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* asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2Peter Korsgaard2018-01-071-0/+35
Fixes the following security issues: 14.6.1: * AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT. A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times. If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well. * AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has an “externnotify” program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection. * AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash For more details, see the announcement: https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security 14.6.2: * AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the “nat” and “symmetric_rtp” options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report. The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what AST-2017-005 was mitigating. The intent was to qualify a series of packets before accepting the new source address. For more details, see the announcement: https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross compilation)). If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted upstream. Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
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