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* security: follow rename pack_hex_byte() to hex_byte_pack()Andy Shevchenko2011-10-312-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | There is no functional change. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Cross Memory AttachChristopher Yeoh2011-10-312-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The basic idea behind cross memory attach is to allow MPI programs doing intra-node communication to do a single copy of the message rather than a double copy of the message via shared memory. The following patch attempts to achieve this by allowing a destination process, given an address and size from a source process, to copy memory directly from the source process into its own address space via a system call. There is also a symmetrical ability to copy from the current process's address space into a destination process's address space. - Use of /proc/pid/mem has been considered, but there are issues with using it: - Does not allow for specifying iovecs for both src and dest, assuming preadv or pwritev was implemented either the area read from or written to would need to be contiguous. - Currently mem_read allows only processes who are currently ptrace'ing the target and are still able to ptrace the target to read from the target. This check could possibly be moved to the open call, but its not clear exactly what race this restriction is stopping (reason appears to have been lost) - Having to send the fd of /proc/self/mem via SCM_RIGHTS on unix domain socket is a bit ugly from a userspace point of view, especially when you may have hundreds if not (eventually) thousands of processes that all need to do this with each other - Doesn't allow for some future use of the interface we would like to consider adding in the future (see below) - Interestingly reading from /proc/pid/mem currently actually involves two copies! (But this could be fixed pretty easily) As mentioned previously use of vmsplice instead was considered, but has problems. Since you need the reader and writer working co-operatively if the pipe is not drained then you block. Which requires some wrapping to do non blocking on the send side or polling on the receive. In all to all communication it requires ordering otherwise you can deadlock. And in the example of many MPI tasks writing to one MPI task vmsplice serialises the copying. There are some cases of MPI collectives where even a single copy interface does not get us the performance gain we could. For example in an MPI_Reduce rather than copy the data from the source we would like to instead use it directly in a mathops (say the reduce is doing a sum) as this would save us doing a copy. We don't need to keep a copy of the data from the source. I haven't implemented this, but I think this interface could in the future do all this through the use of the flags - eg could specify the math operation and type and the kernel rather than just copying the data would apply the specified operation between the source and destination and store it in the destination. Although we don't have a "second user" of the interface (though I've had some nibbles from people who may be interested in using it for intra process messaging which is not MPI). This interface is something which hardware vendors are already doing for their custom drivers to implement fast local communication. And so in addition to this being useful for OpenMPI it would mean the driver maintainers don't have to fix things up when the mm changes. There was some discussion about how much faster a true zero copy would go. Here's a link back to the email with some testing I did on that: http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=130105930902915&w=2 There is a basic man page for the proposed interface here: http://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/process_vm_readv.txt This has been implemented for x86 and powerpc, other architecture should mainly (I think) just need to add syscall numbers for the process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev. There are 32 bit compatibility versions for 64-bit kernels. For arch maintainers there are some simple tests to be able to quickly verify that the syscalls are working correctly here: http://ozlabs.org/~cyeoh/cma/cma-test-20110718.tgz Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* encrypted-keys: check hex2bin resultMimi Zohar2011-09-201-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | For each hex2bin call in encrypted keys, check that the ascii hex string is valid. On failure, return -EINVAL. Changelog v1: - hex2bin now returns an int Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
* trusted-keys: check hex2bin resultMimi Zohar2011-09-201-4/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | For each hex2bin call in trusted keys, check that the ascii hex string is valid. On failure, return -EINVAL. Changelog v1: - hex2bin now returns an int Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
* encrypted-keys: IS_ERR need include/err.hStephen Rothwell2011-09-151-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Fixes this build error: security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c: In function 'request_trusted_key': security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c:35:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'IS_ERR' Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* encrypted-keys: remove trusted-keys dependencyMimi Zohar2011-09-144-27/+64
| | | | | | | | Encrypted keys are decrypted/encrypted using either a trusted-key or, for those systems without a TPM, a user-defined key. This patch removes the trusted-keys and TCG_TPM dependencies. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* encrypted-keys: create encrypted-keys directoryMimi Zohar2011-09-146-1/+6
| | | | | | Move all files associated with encrypted keys to keys/encrypted-keys. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
* KEYS: Correctly destroy key payloads when their keytype is removedDavid Howells2011-08-233-208/+258
