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* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds2014-06-121-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov. 2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J Benniston. 3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn Mork. 4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez. 5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel Borkmann. 6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee. 7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia. 8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy. 9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli. 10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu. 11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses, from Lorenzo Colitti. 12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal Cardwell. 13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman. 14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru. 15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich. 16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits) rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0 tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery net: fec: Add software TSO support net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number net: fec: Factorize feature setting net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem net/core: Add VF link state control policy net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving ...
| * audit: add netlink audit protocol bind to check capabilities on multicast joinRichard Guy Briggs2014-04-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-06-101-2/+2
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn: "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi" * 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security: ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages. Warning in scanf string typing Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3 security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr bugfix patch for SMACK Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme() Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount' smack: fix key permission verification KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
| * selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.Stephen Smalley2014-06-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode. Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2014-03-252-2/+3
|\ \ | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt net/core/netpoll.c The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'. In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov2014-03-102-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | flowcache: Make flow cache name space awareFan Du2014-02-121-2/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation. Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should also be made in per net style. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-01-211-1/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux (and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning) tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1 ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common() ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init() ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init() ...
| * selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore2013-12-091-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: Update policy version to support constraints infoRichard Haines2013-11-191-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the policy version (POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) to allow holding of policy source info for constraints. Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * Merge tag 'v3.12'Paul Moore2013-11-082-14/+11
| |\ | | | | | | | | | Linux 3.12
* | | SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt2014-01-121-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore2013-12-121-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | | Merge tag 'v3.12'Paul Moore2013-11-262-14/+11
|\ \ \ | |/ / |/| / | |/ Linux 3.12
| * selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from avc_audit()Linus Torvalds2013-10-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Now avc_audit() has no more users with that parameter. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * selinux: avc_has_perm_flags has no more usersLinus Torvalds2013-10-041-11/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | .. so get rid of it. The only indirect users were all the avc_has_perm() callers which just expanded to have a zero flags argument. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * net: split rt_genid for ipv4 and ipv6fan.du2013-07-311-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current net name space has only one genid for both IPv4 and IPv6, it has below drawbacks: - Add/delete an IPv4 address will invalidate all IPv6 routing table entries. - Insert/remove XFRM policy will also invalidate both IPv4/IPv6 routing table entries even when the policy is only applied for one address family. Thus, this patch attempt to split one genid for two to cater for IPv4 and IPv6 separately in a fine granularity. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinuxPaul Moore2013-09-183-33/+29
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts() between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use() simplification patch.
| * Revert "SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag"Eric Paris2013-08-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 308ab70c465d97cf7e3168961dfd365535de21a6. It breaks my FC6 test box. /dev/pts is not mounted. dmesg says SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings for (dev devpts, type devpts) Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.Chris PeBenito2013-07-251-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules were maliciously flushed. Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or labeled IPSEC configuration. Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct. The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel change fell on the floor. Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: pass a superblock to security_fs_useEric Paris2013-07-251-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to reuse on some other OS) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flagEric Paris2013-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option just handle it like the mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: change sbsec->behavior to shortEric Paris2013-07-252-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that packs nicely. This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little bit. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: renumber the superblock optionsEric Paris2013-07-252-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just to make it clear that we have mount time options and flags, separate them. Since I decided to move the non-mount options above above 0x10, we need a short instead of a char. (x86 padding says this takes up no additional space as we have a 3byte whole in the structure) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: rename SE_SBLABELSUPP to SBLABEL_MNTEric Paris2013-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Just a flag rename as we prepare to make it not so special. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid()Paul Moore2013-07-251-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the error code up to the caller. Also check the return values in the only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: cleanup the XFRM headerPaul Moore2013-07-251-14/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the unused get_sock_isec() function and do some formatting fixes. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()Paul Moore2013-07-251-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some basic simplification and comment reformatting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementationPaul Moore2013-07-251-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel: * xfrm_state_alloc * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux code; no other LSMs are affected. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | SELinux: Add new labeling type native labelsDavid Quigley2013-06-081-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There currently doesn't exist a labeling type that is adequate for use with labeled NFS. Since NFS doesn't really support xattrs we can't use the use xattr labeling behavior. For this we developed a new labeling type. The native labeling type is used solely by NFS to ensure NFS inodes are labeled at runtime by the NFS code instead of relying on the SELinux security server on the client end. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com> Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devicesPaul Moore2013-01-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause the tun device to lose its SELinux label. We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g. SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook, security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE. The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* selinux: add the "attach_queue" permission to the "tun_socket" classPaul Moore2013-01-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new permission to align with the new TUN multiqueue support, "tun_socket:attach_queue". The corresponding SELinux reference policy patch is show below: diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors index 28802c5..a0664a1 100644 --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors @@ -827,6 +827,9 @@ class kernel_service class tun_socket inherits socket +{ + attach_queue +} class x_pointer inherits x_device Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* xfrm: invalidate dst on policy insertion/deletionNicolas Dichtel2012-09-181-0/+1
| | | | | | | When a policy is inserted or deleted, all dst should be recalculated. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge branch 'for-linus-2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-07-231-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro: "This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there: - the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open intents. The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is ->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing everything via its fields. Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0 on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink found on server, etc.). See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile: ->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag. With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle, declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c itself. [me, miklos, hch] - The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have __fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep in call stack. That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there. Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore. There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace. For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there might be more. There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's __fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last cycle] - sync series from Jan - large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand, those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread calling it. - preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells). - assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual. This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes, so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too. Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one - it's large enough as it is..." * 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits) ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file() btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file() switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open() zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode tidy up namei.c a bit unobfuscate follow_up() a bit ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size() ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback ...
| * switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itselfAl Viro2012-07-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-07-181-1/+3
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull SELinux regression fixes from James Morris. Andrew Morton has a box that hit that open perms problem. I also renamed the "epollwakeup" selinux name for the new capability to be "block_suspend", to match the rename done by commit d9914cf66181 ("PM: Rename CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP to CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND"). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: SELinux: do not check open perms if they are not known to policy SELinux: include definition of new capabilities
| * SELinux: include definition of new capabilitiesEric Paris2012-07-161-1/+3
|/ | | | | | | | The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP. We need to define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callbackWanlong Gao2012-04-091-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations. So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao <gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-091-8/+1
| | | | | | | | We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we currently have as "data". Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: remove auditdeny from selinux_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-091-8/+1
| | | | | | It's just takin' up space. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permissionEric Paris2012-04-091-5/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data. Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(), avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving measurable time in a hot path. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: add default_type statementsEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/rangeEric Paris2012-04-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* SELinux: do not allocate stack space for AVC data unless neededEric Paris2012-04-031-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it. We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare it there. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* SELinux: remove avd from selinux_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-031-1/+0
| | | | | | | We do not use it. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_dataEric Paris2012-04-031-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.hDavid Howells2012-03-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing it. Performed with the following command: perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *` Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* SELinux: selinux/xfrm.h needs net/flow.hDavid Howells2012-03-261-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | selinux/xfrm.h needs to #include net/flow.h or else suffer: In file included from security/selinux/ss/services.c:69:0: security/selinux/include/xfrm.h: In function 'selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload': security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: error: 'flow_cache_genid' undeclared (first use in this function) security/selinux/include/xfrm.h:53:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server codeJames Morris2011-09-091-0/+6
| | | | | | Fix several sparse warnings in the SELinux security server code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink codeJames Morris2011-09-091-0/+3
| | | | | | Fix sparse warnings in SELinux Netlink code. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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