Merge 4.15-rc8 into usb-next

We want the USB fixes in here as well for merge issues.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

10 files changed, 285 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index d6d862db3b5d..bfd29bc8d37a 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -375,3 +375,19 @@ Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	information about CPUs heterogeneity.
 
 		cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#.
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+Date:		January 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
+
+		The files are named after the code names of CPU
+		vulnerabilities. The output of those files reflects the
+		state of the CPUs in the system. Possible output values:
+
+		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
+		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
+		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index af7104aaffd9..46b26bfee27b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -713,9 +713,6 @@
 			It will be ignored when crashkernel=X,high is not used
 			or memory reserved is below 4G.
 
-	crossrelease_fullstack
-			[KNL] Allow to record full stack trace in cross-release
-
 	cryptomgr.notests
                         [KNL] Disable crypto self-tests
 
@@ -2626,6 +2623,11 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
+			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
+			to spectre_v2=off.
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -2712,8 +2714,6 @@
 			steal time is computed, but won't influence scheduler
 			behaviour
 
-	nopti		[X86-64] Disable kernel page table isolation
-
 	nolapic		[X86-32,APIC] Do not enable or use the local APIC.
 
 	nolapic_timer	[X86-32,APIC] Do not use the local APIC timer.
@@ -3100,6 +3100,12 @@
 		pcie_scan_all	Scan all possible PCIe devices.  Otherwise we
 				only look for one device below a PCIe downstream
 				port.
+		big_root_window	Try to add a big 64bit memory window to the PCIe
+				root complex on AMD CPUs. Some GFX hardware
+				can resize a BAR to allow access to all VRAM.
+				Adding the window is slightly risky (it may
+				conflict with unreported devices), so this
+				taints the kernel.
 
 	pcie_aspm=	[PCIE] Forcibly enable or disable PCIe Active State Power
 			Management.
@@ -3288,11 +3294,20 @@
 	pt.		[PARIDE]
 			See Documentation/blockdev/paride.txt.
 
-	pti=		[X86_64]
-			Control user/kernel address space isolation:
-			on - enable
-			off - disable
-			auto - default setting
+	pti=		[X86_64] Control Page Table Isolation of user and
+			kernel address spaces.  Disabling this feature
+			removes hardening, but improves performance of
+			system calls and interrupts.
+
+			on   - unconditionally enable
+			off  - unconditionally disable
+			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+			       vulnerable to issues that PTI mitigates
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to pti=auto.
+
+	nopti		[X86_64]
+			Equivalent to pti=off
 
 	pty.legacy_count=
 			[KNL] Number of legacy pty's. Overwrites compiled-in
@@ -3943,6 +3958,29 @@
 	sonypi.*=	[HW] Sony Programmable I/O Control Device driver
 			See Documentation/laptops/sonypi.txt
 
+	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+
+			on   - unconditionally enable
+			off  - unconditionally disable
+			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
+			       vulnerable
+
+			Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
+			mitigation method at run time according to the
+			CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
+			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
+			compiler with which the kernel was built.
+
+			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
+
+			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
+			retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
+			retpoline,amd     - AMD-specific minimal thunk
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2=auto.
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/nilfs2.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/nilfs2.txt
index c0727dc36271..f2f3f8592a6f 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/nilfs2.txt
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/nilfs2.txt
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ available from the following download page.  At least "mkfs.nilfs2",
 cleaner or garbage collector) are required.  Details on the tools are
 described in the man pages included in the package.
 
-Project web page:    http://nilfs.sourceforge.net/
-Download page:       http://nilfs.sourceforge.net/en/download.html
+Project web page:    https://nilfs.sourceforge.io/
+Download page:       https://nilfs.sourceforge.io/en/download.html
 List info:           http://vger.kernel.org/vger-lists.html#linux-nilfs
 
 Caveats
diff --git a/Documentation/gpu/i915.rst b/Documentation/gpu/i915.rst
index 2e7ee0313c1c..e94d3ac2bdd0 100644
--- a/Documentation/gpu/i915.rst
+++ b/Documentation/gpu/i915.rst
@@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ GuC
 GuC-specific firmware loader
 ----------------------------
 
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_guc_loader.c
-   :doc: GuC-specific firmware loader
-
-.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_guc_loader.c
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_guc_fw.c
    :internal:
 
