Fix up Event Types for PCR Extend

Trusted Boot will now use correct event types when performing PCR
extend for PNOR sections that are meant to establish a core root of
trust.

Change-Id: I3cb62e2899083c898e1af6a2031cc8a0a365015e
RTC:172332
Reviewed-on: http://ralgit01.raleigh.ibm.com/gerrit1/40601
Tested-by: Jenkins Server <pfd-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christopher J. Engel <cjengel@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen M. Cprek <smcprek@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins OP Build CI <op-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Timothy R. Block <block@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas E. Bofferding <bofferdn@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: FSP CI Jenkins <fsp-CI-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Baiocchi <mbaiocch@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: William G. Hoffa <wghoffa@us.ibm.com>

6 files changed, 66 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.C b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.C
index 15e519f59..cc714db74 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.C
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.C
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ errlHndl_t PNOR::parseTOC( uint8_t* i_tocBuffer,SectionData_t * o_TOC)
         //Walk through all the entries in the table and record some info
         for(uint32_t i=0; i<l_ffs_hdr->entry_count; i++)
         {
-            uint32_t l_secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
+            PNOR::SectionId l_secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
             ffs_entry* cur_entry = &(l_ffs_hdr->entries[i]);
             TRACUCOMP(g_trac_pnor, "PNOR::parseTOC: TOC %d,  Entry %d, name=%s, pointer=0x%X",l_tocBeingChecked, i,cur_entry->name, (uint64_t)cur_entry);
 
@@ -314,8 +314,7 @@ errlHndl_t PNOR::parseTOC( uint8_t* i_tocBuffer,SectionData_t * o_TOC)
                        PAGESIZE_PLUS_ECC : PAGESIZE;
                    addr -= headerSize;
 
-                   l_errhdl = PNOR::extendHash(addr, headerSize,
-                                               PNOR::SectionIdToString(l_secId));
+                   l_errhdl = PNOR::extendHash(addr, headerSize, l_secId);
                    if (l_errhdl)
                    {
                        break;
@@ -341,12 +340,16 @@ errlHndl_t PNOR::parseTOC( uint8_t* i_tocBuffer,SectionData_t * o_TOC)
 
 // @TODO RTC 168021 Remove legacy extensions when all secure sections are
 // supported
-errlHndl_t PNOR::extendHash(uint64_t i_addr, size_t i_size, const char* i_name)
+errlHndl_t PNOR::extendHash(uint64_t i_addr,
+    size_t i_size,
+    const PNOR::SectionId i_sectionId)
 {
     errlHndl_t l_errhdl = NULL;
 
     do {
         #ifndef __HOSTBOOT_RUNTIME
+        const char* l_name = PNOR::SectionIdToString(i_sectionId);
+
         // Read data from the PNOR DD
         uint8_t* l_buf = new uint8_t[i_size]();
         TARGETING::Target* l_target = TARGETING::MASTER_PROCESSOR_CHIP_TARGET_SENTINEL;
@@ -360,9 +363,14 @@ errlHndl_t PNOR::extendHash(uint64_t i_addr, size_t i_size, const char* i_name)
         SHA512_t l_hash = {0};
         SECUREBOOT::hashBlob(l_buf, i_size, l_hash);
         l_errhdl = TRUSTEDBOOT::pcrExtend(TRUSTEDBOOT::PCR_0,
-                                          TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS,
-                                          l_hash,
-                                          sizeof(SHA512_t), i_name);
+            PNOR::PAYLOAD == i_sectionId?
+                TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_COMPACT_HASH:
+                (PNOR::isCoreRootOfTrustSection(i_sectionId)?
+                    TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS:
+                    TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_POST_CODE),
+            l_hash,
+            sizeof(SHA512_t),
+            l_name);
         delete[] l_buf;
 
         if (l_errhdl)
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.H b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.H
index 497e85e83..fa7e037cc 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.H
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_common.H
@@ -80,13 +80,15 @@ namespace PNOR {
      * @brief Reads version header of section, hashes it, and extends to tpm
      *        buffer list.
      *
-     * @parm i_addr  Offset into flash to read
-     * @parm i_size  Number of bytes to read
-     * @parm i_name  Name of PNOR section
+     * @parm i_addr       Offset into flash to read
+     * @parm i_size       Number of bytes to read
+     * @parm i_sectionId  Section ID of PNOR section
      *
      * @return Error from operation
      */
-    errlHndl_t extendHash(uint64_t i_addr, size_t i_size, const char* i_name);
+    errlHndl_t extendHash(uint64_t i_addr,
+                          size_t i_size,
+                          const PNOR::SectionId i_sectionId);
 
 }
 
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.C b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.C
index b211b375b..2a7552390 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.C
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.C
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ void PNOR::checkHeader (ffs_hdr* i_ffs_hdr,
   *         title.
   */
 void PNOR::getSectionEnum (const ffs_entry* i_entry,
-                           uint32_t* o_secId)
+                           SectionId* o_secId)
 {
     *o_secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
     //Figure out section enum
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ void PNOR::getSectionEnum (const ffs_entry* i_entry,
     {
         if(strcmp(PNOR::SectionIdToString(eyeIndex),i_entry->name) == 0)
         {
-            *o_secId = eyeIndex;
+            *o_secId = SectionId(eyeIndex);
             break;
         }
     }
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ PNOR::parseEntries (ffs_hdr* i_ffs_hdr,
     for(uint32_t i=0; i<i_ffs_hdr->entry_count; i++)
     {
         ffs_entry* cur_entry = (&i_ffs_hdr->entries[i]);
-        uint32_t secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
+        PNOR::SectionId secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
 
