From 3699c53c485bf0168e6500d0ed18bf931584dd7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Tue, 6 Jan 2009 22:27:01 +0000 Subject: CRED: Fix regression in cap_capable() as shown up by sys_faccessat() [ver #3] Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to: commit 3b11a1decef07c19443d24ae926982bc8ec9f4c0 Author: David Howells Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100 CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when accessing current's creds. There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current task. Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test, without affecting the creds as seen from other processes. One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores. The affected capability check is in generic_permission(): if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process being checked. This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite: /* * t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug. * * Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued. * Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #define UID 500 #define GID 100 #define PERM 0 #define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access" static void errExit(char *msg) { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* errExit */ static void accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr) { printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask)); } /* accessTest */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd, perm, uid, gid; char *testpath; char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20]; testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH; perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM; uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID; gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID; unlink(testpath); fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0); if (fd == -1) errExit("open"); if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown"); if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod"); close(fd); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath); system(cmd); if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid"); accessTest(testpath, 0, "0"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK"); accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK"); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } /* main */ This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS filesystem. If successful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 If unsuccessful, it will show: [root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043 ---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1 I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites. Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/security.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/security.c') diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index d85dbb37c972..a02f243f09c0 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -154,14 +154,32 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, effective, inheritable, permitted); } -int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +int security_capable(int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + return security_ops->capable(current, current_cred(), cap, + SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } -int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) { - return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + const struct cred *cred; + int ret; + + cred = get_task_cred(tsk); + ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + put_cred(cred); + return ret; +} + +int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +{ + const struct cred *cred; + int ret; + + cred = get_task_cred(tsk); + ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); + put_cred(cred); + return ret; } int security_acct(struct file *file) -- cgit v1.2.1