 GuC-based command submission
diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.txt b/Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.txt
index 262722d8867b..c4a293a03c33 100644
--- a/Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kbuild/kconfig-language.txt
@@ -200,10 +200,14 @@ module state. Dependency expressions have the following syntax:
 <expr> ::= <symbol>                             (1)
            <symbol> '=' <symbol>                (2)
            <symbol> '!=' <symbol>               (3)
-           '(' <expr> ')'                       (4)
-           '!' <expr>                           (5)
-           <expr> '&&' <expr>                   (6)
-           <expr> '||' <expr>                   (7)
+           <symbol1> '<' <symbol2>              (4)
+           <symbol1> '>' <symbol2>              (4)
+           <symbol1> '<=' <symbol2>             (4)
+           <symbol1> '>=' <symbol2>             (4)
+           '(' <expr> ')'                       (5)
+           '!' <expr>                           (6)
+           <expr> '&&' <expr>                   (7)
+           <expr> '||' <expr>                   (8)
 
 Expressions are listed in decreasing order of precedence. 
 
@@ -214,10 +218,13 @@ Expressions are listed in decreasing order of precedence.
     otherwise 'n'.
 (3) If the values of both symbols are equal, it returns 'n',
     otherwise 'y'.
-(4) Returns the value of the expression. Used to override precedence.
-(5) Returns the result of (2-/expr/).
-(6) Returns the result of min(/expr/, /expr/).
-(7) Returns the result of max(/expr/, /expr/).
+(4) If value of <symbol1> is respectively lower, greater, lower-or-equal,
+    or greater-or-equal than value of <symbol2>, it returns 'y',
+    otherwise 'n'.
+(5) Returns the value of the expression. Used to override precedence.
+(6) Returns the result of (2-/expr/).
+(7) Returns the result of min(/expr/, /expr/).
+(8) Returns the result of max(/expr/, /expr/).
 
 An expression can have a value of 'n', 'm' or 'y' (or 0, 1, 2
 respectively for calculations). A menu entry becomes visible when its
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/index.rst b/Documentation/networking/index.rst
index 66e620866245..7d4b15977d61 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/index.rst
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Contents:
    batman-adv
    kapi
    z8530book
+   msg_zerocopy
 
 .. only::  subproject
 
@@ -16,4 +17,3 @@ Contents:
    =======
 
    * :ref:`genindex`
-
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/msg_zerocopy.rst b/Documentation/networking/msg_zerocopy.rst
index 77f6d7e25cfd..291a01264967 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/msg_zerocopy.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/msg_zerocopy.rst
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ this flag, a process must first signal intent by setting a socket option:
 	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROCOPY, &one, sizeof(one)))
 		error(1, errno, "setsockopt zerocopy");
 
+Setting the socket option only works when the socket is in its initial
+(TCP_CLOSED) state.  Trying to set the option for a socket returned by accept(),
+for example, will lead to an EBUSY error. In this case, the option should be set
+to the listening socket and it will be inherited by the accepted sockets.
 
 Transmission
 ------------
diff --git a/Documentation/usb/gadget-testing.txt b/Documentation/usb/gadget-testing.txt
index 441a4b9b666f..5908a21fddb6 100644
--- a/Documentation/usb/gadget-testing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/usb/gadget-testing.txt
@@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ such specification consists of a number of lines with an inverval value
 in each line. The rules stated above are best illustrated with an example:
 