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | unregister_key_type() has code to mark a key as dead and make it unavailable in one loop and then destroy all those unavailable key payloads in the next loop. However, the loop to mark keys dead renders the key undetectable to the second loop by changing the key type pointer also. Fix this by the following means: (1) The key code has two garbage collectors: one deletes unreferenced keys and the other alters keyrings to delete links to old dead, revoked and expired keys. They can end up holding each other up as both want to scan the key serial tree under spinlock. Combine these into a single routine. (2) Move the dead key marking, dead link removal and dead key removal into the garbage collector as a three phase process running over the three cycles of the normal garbage collection procedure. This is tracked by the KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1, _2 and _3 state flags. unregister_key_type() then just unlinks the key type from the list, wakes up the garbage collector and waits for the third phase to complete. (3) Downgrade the key types sem in unregister_key_type() once it has deleted the key type from the list so that it doesn't block the keyctl() syscall. (4) Dead keys that cannot be simply removed in the third phase have their payloads destroyed with the key's semaphore write-locked to prevent interference by the keyctl() syscall. There should be no in-kernel users of dead keys of that type by the point of unregistration, though keyctl() may be holding a reference. (5) Only perform timer recalculation in the GC if the timer actually expired. If it didn't, we'll get another cycle when it goes off - and if the key that actually triggered it has been removed, it's not a problem. (6) Only garbage collect link if the timer expired or if we're doing dead key clean up phase 2. (7) As only key_garbage_collector() is permitted to use rb_erase() on the key serial tree, it doesn't need to revalidate its cursor after dropping the spinlock as the node the cursor points to must still exist in the tree. (8) Drop the spinlock in the GC if there is contention on it or if we need to reschedule. After dealing with that, get the spinlock again and resume scanning. This has been tested in the following ways: (1) Run the keyutils testsuite against it. (2) Using the AF_RXRPC and RxKAD modules to test keytype removal: Load the rxrpc_s key type: # insmod /tmp/af-rxrpc.ko # insmod /tmp/rxkad.ko Create a key (http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/rxrpc/listen.c): # /tmp/listen & [1] 8173 Find the key: # grep rxrpc_s /proc/keys 091086e1 I--Q-- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 rxrpc_s 52:2 Link it to a session keyring, preferably one with a higher serial number: # keyctl link 0x20e36251 @s Kill the process (the key should remain as it's linked to another place): # fg /tmp/listen ^C Remove the key type: rmmod rxkad rmmod af-rxrpc This can be made a more effective test by altering the following part of the patch: if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) { /* Make sure everyone revalidates their keys if we marked a * bunch as being dead and make sure all keyring ex-payloads * are destroyed. */ kdebug("dead sync"); synchronize_rcu(); To call synchronize_rcu() in GC phase 1 instead. That causes that the keyring's old payload content to hang around longer until it's RCU destroyed - which usually happens after GC phase 3 is complete. This allows the destroy_dead_key branch to be tested. Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: The dead key link reaper should be non-reentrantDavid Howells2011-08-231-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | The dead key link reaper should be non-reentrant as it relies on global state to keep track of where it's got to when it returns to the work queue manager to give it some air. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Make the key reaper non-reentrantDavid Howells2011-08-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Make the key reaper non-reentrant by sticking it on the appropriate system work queue when we queue it. This will allow it to have global state and drop locks. It should probably be non-reentrant already as it may spend a long time holding the key serial spinlock, and so multiple entrants can spend long periods of time just sitting there spinning, waiting to get the lock. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Move the unreferenced key reaper to the keys garbage collector fileDavid Howells2011-08-233-76/+85
| | | | | | | | Move the unreferenced key reaper function to the keys garbage collector file as that's a more appropriate place with the dead key link reaper. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: __key_link() should use the RCU deref wrapper for keyring payloadsDavid Howells2011-08-231-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | __key_link() should use the RCU deref wrapper rcu_dereference_locked_keyring() for accessing keyring payloads rather than calling rcu_dereference_protected() directly. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: keyctl_get_keyring_ID() should create a session keyring if create flag setDavid Howells2011-08-231-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The keyctl call: keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1) should create a session keyring if the process doesn't have one of its own because the create flag argument is set - rather than subscribing to and returning the user-session keyring as: keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0) will do. This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and running the following program a couple of times in a row: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { key_serial_t uk, usk, sk, nsk; uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0); usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0); sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0); nsk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1); printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk, nsk); return 0; } Without this patch, I see: keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66 keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66 With this patch, I see: keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 17db2ce3 keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 39f3c73e As can be seen, the session keyring starts off the same as the user-session keyring each time, but with the patch a new session keyring is created when the create flag is set. Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install itDavid Howells2011-08-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it rather than just creating a new one anyway. This was accidentally broken in: commit d84f4f992cbd76e8f39c488cf0c5d123843923b1 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100 Subject: CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials The impact of that commit is that pam_keyinit no longer works correctly if 'force' isn't specified against a login process. This is because: keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0) now always creates a new session keyring and thus the check whether the session keyring and the user-session keyring are the same is always false. This leads pam_keyinit to conclude that a session keyring is installed and it shouldn't be revoked by pam_keyinit here if 'revoke' is specified. Any system that specifies 'force' against pam_keyinit in the PAM configuration files for login methods (login, ssh, su -l, kdm, etc.) is not affected since that bypasses the broken check and forces the creation of a new session keyring anyway (for which the revoke flag is not cleared) - and any subsequent call to pam_keyinit really does have a session keyring already installed, and so the check works correctly there. Reverting to the previous behaviour will cause the kernel to subscribe the process to the user-session keyring as its session keyring if it doesn't have a session keyring of its own. pam_keyinit will detect this and install a new session keyring anyway (and won't clear the revert flag). This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and running the following program a couple of times in a row: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { key_serial_t uk, usk, sk; uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0); usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0); sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0); printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk); return 0; } Without the patch, I see: keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 22825f8e keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 068772be With the patch, I see: keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0 keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0 As can be seen, with the patch, the session keyring is the same as the user-session keyring each time; without the patch a new session keyring is generated each time. Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-07-275-53/+313
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits) tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc. tpm: Fix a typo tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small tpm: Use durations returned from TPM TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL. TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions. TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions. TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions. ... Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c
| * Merge branch 'linus' into nextJames Morris2011-06-301-3/+3
| |\
| * | encrypted-keys: add ecryptfs format supportRoberto Sassu2011-06-274-8/+180
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token structure. This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'. More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | encrypted-keys: add key format supportRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-40/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces a new parameter, called 'format', that defines the format of data stored by encrypted keys. The 'default' format identifies encrypted keys containing only the symmetric key, while other formats can be defined to support additional information. The 'format' parameter is written in the datablob produced by commands 'keyctl print' or 'keyctl pipe' and is integrity protected by the HMAC. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | encrypted-keys: added additional debug messagesRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-11/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some debug messages have been added in the function datablob_parse() in order to better identify errors returned when dealing with 'encrypted' keys. Changelog from version v4: - made the debug messages more understandable Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | encrypted-keys: fixed valid_master_desc() function descriptionRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Valid key type prefixes for the parameter 'key-type' are: 'trusted' and 'user'. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | encrypted_keys: avoid dumping the master key if the request failsRoberto Sassu2011-06-271-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not dump the master key if an error is encountered during the request. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it> Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | KEYS: Don't return EAGAIN to keyctl_assume_authority()David Howells2011-06-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't return EAGAIN to keyctl_assume_authority() to indicate that a key could not be found (ENOKEY is only returned if a negative key is found). Instead return ENOKEY in both cases. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | Merge branch 'master' into for-nextJiri Kosina2011-07-111-3/+3
|\ \ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | Sync with Linus' tree to be able to apply pending patches that are based on newer code already present upstream.
| * | KEYS: Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link()David Howells2011-06-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix error handling in construct_key_and_link(). If construct_alloc_key() returns an error, it shouldn't pass out through the normal path as the key_serial() called by the kleave() statement will oops when it gets an error code in the pointer: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffff84 IP: [<ffffffff8120b401>] request_key_and_link+0x4d7/0x52f .. Call Trace: [<ffffffff8120b52c>] request_key+0x41/0x75 [<ffffffffa00ed6e8>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x206/0x226 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00eb0c9>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x511/0x1234 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9799>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9c02>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x34b/0x40f [cifs] [<ffffffffa00d9e05>] cifs_mount+0x13f/0x504 [cifs] [<ffffffffa00caabb>] cifs_do_mount+0xc4/0x672 [cifs] [<ffffffff8113ae8c>] mount_fs+0x69/0x155 [<ffffffff8114ff0e>] vfs_kern_mount+0x63/0xa0 [<ffffffff81150be2>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xdf [<ffffffff81152278>] do_mount+0x63c/0x69f [<ffffffff8115255c>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2 [<ffffffff814fbdc2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * | KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyringDavid Howells2011-06-171-2/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ____call_usermodehelper() now erases any credentials set by the subprocess_inf::init() function. The problem is that commit 17f60a7da150 ("capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers") creates and commits new credentials with prepare_kernel_cred() after the call to the init() function. This wipes all keyrings after umh_keys_init() is called. The best way to deal with this is to put the init() call just prior to the commit_creds() call, and pass the cred pointer to init(). That means that umh_keys_init() and suchlike can modify the credentials _before_ they are published and potentially in use by the rest of the system. This prevents request_key() from working as it is prevented from passing the session keyring it set up with the authorisation token to /sbin/request-key, and so the latter can't assume the authority to instantiate the key. This causes the in-kernel DNS resolver to fail with ENOKEY unconditionally. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | rcu: treewide: Do not use rcu_read_lock_held when calling rcu_dereference_checkMichal Hocko2011-07-081-1/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | Since ca5ecddf (rcu: define __rcu address space modifier for sparse) rcu_dereference_check use rcu_read_lock_held as a part of condition automatically so callers do not have to do that as well. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* Merge branch 'docs-move' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-05-274-4/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs * 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs: Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
| * Create Documentation/security/,Randy Dunlap2011-05-194-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
* | Set cred->user_ns in key_replace_session_keyringSerge E. Hallyn2011-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since this cred was not created with copy_creds(), it needs to get initialized. Otherwise use of syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT); can lead to a NULL deref. Thanks to Robert for finding this. But introduced by commit 47a150edc2a ("Cache user_ns in struct cred"). Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.39) Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2011-05-248-25/+46
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| * | KEYS: Make request_key() and co. return an error for a negative keyDavid Howells2011-03-171-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make request_key() and co. return an error for a negative or rejected key. If the key was simply negated, then return ENOKEY, otherwise return the error with which it was rejected. Without this patch, the following command returns a key number (with the latest keyutils): [root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request2 user debug:foo rejected @s 586569904 Trying to print the key merely gets you a permission denied error: [root@andromeda ~]# keyctl print 586569904 keyctl_read_alloc: Permission denied Doing another request_key() call does get you the error, as long as it hasn't expired yet: [root@andromeda ~]# keyctl request user debug:foo request_key: Key was rejected by service Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * | KEYS: Improve /proc/keysDavid Howells2011-03-177-25/+40
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Improve /proc/keys by: (1) Don't attempt to summarise the payload of a negated key. It won't have one. To this end, a helper function - key_is_instantiated() has been added that allows the caller to find out whether the key is positively instantiated (as opposed to being uninstantiated or negatively instantiated). (2) Do show keys that are negative, expired or revoked rather than hiding them. This requires an override flag (no_state_check) to be passed to search_my_process_keyrings() and keyring_search_aux() to suppress this check. Without this, keys that are possessed by the caller, but only grant permissions to the caller if possessed are skipped as the possession check fails. Keys that are visible due to user, group or other checks are visible with or without this patch. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security,rcu: convert call_rcu(user_update_rcu_disposal) to kfree_rcu()Lai Jiangshan2011-05-071-14/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | The rcu callback user_update_rcu_disposal() just calls a kfree(), so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(user_update_rcu_disposal). Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
* KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATEDavid Howells2011-03-083-7/+150
| | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl op (KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV) that is like KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE, but takes an iovec array and concatenates the data in-kernel into one buffer. Since the KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE copies the data anyway, this isn't too much of a problem. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error codeDavid Howells2011-03-086-13/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code. This works much the same as negating a key, and so keyctl_negate_key() is made a special case of keyctl_reject_key(). The difference is that keyctl_negate_key() selects ENOKEY as the error to be reported. Typically the key would be rejected with EKEYEXPIRED, EKEYREVOKED or EKEYREJECTED, but this is not mandatory. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vettedDavid Howells2011-03-081-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a key type operation to permit the key type to vet the description of a new key that key_alloc() is about to allocate. The operation may reject the description if it wishes with an error of its choosing. If it does this, the key will not be allocated. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macroDavid Howells2011-03-083-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | Add an RCU payload dereference macro as this seems to be a common piece of code amongst key types that use RCU referenced payloads. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Fix __key_link_end() quota fixup on errorDavid Howells2011-01-264-20/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix __key_link_end()'s attempt to fix up the quota if an error occurs. There are two erroneous cases: Firstly, we always decrease the quota if the preallocated replacement keyring needs cleaning up, irrespective of whether or not we should (we may have replaced a pointer rather than adding another pointer). Secondly, we never clean up the quota if we added a pointer without the keyring storage being extended (we allocate multiple pointers at a time, even if we're not going to use them all immediately). We handle this by setting the bottom bit of the preallocation pointer in __key_link_begin() to indicate that the quota needs fixing up, which is then passed to __key_link() (which clears the whole thing) and __key_link_end(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* trusted keys: Fix a memory leak in trusted_update().Jesper Juhl2011-01-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | One failure path in security/keys/trusted.c::trusted_update() does not free 'new_p' while the others do. This patch makes sure we also free it in the remaining path (if datablob_parse() returns different from Opt_update). Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* encrypted-keys: rename encrypted_defined files to encryptedMimi Zohar2011-01-243-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | Rename encrypted_defined.c and encrypted_defined.h files to encrypted.c and encrypted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* trusted-keys: rename trusted_defined files to trustedMimi Zohar2011-01-243-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Rename trusted_defined.c and trusted_defined.h files to trusted.c and trusted.h, respectively. Based on request from David Howells. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* KEYS: Fix up comments in key management codeDavid Howells2011-01-2111-366/+777
| | | | | | | Fix up comments in the key management code. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* KEYS: Do some style cleanup in the key management code.David Howells2011-01-2110-248/+80
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do a bit of a style clean up in the key management code. No functional changes. Done using: perl -p -i -e 's!^/[*]*/\n!!' security/keys/*.c perl -p -i -e 's!} /[*] end [a-z0-9_]*[(][)] [*]/\n!}\n!' security/keys/*.c sed -i -s -e ": next" -e N -e 's/^\n[}]$/}/' -e t -e P -e 's/^.*\n//' -e "b next" security/keys/*.c To remove /*****/ lines, remove comments on the closing brace of a function to name the function and remove blank lines before the closing brace of a function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* trusted-keys: avoid scattring va_end()Tetsuo Handa2011-01-191-17/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We can avoid scattering va_end() within the va_start(); for (;;) { } va_end(); loop, assuming that crypto_shash_init()/crypto_shash_update() return 0 on success and negative value otherwise. Make TSS_authhmac()/TSS_checkhmac1()/TSS_checkhmac2() similar to TSS_rawhmac() by removing "va_end()/goto" from the loop. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* trusted-keys: check for NULL before using itTetsuo Handa2011-01-191-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | TSS_rawhmac() checks for data != NULL before using it. We should do the same thing for TSS_authhmac(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* trusted-keys: another free memory bugfixTetsuo Handa2011-01-191-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | TSS_rawhmac() forgot to call va_end()/kfree() when data == NULL and forgot to call va_end() when crypto_shash_update() < 0. Fix these bugs by escaping from the loop using "break" (rather than "return"/"goto") in order to make sure that va_end()/kfree() are always called. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* trusted-keys: free memory bugfixMimi Zohar2011-01-141-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add missing kfree(td) in tpm_seal() before the return, freeing td on error paths as well. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2011-01-101-1/+0
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: security/smack/smack_lsm.c Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * KEYS: Don't call up_write() if __key_link_begin() returns an errorDavid Howells2010-12-231-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In construct_alloc_key(), up_write() is called in the error path if __key_link_begin() fails, but this is incorrect as __key_link_begin() only returns with the nominated keyring locked if it returns successfully. Without this patch, you might see the following in dmesg: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] ------------------------------------- mount.cifs/5769 is trying to release lock (&key->sem) at: [<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 3 locks held by mount.cifs/5769: #0: (&type->s_umount_key#41/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81131321>] sget+0x278/0x3e7 #1: (&ret_buf->session_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa0258e59>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x35a/0x443 [cifs] #2: (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81201000>] request_key_and_link+0x10a/0x3fc stack backtrace: Pid: 5769, comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 2.6.37-rc6+ #1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc [<ffffffff81081601>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xca/0xd5 [<ffffffff81083248>] lock_release_non_nested+0xc1/0x263 [<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc [<ffffffff81201159>] ? request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc [<ffffffff81083567>] lock_release+0x17d/0x1a4 [<ffffffff81073f45>] up_write+0x23/0x3b [<ffffffff81201159>] request_key_and_link+0x263/0x3fc [<ffffffffa026fe9e>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x61/0x21f [cifs] [<ffffffff812013c5>] request_key+0x41/0x74 [<ffffffffa027003d>] cifs_get_spnego_key+0x200/0x21f [cifs] [<ffffffffa026e296>] CIFS_SessSetup+0x55d/0x1273 [cifs] [<ffffffffa02589e1>] cifs_setup_session+0x90/0x1ae [cifs] [<ffffffffa0258e7e>] cifs_get_smb_ses+0x37f/0x443 [cifs] [<ffffffffa025a9e3>] cifs_mount+0x1aa1/0x23f3 [cifs] [<ffffffff8111fd94>] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xdb/0x120 [<ffffffffa027002c>] ? cifs_get_spnego_key+0x1ef/0x21f [cifs] [<ffffffffa024cc71>] cifs_do_mount+0x165/0x2b3 [cifs] [<ffffffff81130e72>] vfs_kern_mount+0xaf/0x1dc [<ffffffff81131007>] do_kern_mount+0x4d/0xef [<ffffffff811483b9>] do_mount+0x6f4/0x733 [<ffffffff8114861f>] sys_mount+0x88/0xc2 [<ffffffff8100ac42>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | encrypted-keys: style and other cleanupMimi Zohar2010-12-152-37/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions: - use static const char arrays instead of #define - rename init_sdesc to alloc_sdesc - convert 'unsigned int' definitions to 'size_t' - revert remaining 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int' Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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