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author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2014-07-21 18:49:16 -0700 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-09-03 14:58:17 -0700 |
commit | d39bd00deabe57420f2a3669eb71b0e0c4997184 (patch) | |
tree | bc32386d90df23c8d657b6b6a0051a0a59af11fe /kernel/seccomp.c | |
parent | 13aa72f0fd0a9f98a41cefb662487269e2f1ad65 (diff) | |
download | talos-obmc-linux-d39bd00deabe57420f2a3669eb71b0e0c4997184.tar.gz talos-obmc-linux-d39bd00deabe57420f2a3669eb71b0e0c4997184.zip |
seccomp: Allow arch code to provide seccomp_data
populate_seccomp_data is expensive: it works by inspecting
task_pt_regs and various other bits to piece together all the
information, and it's does so in multiple partially redundant steps.
Arch-specific code in the syscall entry path can do much better.
Admittedly this adds a bit of additional room for error, but the
speedup should be worth it.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 32 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 6c8528ce9df9..1285cb205d49 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -173,10 +173,10 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen) * * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes. */ -static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void) +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd) { struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); - struct seccomp_data sd; + struct seccomp_data sd_local; u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW; /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ @@ -186,14 +186,17 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void) /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */ smp_read_barrier_depends(); - populate_seccomp_data(&sd); + if (!sd) { + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local); + sd = &sd_local; + } /* * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA). */ for (; f; f = f->prev) { - u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, (void *)&sd); + u32 cur_ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(f->prog, (void *)sd); if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION)) ret = cur_ret; @@ -599,7 +602,7 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) #else int __secure_computing(void) { - u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(); + u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL); if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK)) return 0; @@ -610,7 +613,7 @@ int __secure_computing(void) } #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER -static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct pt_regs *regs) +static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd) { u32 filter_ret, action; int data; @@ -621,20 +624,20 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct pt_regs *regs) */ rmb(); - filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(); + filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd); data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA; action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION; switch (action) { case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: /* Set the low-order 16-bits as a errno. */ - syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, + syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current), -data, 0); goto skip; case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP: /* Show the handler the original registers. */ - syscall_rollback(current, regs); + syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current)); /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */ seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data); goto skip; @@ -661,11 +664,14 @@ skip: /** * seccomp_phase1() - run fast path seccomp checks on the current syscall + * @arg sd: The seccomp_data or NULL * * This only reads pt_regs via the syscall_xyz helpers. The only change * it will make to pt_regs is via syscall_set_return_value, and it will * only do that if it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP. * + * If sd is provided, it will not read pt_regs at all. + * * It may also call do_exit or force a signal; these actions must be * safe. * @@ -679,11 +685,11 @@ skip: * If it returns anything else, then the return value should be passed * to seccomp_phase2 from a context in which ptrace hooks are safe. */ -u32 seccomp_phase1(void) +u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd) { int mode = current->seccomp.mode; - struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current); - int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, regs); + int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr : + syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current)); switch (mode) { case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: @@ -691,7 +697,7 @@ u32 seccomp_phase1(void) return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK; #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: - return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, regs); + return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, sd); #endif default: BUG(); |