 # mkdir functions/uvc.usb0/control/header/h
-# cd functions/uvc.usb0/control/header/h
+# cd functions/uvc.usb0/control/
 # ln -s header/h class/fs
 # ln -s header/h class/ss
 # mkdir -p functions/uvc.usb0/streaming/uncompressed/u/360p
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/pti.txt b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d11eff61fc9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/pti.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+Overview
+========
+
+Page Table Isolation (pti, previously known as KAISER[1]) is a
+countermeasure against attacks on the shared user/kernel address
+space such as the "Meltdown" approach[2].
+
+To mitigate this class of attacks, we create an independent set of
+page tables for use only when running userspace applications.  When
+the kernel is entered via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, the
+page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy.  When the system
+switches back to user mode, the user copy is used again.
+
+The userspace page tables contain only a minimal amount of kernel
+data: only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the
+entry/exit functions themselves and the interrupt descriptor table
+(IDT).  There are a few strictly unnecessary things that get mapped
+such as the first C function when entering an interrupt (see
+comments in pti.c).
+
+This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
+the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled.  It can be
+enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
+Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
+'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+
+Page Table Management
+=====================
+
+When PTI is enabled, the kernel manages two sets of page tables.
+The first set is very similar to the single set which is present in
+kernels without PTI.  This includes a complete mapping of userspace
+that the kernel can use for things like copy_to_user().
+
+Although _complete_, the user portion of the kernel page tables is
+crippled by setting the NX bit in the top level.  This ensures
+that any missed kernel->user CR3 switch will immediately crash
+userspace upon executing its first instruction.
+
+The userspace page tables map only the kernel data needed to enter
+and exit the kernel.  This data is entirely contained in the 'struct
+cpu_entry_area' structure which is placed in the fixmap which gives
+each CPU's copy of the area a compile-time-fixed virtual address.
+
+For new userspace mappings, the kernel makes the entries in its
+page tables like normal.  The only difference is when the kernel
+makes entries in the top (PGD) level.  In addition to setting the
+entry in the main kernel PGD, a copy of the entry is made in the
+userspace page tables' PGD.
+
+This sharing at the PGD level also inherently shares all the lower
+layers of the page tables.  This leaves a single, shared set of
+userspace page tables to manage.  One PTE to lock, one set of
+accessed bits, dirty bits, etc...
+
+Overhead
+========
+
+Protection against side-channel attacks is important.  But,
+this protection comes at a cost:
+
+1. Increased Memory Use
+  a. Each process now needs an order-1 PGD instead of order-0.
+     (Consumes an additional 4k per process).
+  b. The 'cpu_entry_area' structure must be 2MB in size and 2MB
+     aligned so that it can be mapped by setting a single PMD
+     entry.  This consumes nearly 2MB of RAM once the kernel
+     is decompressed, but no space in the kernel image itself.
+
+2. Runtime Cost
+  a. CR3 manipulation to switch between the page table copies
+     must be done at interrupt, syscall, and exception entry
+     and exit (it can be skipped when the kernel is interrupted,
+     though.)  Moves to CR3 are on the order of a hundred
+     cycles, and are required at every entry and exit.
+  b. A "trampoline" must be used for SYSCALL entry.  This
+     trampoline depends on a smaller set of resources than the
+     non-PTI SYSCALL entry code, so requires mapping fewer
+     things into the userspace page tables.  The downside is
+     that stacks must be switched at entry time.
+  d. Global pages are disabled for all kernel structures not
+     mapped into both kernel and userspace page tables.  This
+     feature of the MMU allows different processes to share TLB
+     entries mapping the kernel.  Losing the feature means more
+     TLB misses after a context switch.  The actual loss of
+     performance is very small, however, never exceeding 1%.
+  d. Process Context IDentifiers (PCID) is a CPU feature that
+     allows us to skip flushing the entire TLB when switching page
+     tables by setting a special bit in CR3 when the page tables
+     are changed.  This makes switching the page tables (at context
+     switch, or kernel entry/exit) cheaper.  But, on systems with
+     PCID support, the context switch code must flush both the user
+     and kernel entries out of the TLB.  The user PCID TLB flush is
+     deferred until the exit to userspace, minimizing the cost.
+     See intel.com/sdm for the gory PCID/INVPCID details.
+  e. The userspace page tables must be populated for each new
+     process.  Even without PTI, the shared kernel mappings
+     are created by copying top-level (PGD) entries into each
+     new process.  But, with PTI, there are now *two* kernel
+     mappings: one in the kernel page tables that maps everything
+     and one for the entry/exit structures.  At fork(), we need to
+     copy both.
+  f. In addition to the fork()-time copying, there must also
+     be an update to the userspace PGD any time a set_pgd() is done
+     on a PGD used to map userspace.  This ensures that the kernel
+     and userspace copies always map the same userspace
+     memory.
+  g. On systems without PCID support, each CR3 write flushes
+     the entire TLB.  That means that each syscall, interrupt
+     or exception flushes the TLB.
+  h. INVPCID is a TLB-flushing instruction which allows flushing
+     of TLB entries for non-current PCIDs.  Some systems support
