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| * | | | selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov2014-03-101-6/+7
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2014-01-211-6/+1
| |\ \ \ | | |_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux (and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits) SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning) tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1 ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common() ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init() ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init() ...
| * | | SELinux: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in selinux_inode_permission()Steven Rostedt2014-01-121-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit this bug: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20 Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006 task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000 RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54 R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Call Trace: security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30 __inode_permission+0x41/0xa0 inode_permission+0x18/0x50 link_path_walk+0x66/0x920 path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0 do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0 do_sys_open+0x146/0x240 SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160 CR2: 0000000000000020 Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the dereference of it caused the oops. in selinux_inode_permission(): isec = inode->i_security; rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder to hit. What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted. As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock(). The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the permission check). Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | | selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loadedPaul Moore2014-03-191-9/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes the problem below: "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry() on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does: /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { if (opt_dentry) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...) rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry, isec->sclass, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; isec->sid = sid; } } Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid() and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock. I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..." On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in /proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were accessed early in the boot), for example: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax However, with this patch in place we see the expected result: # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }' system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | | selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controlsPaul Moore2014-03-191-12/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO). Example: # cat mmap_test.c #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <sys/mman.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int rc; void *mem; mem = mmap(0x0, 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); if (mem == MAP_FAILED) return errno; printf("mem = %p\n", mem); munmap(mem, 4096); return 0; } # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c # ./mmap_test mem = (nil) # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero } for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test" scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=memprotect This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* | | | security: replace strict_strto*() with kstrto*()Jingoo Han2014-02-061-2/+2
| |/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be used. Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* | | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into nextJames Morris2014-01-071-6/+1
|\ \ \ | |/ / |/| / | |/ | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Resolved using request struct. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov2013-12-161-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * SELinux: remove duplicated include from hooks.cWei Yongjun2013-12-161-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove duplicated include. Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: revert 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260Paul Moore2013-12-131-22/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies" This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260. Explanation from Eric Paris: SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount command, they will deadlock. I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the rule in question. The code is useless. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson2013-12-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore2013-12-101-7/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_ip_postroute() Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore2013-12-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: pull address family directly from the request_sock structPaul Moore2013-12-041-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the request_sock directly. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore2013-12-041-15/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore2013-12-041-2/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| * Merge tag 'v3.12'Paul Moore2013-11-081-19/+13
| |\ | | | | | | | | | Linux 3.12
* | | selinux: selinux_setprocattr()->ptrace_parent() needs rcu_read_lock()Oleg Nesterov2013-12-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p), but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace, this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage" warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check(). And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable() doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access the ->parent. Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | | selinux: fix broken peer recv checkChad Hanson2013-12-231-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is ignored. Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-12-151-25/+112
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris. * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute() selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute() selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output() selinux: fix possible memory leak
| * \ \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux_fixes ↵James Morris2013-12-131-25/+112
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into for-linus
| | * | | selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in ↵Paul Moore2013-12-121-7/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | selinux_ip_postroute() Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packetsPaul Moore2013-12-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security labels. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()Paul Moore2013-12-121-15/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock, not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that originally labeled the associated request_sock. See the inline comments for more explanation. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()Paul Moore2013-12-121-2/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval socket represented by the request_sock struct. Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet. It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about information leaks. Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
| | * | | Merge tag 'v3.12'Paul Moore2013-11-261-19/+13
| | |\ \ \ | | | |/ / | | |/| / | | | |/ Linux 3.12
* | | | Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"Linus Torvalds2013-12-151-22/+18
|/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 102aefdda4d8275ce7d7100bc16c88c74272b260. Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965 and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in the rawhide kernel fixes the problem. Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more. Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com> Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge branch 'for-linus2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2013-11-211-52/+94
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore taking over as maintainer of that code. Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor" and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling, here's the explanation from David Howells on that: "Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can do that too. (1) Keyring capacity expansion. KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access KEYS: Introduce a search context structure KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID Add a generic associative array implementation. KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page. Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to the cause. Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node struct into the key struct for this purpose. I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code. I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree. So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to the target key. I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it also. FS-Cache might, for example. (2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'. KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the addition or linkage of trusted keys. Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can thus be added into the master keyring. Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also. (3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature. X.509: Remove certificate date checks It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is loaded - so just remove those checks. (4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel. KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509" into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section. (5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings. KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs. We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more easily. To make this work, two things were needed: (a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them. The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out happens), so neither of these places is suitable. I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos tokens it held are then also gc'd. (b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size). The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer" * 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits) KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent() KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL() KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate() KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain() apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting Smack: Ptrace access check mode ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template ...
| * \ \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into ↵James Morris2013-10-221-52/+94
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | | | | | | | | ra-next
| | * | Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinuxPaul Moore2013-09-181-52/+94
| | |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts() between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use() simplification patch.
