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<title>buildroot/package/openssh, branch 2019.02-op-build</title>
<subtitle>OpenPOWER buildroot sources</subtitle>
<id>https://git.raptorcs.com/git/buildroot/atom?h=2019.02-op-build</id>
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<updated>2019-02-12T18:59:11+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>openssh: add upstream security fixes</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:59:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baruch Siach</name>
<email>baruch@tkos.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-12T12:13:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7fe3741bc4197f6bff48236f357f5db1269586c7</id>
<content type='text'>
CVE-2019-6109: Due to missing character encoding in the progress
display, a malicious server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can employ
crafted object names to manipulate the client output, e.g., by using
ANSI control codes to hide additional files being transferred. This
affects refresh_progress_meter() in progressmeter.c.

CVE-2019-6111: Due to the scp implementation being derived from 1983
rcp, the server chooses which files/directories are sent to the client.
However, the scp client only performs cursory validation of the object
name returned (only directory traversal attacks are prevented). A
malicious scp server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can overwrite
arbitrary files in the scp client target directory. If recursive
operation (-r) is performed, the server can manipulate subdirectories as
well (for example, to overwrite the .ssh/authorized_keys file).

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach &lt;baruch@tkos.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard &lt;peter@korsgaard.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/openssh: Add sysusers.d snippet</title>
<updated>2019-02-06T17:03:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Lesiak</name>
<email>chris.lesiak@licor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-06T16:36:39+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9acbf811cd7028dba17a26ee23e8494b083b8cab</id>
<content type='text'>
Whether using the new sysusers.d snippet, or adding an entry to
/etc/password, set the service's home directory to /var/empty.
See README.privsep included as part of the openssh distribution.

Signed-off-by: Chris Lesiak &lt;chris.lesiak@licor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) &lt;arnout@mind.be&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/openssh: Set /var/empty permissions</title>
<updated>2019-02-03T20:49:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Lesiak</name>
<email>chris.lesiak@licor.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-17T22:25:32+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f85665c58562a967e3dcb5f72fa8af0a606c9274</id>
<content type='text'>
The openssh privilege separation feature, enabled by default,
requires that the path /var/empty exists and has certain permissions
(not writable by the sshd user). Note that nothing ever gets writting
in this directory, so it works fine on a readonly rootfs.

See README.privsep included as part of the openssh distribution.

Signed-off-by: Chris Lesiak &lt;chris.lesiak@licor.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) &lt;arnout@mind.be&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/openssh: add upstream security fix</title>
<updated>2019-01-15T18:49:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baruch Siach</name>
<email>baruch@tkos.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-15T11:17:53+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8233c666124890fff713ecb254993b52b1fa7674</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes CVE-2018-20685: The scp client allows server to modify permissions
of the target directory by using empty ("D0777 0 \n") or dot ("D0777 0
.\n") directory name.

The bug reporter lists a number of related vulnerabilities that are not
fixed yet:

  https://sintonen.fi/advisories/scp-client-multiple-vulnerabilities.txt

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach &lt;baruch@tkos.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard &lt;peter@korsgaard.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/openssh: use BR2_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_PATH as default PATH</title>
<updated>2018-12-31T13:33:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Markus Mayer</name>
<email>mmayer@broadcom.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-20T17:58:13+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d63fb82509d9be26995d3a9a4fa56511250070fd</id>
<content type='text'>
We use the configuration option $(BR2_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_PATH) to set the
default PATH in OpenSSH sessions.

$(BR2_SYSTEM_DEFAULT_PATH) is a Kconfig string. So it is already
quoted, which is exactly what we want.

Signed-off-by: Markus Mayer &lt;mmayer@broadcom.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" &lt;yann.morin.1998@free.fr&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni &lt;thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openssh: bump to version 7.9p1</title>
<updated>2018-10-21T21:31:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baruch Siach</name>
<email>baruch@tkos.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-21T17:28:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:458ad4d7b6f542b3734088b5f5b0c96dce119851</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop patch #1. uClibc no longer includes pthreads.h indirectly.

Drop patch #2. The sys/param.h header is included indirectly through the
local includes.h header since version 6.8p1.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach &lt;baruch@tkos.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard &lt;peter@korsgaard.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openssh: security bump to version 7.8</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T12:38:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baruch Siach</name>
<email>baruch@tkos.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-24T04:56:14+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5ef5b39bd4006526717364b39b04a663ce174517</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes CVE-2018-15473: user enumeration vulnerability due to not delaying
bailout for an invalid authenticating user until after the packet
containing the request has been fully parsed.

Some OpenSSH developers don't consider this a security issue:

  https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2018-August/037138.html

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach &lt;baruch@tkos.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni &lt;thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>openssh: bump to version 7.7p1</title>
<updated>2018-04-10T07:28:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Baruch Siach</name>
<email>baruch@tkos.co.il</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T05:44:42+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a08cd50e98107b8f79d133c85a65187459614649</id>
<content type='text'>
Drop upstream patches, renumber the rest.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach &lt;baruch@tkos.co.il&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni &lt;thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/openssh: also install ssh-copy-id script</title>
<updated>2018-02-08T22:10:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julien BOIBESSOT</name>
<email>julien.boibessot@armadeus.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-02-07T18:35:59+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0552b7fc3878d7e446ee082f492845bc33594bba</id>
<content type='text'>
This script is useful to copy SSH keys between client and server [1] and
installed on most distributions (for example on debian: [2]).

[1] https://www.ssh.com/ssh/copy-id
[2] https://packages.debian.org/fr/jessie/armhf/openssh-client/filelist

Signed-off-by: Julien BOIBESSOT &lt;julien.boibessot@armadeus.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" &lt;yann.morin.1998@free.fr&gt;
[Thomas: use full destination path.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni &lt;thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>package/*/Config.in: fix help text check-package warnings</title>
<updated>2017-12-18T08:22:54+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Petazzoni</name>
<email>thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-18T08:21:05+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2277fdeca8c94f8ea8fe8afebcdbb176c6b1531d</id>
<content type='text'>
This commit fixes the warnings reported by check-package on the help
text of all package Config.in files, related to the formatting of the
help text: should start with a tab, then 2 spaces, then at most 62
characters.

The vast majority of warnings fixed were caused by too long lines. A
few warnings were related to spaces being used instead of a tab to
indent the help text.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni &lt;thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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