| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
bonding: wrap slave state work
net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
be2net: Bump up the version number
be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
xen network backend driver
bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
netxen: support for GbE port settings
...
Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.
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I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi
structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes
first, much like struct sock_common.
This is the first step to move in that direction.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
...
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The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove
options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining
options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the
SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls
into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed
to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where
this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will
print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using
xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and
ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called
and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means
and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop
# mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp
/dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0
# mount -o remount /mnt/tmp
mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option
# dmesg
EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value
This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call
through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file
system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more.
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based
security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits)
posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls
hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer()
hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation
hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly
timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface
timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base
time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep
time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime
hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids
ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check
mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update()
posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks
posix-timers: Cleanup namespace
posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks
x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86
posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning.
time: Splitout compat timex accessors
ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit
time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset
posix-timer: Update comment
...
Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
(name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some
due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in:
kernel/time.c
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Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const'
attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the
missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions
implementing these calls.
Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at>
Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin
* 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits)
fs: scale mntget/mntput
fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers
fs: implement faster dentry memcmp
fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup
fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems
fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking
fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking
bit_spinlock: add required includes
kernel: add bl_list
xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation
fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation
fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops
fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method
fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk
fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path
fs: dcache remove d_mounted
fs: fs_struct use seqlock
fs: rcu-walk for path lookup
...
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Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the
ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current
algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk.
This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element,
significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline
bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability.
The overall design is like this:
* LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk.
* Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring
of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are
not required for dentry persistence.
* synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can
access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk.
* Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt
refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount
lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and
down the path.
* Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode,
so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its
members have changed.
* Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent
sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent
during the path walk.
* inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for
limited things.
* i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk.
* i_op can be loaded.
When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence,
and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks
are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does
not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the
lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the
path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk.
Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted
where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take
a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if
we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup
using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk
for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to
gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root).
The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are:
* NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element)
* parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs
* dentries with d_revalidate
* Following links
In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It
may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware.
Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the
very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
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unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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* ima-memory-use-fixes:
IMA: fix the ToMToU logic
IMA: explicit IMA i_flag to remove global lock on inode_delete
IMA: drop refcnt from ima_iint_cache since it isn't needed
IMA: only allocate iint when needed
IMA: move read counter into struct inode
IMA: use i_writecount rather than a private counter
IMA: use inode->i_lock to protect read and write counters
IMA: convert internal flags from long to char
IMA: use unsigned int instead of long for counters
IMA: drop the inode opencount since it isn't needed for operation
IMA: use rbtree instead of radix tree for inode information cache
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IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about
every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of
readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that
information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct
this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed.
Thus greatly reducing memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module").
If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0
unless overridden via boot time parameter.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:
unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall
rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit
rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit
rlimits: add rlimit64 structure
rlimits: do security check under task_lock
rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks
rlimits: split sys_setrlimit
rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock
rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit
rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit
Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify
system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4
along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
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Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set
rlimit of task other than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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* 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits)
fanotify: use both marks when possible
fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark
fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously
fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing
fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists
fsnotify: remove group->mask
fsnotify: remove the global masks
fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event
fanotify: use the mark in handler functions
audit: use the mark in handler functions
dnotify: use the mark in handler functions
inotify: use the mark in handler functions
fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions
fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements
fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks
fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called
fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal
fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address
vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput
fsnotify: store struct file not struct path
...
Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
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introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the
security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access
control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the
generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks
to be in any way useful.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
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When commit be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d "introduce new LSM hooks
where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),
only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.
But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.
Thus, let's remove these arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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register_security() became __init function.
So do verify() and security_fixup_ops().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Unused hook. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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on runtime
LSM framework doesn't allow to load a security module on runtime, it must be loaded on boot time.
but in security/security.c:
int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
{
...
if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
return -EAGAIN;
...
}
if security_ops == &default_security_ops, it can access to register a security module. If selinux is enabled,
other security modules can't register, but if selinux is disabled on boot time, the security_ops was set to
default_security_ops, LSM allows other kernel modules to use register_security() to register a not trust
security module. For example:
disable selinux on boot time(selinux=0).
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/version.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("wzt");
extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
int (*new_register_security)(struct security_operations *ops);
int rootkit_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
struct security_operations rootkit_ops = {
.bprm_check_security = rootkit_bprm_check_security,
};
static int rootkit_init(void)
{
printk("Load LSM rootkit module.\n");
/* cat /proc/kallsyms | grep register_security */
new_register_security = 0xc0756689;
if (new_register_security(&rootkit_ops)) {
printk("Can't register rootkit module.\n");
return 0;
}
printk("Register rootkit module ok.\n");
return 0;
}
static void rootkit_exit(void)
{
printk("Unload LSM rootkit module.\n");
}
module_init(rootkit_init);
module_exit(rootkit_exit);
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security
module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and
default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops
and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as
a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by
SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy),
but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only
remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer
value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config.
Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can
just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available.
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Currently, the getsecurity and setsecurity operations return zero for
kernel private inodes, where xattrs are not available directly to
userspace.
This confuses some applications, and does not conform to the
man page for getxattr(2) etc., which state that these syscalls
should return ENOTSUP if xattrs are not supported or disabled.
Note that in the listsecurity case, we still need to return zero
as we don't know which other xattr handlers may be active.
For discussion of userland confusion, see:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg17988.html
This patch corrects the error returns so that ENOTSUP is reported
to userspace as required.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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include/linux/security.h and security/capability.c are using "struct path *dir"
but security/security.c was using "struct path *path" by error.
This patch renames "struct path *path" to "struct path *dir".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Hooks: Just Say No.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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