From 3d6e48f43340343d97839eadb1ab7b6a3ea98797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarod Wilson Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2008 12:38:56 +0200 Subject: [S390] CVE-2008-1514: prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel, reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32 will result in a kernel panic. This is also known as CVE-2008-1514. Test case available here: http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap Steps to reproduce: 1) wget the above 2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31 3) ./user-area-padding-31bit Test status ----------- Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case, as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads returning zero, writes ignored. Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested the change to return 0 on write attempts. Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson Tested-by: Jan Kratochvil Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky --- arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) (limited to 'arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c') diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c index 2815bfe348a6..c8b08289eb87 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ static unsigned long __peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr) */ tmp = (addr_t) task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { + /* + * prevent reads of padding hole between + * orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. + */ + tmp = 0; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) { /* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure @@ -270,6 +277,13 @@ static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data) */ task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 = data; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { + /* + * prevent writes of padding hole between + * orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. + */ + return 0; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs + 1)) { /* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure @@ -428,6 +442,13 @@ static u32 __peek_user_compat(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr) */ tmp = *(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4); + } else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) { + /* + * prevent reads of padding hole between + * orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. + */ + tmp = 0; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) { /* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure @@ -514,6 +535,13 @@ static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child, */ *(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) { + /* + * prevent writess of padding hole between + * orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. + */ + return 0; + } else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) { /* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure -- cgit v1.2.1