge branch 'linus' into timers/core

Pick up the latest fixes and refresh the branch.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

10 files changed, 221 insertions, 128 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 9636e17c9f5d..0356e1d437ca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
 const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
 
 /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 80374842fe0b..c38bbce8c6a6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /*
+ * ima_free_template_entry - free an existing template entry
+ */
+void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < entry->template_desc->num_fields; i++)
+		kfree(entry->template_data[i].data);
+
+	kfree(entry);
+}
+
+/*
  * ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
  */
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -37,6 +50,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!*entry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	for (i = 0; i < template_desc->num_fields; i++) {
 		struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
 		u32 len;
@@ -51,10 +65,9 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		(*entry)->template_data_len += sizeof(len);
 		(*entry)->template_data_len += len;
 	}
-	(*entry)->template_desc = template_desc;
 	return 0;
 out:
-	kfree(*entry);
+	ima_free_template_entry(*entry);
 	*entry = NULL;
 	return result;
 }
@@ -134,7 +147,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	}
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 err_out:
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
 			    op, cause, result, 0);
@@ -269,7 +282,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
 		iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 }
 
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 15f34bd40abe..37122768554a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 		result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
 		if (result < 0) {
 			audit_cause = "hashing_error";
-			kfree(entry);
 			goto err_out;
 		}
 	}
@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 	result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
 				    boot_aggregate_name);
 	if (result < 0)
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_template_entry(entry);
 	return;
 err_out:
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 7f44c3207a9b..8137b27d641d 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 *
 		 * TODO: Encrypt the stored data with a temporary key.
 		 */
-		file = shmem_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
+		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
 		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(file);
 			goto err_quota;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 55d110f0aced..6e21c11e48bc 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	}
 
 	/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
-	key = kmem_cache_alloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!key)
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
@@ -293,18 +293,12 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 	key->uid = uid;
 	key->gid = gid;
 	key->perm = perm;
-	key->flags = 0;
-	key->expiry = 0;
-	key->payload.data = NULL;
-	key->security = NULL;
 
 	if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
 	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED)
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED;
 
-	memset(&key->type_data, 0, sizeof(key->type_data));
-
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
 	key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
 #endif
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 69f0cb7bab7e..d46cbc5e335e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static u64 mult_64x32_and_fold(u64 x, u32 y)
 static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *index_key)
 {
 	const unsigned level_shift = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
-	const unsigned long level_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
+	const unsigned long fan_mask = ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
 	const char *description = index_key->description;
 	unsigned long hash, type;
 	u32 piece;
@@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ static unsigned long hash_key_type_and_desc(const struct keyring_index_key *inde
 	 * ordinary keys by making sure the lowest level segment in the hash is
 	 * zero for keyrings and non-zero otherwise.
 	 */
-	if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) == 0)
+	if (index_key->type != &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) == 0)
 		return hash | (hash >> (ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE - level_shift)) | 1;
-	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & level_mask) != 0)
-		return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~level_mask;
+	if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring && (hash & fan_mask) != 0)
+		return (hash + (hash << level_shift)) & ~fan_mask;
 	return hash;
 }
 
@@ -279,12 +279,11 @@ static bool keyring_compare_object(const void *object, const void *data)
  * Compare the index keys of a pair of objects and determine the bit position
  * at which they differ - if they differ.
  */
-static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+static int keyring_diff_objects(const void *object, const void *data)
 {
-	const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(_a);
-	const struct key *key_b = keyring_ptr_to_key(_b);
+	const struct key *key_a = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
 	const struct keyring_index_key *a = &key_a->index_key;
-	const struct keyring_index_key *b = &key_b->index_key;
+	const struct keyring_index_key *b = data;
 	unsigned long seg_a, seg_b;
 	int level, i;
 
@@ -691,8 +690,8 @@ descend_to_node:
 		smp_read_barrier_depends();
 		ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
 		BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr));
-		node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
 	}
+	node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
 
 begin_node:
 	kdebug("begin_node");
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 794c3ca49eac..6625699f497c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>		/* for local_port_range[] */
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>		/* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -95,10 +96,6 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
-#define SB_TYPE_FMT "%s%s%s"
-#define SB_SUBTYPE(sb) (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0])
-#define SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb) sb->s_type->name, SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? "." : "", SB_SUBTYPE(sb) ? sb->s_subtype : ""
-
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -413,8 +410,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		   the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 		   assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 		if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") has no "
-			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+			       "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 			rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -422,22 +419,22 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 			if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
-				       SB_TYPE_FMT") has no security xattr handler\n",
-				       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+				       "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+				       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 			else
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
-				       SB_TYPE_FMT") getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
-				       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), -rc);
+				       "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+				       sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), unknown behavior\n",
-		       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 	else
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT"), %s\n",
-		       sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb),
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 		       labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
 	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
@@ -600,6 +597,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int rc = 0, i;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 	struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 	u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
@@ -658,8 +656,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 					     strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
-			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
-			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 			goto out;
 		}
 		switch (flags[i]) {
@@ -806,8 +804,7 @@ out:
 out_double_mount:
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
-	       "security settings for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
-	       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+	       "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 	goto out;
 }
 
