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| author | Ilya Smirnov <ismirno@us.ibm.com> | 2019-02-19 09:19:35 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel M. Crowell <dcrowell@us.ibm.com> | 2019-03-01 15:06:57 -0600 |
| commit | b1c1b2cc5e78267fadb9001587f66566cf19159e (patch) | |
| tree | e40435fd16338b995a5b6c3b0c3bd132ce3d159f /src/usr/runtime | |
| parent | 7364f2447d187b1b7dfff42403db051c4fc7e4e4 (diff) | |
| download | talos-hostboot-b1c1b2cc5e78267fadb9001587f66566cf19159e.tar.gz talos-hostboot-b1c1b2cc5e78267fadb9001587f66566cf19159e.zip | |
Secureboot: Enhanced Multinode Comm: TPM_POISONED
This commit introduces a new attribute TPM_POISONED used
to indicate that a certain TPM was poisoned during the boot.
This attribute is also used to adjust the trustedboot flag
in HDAT: if the primary TPM was poisoned during the IPL,
the trustedboot setting is turned off in HDAT.
Change-Id: I32ff6e79ebba0e38c0e8b4b9bd4aa0f52a250d9a
RTC: 203645
Reviewed-on: http://rchgit01.rchland.ibm.com/gerrit1/72129
Reviewed-by: Michael Baiocchi <mbaiocch@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins Server <pfd-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins OP Build CI <op-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jenkins OP HW <op-hw-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: FSP CI Jenkins <fsp-CI-jenkins+hostboot@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas E. Bofferding <bofferdn@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel M. Crowell <dcrowell@us.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/usr/runtime')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C | 18 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C b/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C index db32eef40..75c8f3a2f 100644 --- a/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C +++ b/src/usr/runtime/populate_hbruntime.C @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ /* */ /* OpenPOWER HostBoot Project */ /* */ -/* Contributors Listed Below - COPYRIGHT 2016,2018 */ +/* Contributors Listed Below - COPYRIGHT 2016,2019 */ /* [+] International Business Machines Corp. */ /* */ /* */ @@ -1762,6 +1762,22 @@ errlHndl_t populate_hbSecurebootData ( void ) bool trusted = false; #ifdef CONFIG_TPMDD trusted = TRUSTEDBOOT::functionalPrimaryTpmExists(); + + if(trusted) + { + // Check if the primary TPM has been poisoned. If it has, + // trustedboot state cannot be guaranteed on the system. + TARGETING::Target* l_primaryTpm = nullptr; + TRUSTEDBOOT::getPrimaryTpm(l_primaryTpm); + if(!l_primaryTpm || + l_primaryTpm->getAttr<TARGETING::ATTR_TPM_POISONED>()) + { + // Primary TPM doesn't exist or is poisoned - + // turn off trustedboot + trusted = false; + } + } + #endif l_sysSecSets->trustedboot = trusted? 1: 0; |