         // ffs entry check, 0 if checksums match
         if( PNOR::pnor_ffs_checksum(cur_entry, FFS_ENTRY_SIZE) != 0)
@@ -400,6 +400,23 @@ bool PNOR::isEnforcedSecureSection(const uint32_t i_section)
 #endif
 }
 
+bool PNOR::isCoreRootOfTrustSection(const PNOR::SectionId i_section)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECUREBOOT
+    #ifdef BOOTLOADER
+        return i_section == HB_BASE_CODE;
+    #else
+        return i_section == HB_BOOTLOADER ||
+               i_section == HB_EXT_CODE ||
+               i_section == HB_DATA ||
+               i_section == SBE_IPL ||
+               i_section == HB_BASE_CODE;
+    #endif
+#else
+    return false;
+#endif
+}
+
 const char * PNOR::SectionIdToString( uint32_t i_secIdIndex )
 {
     /**
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.H b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.H
index 700820644..a608234fb 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.H
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/pnor_utils.H
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ void checkHeader (ffs_hdr* i_ffs_hdr,
   *
 */
 void getSectionEnum (const ffs_entry* i_entry,
-                      uint32_t* o_secId);
+                      SectionId* o_secId);
 /**
   * @brief Iterate through the entries, each which represent a section in pnor.
   *         During the iteration we are checking that the entries are valid
@@ -227,6 +227,17 @@ parseEntries (ffs_hdr* i_ffs_hdr,
 bool isEnforcedSecureSection(const uint32_t i_section);
 
 /**
+ * @brief Determines whether the given section is a "core root of trust" section
+ *        for the purposes of trusted boot. The set of "core root of trust"
+ *        sections are a distinct subset of secure sections that form the basis
+ *        of security for the remaining secure sections.
+ * @param[in] i_section PNOR section to test.
+ *
+ * @return bool True if core root of test section, false otherwise
+ */
+bool isCoreRootOfTrustSection(const PNOR::SectionId i_section);
+
+/**
  * @brief Determines if a section has a Header and that it is not a Secure Header
  *
  * @param[out] i_secInfo  PNOR information of section
diff --git a/src/usr/pnor/runtime/rt_pnor.C b/src/usr/pnor/runtime/rt_pnor.C
index d4f5f8400..6a1541721 100644
--- a/src/usr/pnor/runtime/rt_pnor.C
+++ b/src/usr/pnor/runtime/rt_pnor.C
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ errlHndl_t RtPnor::setSecure(const uint8_t* i_tocBuffer,
         auto const l_ffs_hdr = reinterpret_cast<const ffs_hdr*>(i_tocBuffer);
         for(uint32_t i=0; i<l_ffs_hdr->entry_count; ++i)
         {
-            uint32_t l_secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
+            PNOR::SectionId l_secId = PNOR::INVALID_SECTION;
 
             // Get current entry section id
             auto cur_entry = &(l_ffs_hdr->entries[i]);
diff --git a/src/usr/secureboot/trusted/base/trustedboot_base.C b/src/usr/secureboot/trusted/base/trustedboot_base.C
index 4d2815862..f8bee162b 100644
--- a/src/usr/secureboot/trusted/base/trustedboot_base.C
+++ b/src/usr/secureboot/trusted/base/trustedboot_base.C
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include "../trustedboot.H"
 #include "../trustedbootCmds.H"
 #include "../trustedbootUtils.H"
+#include "../../pnor/pnor_utils.H"
 #include "trustedbootMsg.H"
 
 // ----------------------------------------------
@@ -331,11 +332,17 @@ errlHndl_t extendPnorSectionHash(
 
     TPM_Pcr pnorHashPcr = PCR_0;
     EventTypes swKeyHashEventType = TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_PLATFORM_CONFIG_FLAGS;
+    EventTypes pnorHashEventType = TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_POST_CODE;
     // PAYLOAD is the only section that needs its hash extended to PCR_4
     if (i_sec == PNOR::PAYLOAD)
     {
         pnorHashPcr = PCR_4;
         swKeyHashEventType = TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_COMPACT_HASH;
+        pnorHashEventType = TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_COMPACT_HASH;
+    }
+    else if(PNOR::isCoreRootOfTrustSection(i_sec))
+    {
+        pnorHashEventType = TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS;
     }
     // Extend swKeyHash to the next PCR after the hash extension PCR.
     const TPM_Pcr swKeyHashPcr = static_cast<TPM_Pcr>(pnorHashPcr + 1);
@@ -343,10 +350,8 @@ errlHndl_t extendPnorSectionHash(
     if (SECUREBOOT::enabled())
     {
         // If secureboot is enabled, use protected hash in header
-        /// @todo RTC 172332 Update log type based on what is being extended
-        /// EV_POST_CODE or EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS or EV_COMPACT_HASH
         pError = TRUSTEDBOOT::pcrExtend(pnorHashPcr,
-              TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_POST_CODE,
+              pnorHashEventType,
               reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(i_conHdr.payloadTextHash()),
               sizeof(SHA512_t),
               sectionInfo.name);
@@ -375,14 +380,13 @@ errlHndl_t extendPnorSectionHash(
     else
     {
         // If secureboot is not enabled, measure protected section
-        /// @todo RTC 172332 Update log type based on what is being extended
-        /// EV_POST_CODE or EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS or EV_COMPACT_HASH
         SHA512_t hash = {0};
         SECUREBOOT::hashBlob(i_vaddr, protectedSize, hash);
         pError = TRUSTEDBOOT::pcrExtend(pnorHashPcr,
-                                        TRUSTEDBOOT::EV_POST_CODE,
-                                        hash, sizeof(SHA512_t),
-                                        sectionInfo.name);
+                pnorHashEventType,
+                hash,
+                sizeof(SHA512_t),
+                sectionInfo.name);
         if (pError)
         {
             TRACFCOMP(g_trac_trustedboot, ERR_MRK " Failed in call to "