+     PCIDs, but do not support INVPCID.  On these systems, addresses
+     can only be flushed from the TLB for the current PCID.  When
+     flushing a kernel address, we need to flush all PCIDs, so a
+     single kernel address flush will require a TLB-flushing CR3
+     write upon the next use of every PCID.
+
+Possible Future Work
+====================
+1. We can be more careful about not actually writing to CR3
+   unless its value is actually changed.
+2. Allow PTI to be enabled/disabled at runtime in addition to the
+   boot-time switching.
+
+Testing
+========
+
+To test stability of PTI, the following test procedure is recommended,
+ideally doing all of these in parallel:
+
+1. Set CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
+2. Run several copies of all of the tools/testing/selftests/x86/ tests
+   (excluding MPX and protection_keys) in a loop on multiple CPUs for
+   several minutes.  These tests frequently uncover corner cases in the
+   kernel entry code.  In general, old kernels might cause these tests
+   themselves to crash, but they should never crash the kernel.
+3. Run the 'perf' tool in a mode (top or record) that generates many
+   frequent performance monitoring non-maskable interrupts (see "NMI"
+   in /proc/interrupts).  This exercises the NMI entry/exit code which
+   is known to trigger bugs in code paths that did not expect to be
+   interrupted, including nested NMIs.  Using "-c" boosts the rate of
+   NMIs, and using two -c with separate counters encourages nested NMIs
+   and less deterministic behavior.
+
+	while true; do perf record -c 10000 -e instructions,cycles -a sleep 10; done
+
+4. Launch a KVM virtual machine.
+5. Run 32-bit binaries on systems supporting the SYSCALL instruction.
+   This has been a lightly-tested code path and needs extra scrutiny.
+
+Debugging
+=========
+
+Bugs in PTI cause a few different signatures of crashes
+that are worth noting here.
+
+ * Failures of the selftests/x86 code.  Usually a bug in one of the
+   more obscure corners of entry_64.S
+ * Crashes in early boot, especially around CPU bringup.  Bugs
+   in the trampoline code or mappings cause these.
+ * Crashes at the first interrupt.  Caused by bugs in entry_64.S,
+   like screwing up a page table switch.  Also caused by
+   incorrectly mapping the IRQ handler entry code.
+ * Crashes at the first NMI.  The NMI code is separate from main
+   interrupt handlers and can have bugs that do not affect
+   normal interrupts.  Also caused by incorrectly mapping NMI
+   code.  NMIs that interrupt the entry code must be very
+   careful and can be the cause of crashes that show up when
+   running perf.
+ * Kernel crashes at the first exit to userspace.  entry_64.S
+   bugs, or failing to map some of the exit code.
+ * Crashes at first interrupt that interrupts userspace. The paths
+   in entry_64.S that return to userspace are sometimes separate
+   from the ones that return to the kernel.
+ * Double faults: overflowing the kernel stack because of page
+   faults upon page faults.  Caused by touching non-pti-mapped
+   data in the entry code, or forgetting to switch to kernel
+   CR3 before calling into C functions which are not pti-mapped.
+ * Userspace segfaults early in boot, sometimes manifesting
+   as mount(8) failing to mount the rootfs.  These have
+   tended to be TLB invalidation issues.  Usually invalidating
+   the wrong PCID, or otherwise missing an invalidation.
+
+1. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
+2. https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
index ad41b3813f0a..ea91cb61a602 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
+++ b/Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ ffffea0000000000 - ffffeaffffffffff (=40 bits) virtual memory map (1TB)
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffec0000000000 - fffffbffffffffff (=44 bits) kasan shadow memory (16TB)
 ... unused hole ...
-fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
-fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
+fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) LDT remap for PTI
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffffef00000000 - fffffffeffffffff (=64 GB) EFI region mapping space
@@ -37,13 +38,15 @@ ffd4000000000000 - ffd5ffffffffffff (=49 bits) virtual memory map (512TB)
 ... unused hole ...
 ffdf000000000000 - fffffc0000000000 (=53 bits) kasan shadow memory (8PB)
 ... unused hole ...
-fffffe8000000000 - fffffeffffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+				    vaddr_end for KASLR
+fffffe0000000000 - fffffe7fffffffff (=39 bits) cpu_entry_area mapping
+... unused hole ...
 ffffff0000000000 - ffffff7fffffffff (=39 bits) %esp fixup stacks
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffffef00000000 - fffffffeffffffff (=64 GB) EFI region mapping space
 ... unused hole ...
 ffffffff80000000 - ffffffff9fffffff (=512 MB)  kernel text mapping, from phys 0
-ffffffffa0000000 - [fixmap start]   (~1526 MB) module mapping space
+ffffffffa0000000 - fffffffffeffffff (1520 MB) module mapping space
 [fixmap start]   - ffffffffff5fffff kernel-internal fixmap range
 ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff (=4 kB) legacy vsyscall ABI
 ffffffffffe00000 - ffffffffffffffff (=2 MB) unused hole
@@ -67,9 +70,10 @@ memory window (this size is arbitrary, it can be raised later if needed).
 The mappings are not part of any other kernel PGD and are only available
 during EFI runtime calls.
 
-The module mapping space size changes based on the CONFIG requirements for the
-following fixmap section.
-
 Note that if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY is enabled, the direct mapping of all
 physical memory, vmalloc/ioremap space and virtual memory map are randomized.
 Their order is preserved but their base will be offset early at boot time.
+
+Be very careful vs. KASLR when changing anything here. The KASLR address
+range must not overlap with anything except the KASAN shadow area, which is
+correct as KASAN disables KASLR.