| | | * | Revert "SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flag"Eric Paris2013-08-281-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 308ab70c465d97cf7e3168961dfd365535de21a6. It breaks my FC6 test box. /dev/pts is not mounted. dmesg says SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings for (dev devpts, type devpts) Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policiesAnand Avati2013-08-281-18/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Not considering sub filesystem has the following limitation. Support for SELinux in FUSE is dependent on the particular userspace filesystem, which is identified by the subtype. For e.g, GlusterFS, a FUSE based filesystem supports SELinux (by mounting and processing FUSE requests in different threads, avoiding the mount time deadlock), whereas other FUSE based filesystems (identified by a different subtype) have the mount time deadlock. By considering the subtype of the filesytem in the SELinux policies, allows us to specify a filesystem subtype, in the following way: fs_use_xattr fuse.glusterfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); This way not all FUSE filesystems are put in the same bucket and subjected to the limitations of the other subtypes. Signed-off-by: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | Add SELinux policy capability for always checking packet and peer classes.Chris PeBenito2013-07-251-5/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules were maliciously flushed. Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or labeled IPSEC configuration. Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct. The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel change fell on the floor. Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: use a helper function to determine seclabelEric Paris2013-07-251-14/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use a helper to determine if a superblock should have the seclabel flag rather than doing it in the function. I'm going to use this in the security server as well. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: pass a superblock to security_fs_useEric Paris2013-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to reuse on some other OS) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: do not handle seclabel as a special flagEric Paris2013-07-251-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option just handle it like the mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: do all flags twiddling in one placeEric Paris2013-07-251-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently we set the initialize and seclabel flag in one place. Do some unrelated printk then we unset the seclabel flag. Eww. Instead do the flag twiddling in one place in the code not seperated by unrelated printk. Also don't set and unset the seclabel flag. Only set it if we need to. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: rename SE_SBLABELSUPP to SBLABEL_MNTEric Paris2013-07-251-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just a flag rename as we prepare to make it not so special. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: use define for number of bits in the mnt flags maskEric Paris2013-07-251-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We had this random hard coded value of '8' in the code (I put it there) for the number of bits to check for mount options. This is stupid. Instead use the #define we already have which tells us the number of mount options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: make it harder to get the number of mnt opts wrongEric Paris2013-07-251-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of just hard coding a value, use the enum to out benefit. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: remove crazy contortions around procEric Paris2013-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We check if the fsname is proc and if so set the proc superblock security struct flag. We then check if the flag is set and use the string 'proc' for the fsname instead of just using the fsname. What's the point? It's always proc... Get rid of the useless conditional. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | SELinux: Enable setting security contexts on rootfs inodes.Stephen Smalley2013-07-251-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rootfs (ramfs) can support setting of security contexts by userspace due to the vfs fallback behavior of calling the security module to set the in-core inode state for security.* attributes when the filesystem does not provide an xattr handler. No xattr handler required as the inodes are pinned in memory and have no backing store. This is useful in allowing early userspace to label individual files within a rootfs while still providing a policy-defined default via genfs. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | selinux: remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid()Paul Moore2013-07-251-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the error code up to the caller. Also check the return values in the only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(). Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | | * | lsm: split the xfrm_state_alloc_security() hook implementationPaul Moore2013-07-251-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel: * xfrm_state_alloc * xfrm_state_alloc_acquire Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux code; no other LSMs are affected. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* | | | | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2013-10-231-8/+7
|\ \ \ \ \ | | |_|_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c include/net/dst.h Trivial merge conflicts, both were overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | | selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from avc_audit()Linus Torvalds2013-10-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now avc_audit() has no more users with that parameter. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * | | | selinux: remove 'flags' parameter from inode_has_permLinus Torvalds2013-10-041-7/+6
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Every single user passes in '0'. I think we had non-zero users back in some stone age when selinux_inode_permission() was implemented in terms of inode_has_perm(), but that complicated case got split up into a totally separate code-path so that we could optimize the much simpler special cases. See commit 2e33405785d3 ("SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permission") for example. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | | netfilter: pass hook ops to hookfnPatrick McHardy2013-10-141-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass the hook ops to the hookfn to allow for generic hook functions. This change is required by nf_tables. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
* | | | net ipv4: Convert ipv4.ip_local_port_range to be per netns v3Eric W. Biederman2013-09-301-1/+1
|/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Move sysctl_local_ports from a global variable into struct netns_ipv4. - Modify inet_get_local_port_range to take a struct net, and update all of the callers. - Move the initialization of sysctl_local_ports into sysctl_net_ipv4.c:ipv4_sysctl_init_net from inet_connection_sock.c v2: - Ensure indentation used tabs - Fixed ip.h so it applies cleanly to todays net-next v3: - Compile fixes of strange callers of inet_get_local_port_range. This patch now successfully passes an allmodconfig build. Removed manual inlining of inet_get_local_port_range in ipv4_local_port_range Originally-by: Samya <samya@twitter.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | xattr: Constify ->name member of "struct xattr".Tetsuo Handa2013-07-251-11/+6
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"->name but nobody modifies "struct xattr"->name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure checking by constifying ->name member of "struct xattr". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> [ocfs2] Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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