@@ -2480,8 +2477,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 		rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
-			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT") errno=%d\n",
-			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb), rc);
+			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+			       mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 			goto out_free_opts;
 		}
 		rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -2519,8 +2516,8 @@ out_free_secdata:
 	return rc;
 out_bad_option:
 	printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
-	       "during remount (dev %s, type "SB_TYPE_FMT")\n", sb->s_id,
-	       SB_TYPE_ARGS(sb));
+	       "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
+	       sb->s_type->name);
 	goto out_free_opts;
 }
 
@@ -3828,7 +3825,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	u32 nlbl_sid;
 	u32 nlbl_type;
 
-	err = selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+	err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return -EACCES;
 	err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
@@ -3846,6 +3843,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+	else
+		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+	return err;
+}
+
 /* socket security operations */
 
 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
@@ -4313,8 +4334,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		}
 		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
 				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
-		if (err)
+		if (err) {
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (secmark_active) {
@@ -4452,7 +4475,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	int err;
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
-	u32 newsid;
+	u32 connsid;
 	u32 peersid;
 
 	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
@@ -4462,16 +4485,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = sksec->sid;
-		req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
-	} else {
-		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		req->secid = newsid;
-		req->peer_secid = peersid;
-	}
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	req->secid = connsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
 
 	return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
 }
@@ -4731,6 +4749,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				      u16 family)
 {
+	struct sock *sk;
 	u32 sid;
 
 	if (!netlbl_enabled())
@@ -4739,8 +4758,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
 	 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
 	 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
-	if (skb->sk) {
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+	sk = skb->sk;
+	if (sk) {
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+		if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
+			/* if the socket is the listening state then this
+			 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+			 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+			 * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
+			 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+			 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+			 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+			 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+			 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+			 * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+			 * security label in the packet itself this is the
+			 * best we can do. */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+		sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		sid = sksec->sid;
 	} else
 		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -4810,27 +4848,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
 	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
 		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+		return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+	sk = skb->sk;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
 	/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
 	 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
 	 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
 	 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
 	 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
-	 *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
-	if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
+	 *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+	 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+	 *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+	 *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+	 *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+	 *       connection. */
+	if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+	    !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 #endif
-	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
-	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
-	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
-		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-	/* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
-	 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
-	 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
-	 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
-	sk = skb->sk;
 	if (sk == NULL) {
+		/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+		 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+		 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+		 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
 		if (skb->skb_iif) {
 			secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
 			if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
@@ -4839,7 +4886,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 			secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 			peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 		}
+	} else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
+		/* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+		 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
+		 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+		 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+		 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+		 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+		 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+		 * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
+		 * for similar problems. */
+		u32 skb_sid;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+		 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+		 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+		 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+		 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+		 * pass the packet. */
+		if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			switch (family) {
+			case PF_INET:
+				if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+				break;
+			case PF_INET6:
+				if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+					return NF_ACCEPT;
+			default:
+				return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+			}
+		}
+		if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+			return NF_DROP;
+		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	} else {
+		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+		 * associated socket. */
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
@@ -5503,11 +5588,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 		/* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
 		ptsid = 0;
-		task_lock(p);
+		rcu_read_lock();
 		tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
 		if (tracer)
 			ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
-		task_unlock(p);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		if (tracer) {
 			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 0dec76c64cf5..48c3cc94c168 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 {
@@ -79,11 +80,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 {
 }
-#endif
 
-static inline int selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
-	return selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+	return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ee470a0b5c27..d106733ad987 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2334,50 +2334,16 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
-	const char *subtype = (sb->s_subtype && sb->s_subtype[0]) ? sb->s_subtype : NULL;
-	struct ocontext *base = NULL;
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
-	for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; c; c = c->next) {
-		char *sub;
-		int baselen;
-
-		baselen = strlen(fstype);
-
-		/* if base does not match, this is not the one */
-		if (strncmp(fstype, c->u.name, baselen))
-			continue;
-
-		/* if there is no subtype, this is the one! */
-		if (!subtype)
-			break;
-
-		/* skip past the base in this entry */
-		sub = c->u.name + baselen;
-
-		/* entry is only a base. save it. keep looking for subtype */
-		if (sub[0] == '\0') {
-			base = c;
-			continue;
-		}
-
-		/* entry is not followed by a subtype, so it is not a match */
-		if (sub[0] != '.')
-			continue;
-
-		/* whew, we found a subtype of this fstype */
-		sub++; /* move past '.' */
-
-		/* exact match of fstype AND subtype */
-		if (!strcmp(subtype, sub))
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
+		c = c->next;
 	}
 
-	/* in case we had found an fstype match but no subtype match */
-	if (!c)
-		c = base;
-
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index a91d205ec0c6..0462cb3ff0a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -209,19 +209,26 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
- * incoming packet.
- */
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
-	struct sec_path *sp;
+	struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+	struct xfrm_state *x;
 
-	if (skb == NULL)
-		goto out;
+	if (dst == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+	x = dst->xfrm;
+	if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+					u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+	struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
 
-	sp = skb->sp;
 	if (sp) {
 		int i;
 
@@ -248,6 +255,30 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+	if (skb == NULL) {
+		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
+
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+	if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		*sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
@@ -327,19 +358,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 		return rc;
 
 	ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!ctx) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
 	ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
 	ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
-	kfree(ctx_str);
 
 	x->security = ctx;
 	atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(ctx_str);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /*