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* Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>Jörn Engel2006-06-302-2/+0
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* [XFRM]: unexport xfrm_state_mtuAdrian Bunk2006-06-291-2/+0
| | | | | | | This patch removes the unused EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_mtu). Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.Darrel Goeddel2006-06-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Fix warnings after LSM-IPSEC changes.David S. Miller2006-06-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Assignment used as truth value in xfrm_del_sa() and xfrm_get_policy(). Wrong argument type declared for security_xfrm_state_delete() when SELINUX is disabled. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux AuthorizeCatherine Zhang2006-06-171-7/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] xfrm: Abstract out encapsulation modesHerbert Xu2006-06-172-0/+89
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode. It is meant to represent the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes. By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths. Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and BEET modes. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] xfrm: Undo afinfo lock proliferationHerbert Xu2006-06-172-30/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced down to one each for policy and state respectively. This is based on the observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6. The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look suspicious at first. However, after you realise that nobody ever takes the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :) As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of the corresponding modules. Since neither module can be unloaded at all we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :) Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: Fix "ntohl(ntohs" bugsAlexey Dobriyan2006-05-221-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock useIngo Molnar2006-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at: [<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d [<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22 [<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d [<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32 [<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b [<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad [<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a [<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e [<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7 [<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141 [<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0 [<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46 [<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138 [<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9 [<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413 [<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356 [<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110 [<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d [<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6 [<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1 this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo(). Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_state_afinfo_lock useIngo Molnar2006-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | xfrm_state_afinfo_lock can be read-locked from bh context, so take it in a bh-safe manner in xfrm_state_register_afinfo() and xfrm_state_unregister_afinfo(). Found by the lock validator. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix softirq-unsafe xfrm typemap->lock useIngo Molnar2006-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock() uses must be softirq-safe. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Fix aevent timer.Jamal Hadi Salim2006-04-141-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | Send aevent immediately if we have sent nothing since last timer and this is the first packet. Fixes a corner case when packet threshold is very high, the timer low and a very low packet rate input which is bursty. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Kill unused decap state structureHerbert Xu2006-04-012-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | This patch removes the *_decap_state structures which were previously used to share state between input/post_input. This is no longer needed. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Fix aevent related crashPatrick McHardy2006-03-201-4/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | When xfrm_user isn't loaded xfrm_nl is NULL, which makes IPsec crash because xfrm_aevent_is_on passes the NULL pointer to netlink_has_listeners as socket. A second problem is that the xfrm_nl pointer is not cleared when the socket is releases at module unload time. Protect references of xfrm_nl from outside of xfrm_user by RCU, check that the socket is present in xfrm_aevent_is_on and set it to NULL when unloading xfrm_user. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET] sem2mutex: net/Arjan van de Ven2006-03-202-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] xfrm_user: Kill PAGE_SIZE check in verify_sec_ctx_len()David S. Miller2006-03-201-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | First, it warns when PAGE_SIZE >= 64K because the ctx_len field is 16-bits. Secondly, if there are any real length limitations it can be verified by the security layer security_xfrm_state_alloc() call. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Add some missing exports.David S. Miller2006-03-202-0/+7
| | | | | | To fix the case of modular xfrm_user. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Move xfrm_nl to xfrm_state.c from xfrm_user.cDavid S. Miller2006-03-202-3/+3
| | | | | | | xfrm_user could be modular, and since generic code uses this symbol now... Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Make sure xfrm_replay_timer_handler() is declared early enough.David S. Miller2006-03-201-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - policy expiresJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-203-4/+59
| | | | | | | | This is similar to the SA expire insertion patch - only it inserts expires for SP. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - SA expiresJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-202-7/+40
| | | | | | | | | This patch allows a user to insert SA expires. This is useful to do on an HA backup for the case of byte counts but may not be very useful for the case of time based expiry. Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - acquire insertJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-202-2/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This introduces a feature similar to the one described in RFC 2367: " ... the application needing an SA sends a PF_KEY SADB_ACQUIRE message down to the Key Engine, which then either returns an error or sends a similar SADB_ACQUIRE message up to one or more key management applications capable of creating such SAs. ... ... The third is where an application-layer consumer of security associations (e.g. an OSPFv2 or RIPv2 daemon) needs a security association. Send an SADB_ACQUIRE message from a user process to the kernel. <base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal> The kernel returns an SADB_ACQUIRE message to registered sockets. <base, address(SD), (address(P),) (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal> The user-level consumer waits for an SADB_UPDATE or SADB_ADD message for its particular type, and then can use that association by using SADB_GET messages. " An app such as OSPF could then use ipsec KM to get keys Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - userJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-201-10/+228
| | | | | | | Add xfrm as the user of the core changes Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - core changesJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-202-2/+78
| | | | | | | | This patch provides the core functionality needed for sync events for ipsec. Derived work of Krisztian KOVACS <hidden@balabit.hu> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directlyHerbert Xu2006-02-271-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which we ought to do. However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the checksums without using this post_input stuff at all. The crucial point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered when adjusting checksums. What's more, the checksum adjustment comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums. We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :) When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum is currently unused. All we have to do is to make that the checksum adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures! I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately woven into the sec_path stuff. We can kill them later too. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Eliminate refcounting confusion by creating __xfrm_state_put().Herbert Xu2006-02-232-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | We often just do an atomic_dec(&x->refcnt) on an xfrm_state object because we know there is more than 1 reference remaining and thus we can elide the heavier xfrm_state_put() call. Do this behind an inline function called __xfrm_state_put() so that is more obvious and also to allow us to more cleanly add refcount debugging later. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETFILTER]: Fix bridge netfilter related in xfrm_lookupPatrick McHardy2006-02-231-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The bridge-netfilter code attaches a fake dst_entry with dst->ops == NULL to purely bridged packets. When these packets are SNATed and a policy lookup is done, xfrm_lookup crashes because it tries to dereference dst->ops. Change xfrm_lookup not to dereference dst->ops before checking for the DST_NOXFRM flag and set this flag in the fake dst_entry. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Fix policy double putPatrick McHardy2006-02-191-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The policy is put once immediately and once at the error label, which results in the following Oops: kernel BUG at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:250! invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT [...] CPU: 0 EIP: 0060:[<c028caf7>] Not tainted VLI EFLAGS: 00210246 (2.6.16-rc3 #39) EIP is at __xfrm_policy_destroy+0xf/0x46 eax: d49f2000 ebx: d49f2000 ecx: f74bd880 edx: f74bd280 esi: d49f2000 edi: 00000001 ebp: cd506dcc esp: cd506dc8 ds: 007b es: 007b ss: 0068 Process ssh (pid: 31970, threadinfo=cd506000 task=cfb04a70) Stack: <0>cd506000 cd506e34 c028e92b ebde7280 cd506e58 cd506ec0 f74bd280 00000000 00000214 0000000a 0000000a 00000000 00000002 f7ae6000 00000000 cd506e58 cd506e14 c0299e36 f74bd280 e873fe00 c02943fd cd506ec0 ebde7280 f271f440 Call Trace: [<c0103a44>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xaa/0xb5 [<c0103b75>] show_registers+0x126/0x18c [<c0103e68>] die+0x14e/0x1db [<c02b6809>] do_trap+0x7c/0x96 [<c0104237>] do_invalid_op+0x89/0x93 [<c01035af>] error_code+0x4f/0x54 [<c028e92b>] xfrm_lookup+0x349/0x3c2 [<c02b0b0d>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x317/0x452 [<c0281749>] inet_dgram_connect+0x49/0x54 [<c02404d2>] sys_connect+0x51/0x68 [<c0240928>] sys_socketcall+0x6f/0x166 [<c0102aa1>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Fix strange IPsec freeze.Herbert Xu2006-02-131-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Problem discovered and initial patch by Olaf Kirch: there's a problem with IPsec that has been bugging some of our users for the last couple of kernel revs. Every now and then, IPsec will freeze the machine completely. This is with openswan user land, and with kernels up to and including 2.6.16-rc2. I managed to debug this a little, and what happens is that we end up looping in xfrm_lookup, and never get out. With a bit of debug printks added, I can this happening: ip_route_output_flow calls xfrm_lookup xfrm_find_bundle returns NULL (apparently we're in the middle of negotiating a new SA or something) We therefore call xfrm_tmpl_resolve. This returns EAGAIN We go to sleep, waiting for a policy update. Then we loop back to the top Apparently, the dst_orig that was passed into xfrm_lookup has been dropped from the routing table (obsolete=2) This leads to the endless loop, because we now create a new bundle, check the new bundle and find it's stale (stale_bundle -> xfrm_bundle_ok -> dst_check() return 0) People have been testing with the patch below, which seems to fix the problem partially. They still see connection hangs however (things only clear up when they start a new ping or new ssh). So the patch is obvsiouly not sufficient, and something else seems to go wrong. I'm grateful for any hints you may have... I suggest that we simply bail out always. If the dst decides to die on us later on, the packet will be dropped anyway. So there is no great urgency to retry here. Once we have the proper resolution queueing, we can then do the retry again. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Olaf Kirch <okir@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] remove bogus asm/bug.h includes.Al Viro2006-02-071-1/+0
| | | | | | | A bunch of asm/bug.h includes are both not needed (since it will get pulled anyway) and bogus (since they are done too early). Removed. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"Kris Katterjohn2006-01-092-8/+4
| | | | | | | This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);" Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETFILTER]: Handle NAT in IPsec policy checksPatrick McHardy2006-01-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | Handle NAT of decapsulated IPsec packets by reconstructing the struct flowi of the original packet from the conntrack information for IPsec policy checks. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETFILTER]: Fix xfrm lookup in ip_route_me_harder/ip6_route_me_harderPatrick McHardy2006-01-071-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ip_route_me_harder doesn't use the port numbers of the xfrm lookup and uses ip_route_input for non-local addresses which doesn't do a xfrm lookup, ip6_route_me_harder doesn't do a xfrm lookup at all. Use xfrm_decode_session and do the lookup manually, make sure both only do the lookup if the packet hasn't been transformed already. Makeing sure the lookup only happens once needs a new field in the IP6CB, which exceeds the size of skb->cb. The size of skb->cb is increased to 48b. Apparently the IPv6 mobile extensions need some more room anyway. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Corrections to LSM-IPSec NethooksTrent Jaeger2006-01-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains two corrections to the LSM-IPsec Nethooks patches previously applied. (1) free a security context on a failed insert via xfrm_user interface in xfrm_add_policy. Memory leak. (2) change the authorization of the allocation of a security context in a xfrm_policy or xfrm_state from both relabelfrom and relabelto to setcontext. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.Trent Jaeger2006-01-033-44/+201
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Fix policy updates missed by socketsDavid S. Miller2005-12-221-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The problem is that when new policies are inserted, sockets do not see the update (but all new route lookups do). This bug is related to the SA insertion stale route issue solved recently, and this policy visibility problem can be fixed in a similar way. The fix is to flush out the bundles of all policies deeper than the policy being inserted. Consider beginning state of "outgoing" direction policy list: policy A --> policy B --> policy C --> policy D First, realize that inserting a policy into a list only potentially changes IPSEC routes for that direction. Therefore we need not bother considering the policies for other directions. We need only consider the existing policies in the list we are doing the inserting. Consider new policy "B'", inserted after B. policy A --> policy B --> policy B' --> policy C --> policy D Two rules: 1) If policy A or policy B matched before the insertion, they appear before B' and thus would still match after inserting B' 2) Policy C and D, now "shadowed" and after policy B', potentially contain stale routes because policy B' might be selected instead of them. Therefore we only need flush routes assosciated with policies appearing after a newly inserted policy, if any. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Perform SA switchover immediately.David S. Miller2005-12-192-5/+19
| | | | | | | | | When we insert a new xfrm_state which potentially subsumes an existing one, make sure all cached bundles are flushed so that the new SA is used immediately. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Use generic netlink receive queue processorThomas Graf2005-11-101-56/+5
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Make netlink_callback->done() optionalThomas Graf2005-11-101-7/+1
| | | | | | | | Most netlink families make no use of the done() callback, making it optional gets rid of all unnecessary dummy implementations. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: kfree cleanupJesper Juhl2005-11-081-8/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch. Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/. Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br> Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
* [IPSEC]: Kill obsolete get_mss functionHerbert Xu2005-10-262-43/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we've switched over to storing MTUs in the xfrm_dst entries, we no longer need the dst's get_mss methods. This patch gets rid of them. It also documents the fact that our MTU calculation is not optimal for ESP. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
* [PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1Al Viro2005-10-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t; - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with typedef) and documents what's going on far better. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [IPSEC]: Document that policy direction is derived from the index.Herbert Xu2005-10-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Here is a patch that adds a helper called xfrm_policy_id2dir to document the fact that the policy direction can be and is derived from the index. This is based on a patch by YOSHIFUJI Hideaki and 210313105@suda.edu.cn. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: fix sparse gfp nocast warningsRandy Dunlap2005-10-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Fix implicit nocast warnings in xfrm code: net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:232:47: warning: implicit cast to nocast type Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Always release dst_entry on error in xfrm_lookupPatrick McHardy2005-09-081-4/+4
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: use __read_mostly on kmem_cache_t , DEFINE_SNMP_STAT pointersEric Dumazet2005-08-292-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch puts mostly read only data in the right section (read_mostly), to help sharing of these data between CPUS without memory ping pongs. On one of my production machine, tcp_statistics was sitting in a heavily modified cache line, so *every* SNMP update had to force a reload. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Add "groups" argument to netlink_kernel_createPatrick McHardy2005-08-291-2/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Convert netlink users to use group numbers instead of bitmasksPatrick McHardy2005-08-291-21/+14
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Fix missing dst_groups initializations in netlink_broadcast usersPatrick McHardy2005-08-291-0/+8
| | | | | | | | netlink_broadcast users must initialize NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups to the destination group mask for netlink_recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NETLINK]: Add properly module refcounting for kernel netlink sockets.Harald Welte2005-08-291-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | - Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module - Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink protocol - Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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