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* xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harderAndy Whitcroft2017-03-291-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL replay_windowAndy Whitcroft2017-03-291-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globallyLinus Torvalds2016-12-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* xfrm_user: fix return value from xfrm_user_rcv_msgYi Zhao2016-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It doesn't support to run 32bit 'ip' to set xfrm objdect on 64bit host. But the return value is unknown for user program: ip xfrm policy list RTNETLINK answers: Unknown error 524 Replace ENOTSUPP with EOPNOTSUPP: ip xfrm policy list RTNETLINK answers: Operation not supported Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm_user: propagate sec ctx allocation errorsMathias Krause2016-09-091-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When we fail to attach the security context in xfrm_state_construct() we'll return 0 as error value which, in turn, will wrongly claim success to userland when, in fact, we won't be adding / updating the XFRM state. This is a regression introduced by commit fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl(), attach_sec_ctx(), and attach_one_addr()"). Fix it by propagating the error returned by security_xfrm_state_alloc() in this case. Fixes: fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl()...") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: get rid of another incorrect WARNVegard Nossum2016-07-271-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | During fuzzing I regularly run into this WARN(). According to Herbert Xu, this "certainly shouldn't be a WARN, it probably shouldn't print anything either". Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: get rid of incorrect WARNVegard Nossum2016-07-271-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AFAICT this message is just printed whenever input validation fails. This is a normal failure and we shouldn't be dumping the stack over it. Looks like it was originally a printk that was maybe incorrectly upgraded to a WARN: commit 62db5cfd70b1ef53aa21f144a806fe3b78c84fab Author: stephen hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com> Date: Wed May 12 06:37:06 2010 +0000 xfrm: add severity to printk Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: fix crash in XFRM_MSG_GETSA netlink handlerVegard Nossum2016-07-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If we hit any of the error conditions inside xfrm_dump_sa(), then xfrm_state_walk_init() never gets called. However, we still call xfrm_state_walk_done() from xfrm_dump_sa_done(), which will crash because the state walk was never initialized properly. We can fix this by setting cb->args[0] only after we've processed the first element and checking this before calling xfrm_state_walk_done(). Fixes: d3623099d3 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: align nlattr properly when neededNicolas Dichtel2016-04-231-4/+6
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net/xfrm_user: use in_compat_syscall to deny compat syscallsAndy Lutomirski2016-03-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | The code wants to prevent compat code from receiving messages. Use in_compat_syscall for this. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller2015-10-301-1/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2015-10-30 1) The flow cache is limited by the flow cache limit which depends on the number of cpus and the xfrm garbage collector threshold which is independent of the number of cpus. This leads to the fact that on systems with more than 16 cpus we hit the xfrm garbage collector limit and refuse new allocations, so new flows are dropped. On systems with 16 or less cpus, we hit the flowcache limit. In this case, we shrink the flow cache instead of refusing new flows. We increase the xfrm garbage collector threshold to INT_MAX to get the same behaviour, independent of the number of cpus. 2) Fix some unaligned accesses on sparc systems. From Sowmini Varadhan. 3) Fix some header checks in _decode_session4. We may call pskb_may_pull with a negative value converted to unsigened int from pskb_may_pull. This can lead to incorrect policy lookups. We fix this by a check of the data pointer position before we call pskb_may_pull. 4) Reload skb header pointers after calling pskb_may_pull in _decode_session4 as this may change the pointers into the packet. 5) Add a missing statistic counter on inner mode errors. Please pull or let me know if there are problems. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Fix unaligned access to stats in copy_to_user_state()Sowmini Varadhan2015-10-231-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On sparc, deleting established SAs (e.g., by restarting ipsec) results in unaligned access messages via xfrm_del_sa -> km_state_notify -> xfrm_send_state_notify(). Even though struct xfrm_usersa_info is aligned on 8-byte boundaries, netlink attributes are fundamentally only 4 byte aligned, and this cannot be changed for nla_data() that is passed up to userspace. As a result, the put_unaligned() macro needs to be used to set up potentially unaligned fields such as the xfrm_stats in copy_to_user_state() Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | xfrm: Fix state threshold configuration from userspaceMichael Rossberg2015-09-291-1/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | Allow to change the replay threshold (XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH) and expiry timer (XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH) of a state without having to set other attributes like replay counter and byte lifetime. Changing these other values while traffic flows will break the state. Signed-off-by: Michael Rossberg <michael.rossberg@tu-ilmenau.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* net/xfrm: use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementationAndrzej Hajda2015-08-111-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | The patch was generated using fixed coccinelle semantic patch scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci [1]. [1]: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/2014320 Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: Fix a typoJakub Wilk2015-07-211-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Jakub Wilk <jwilk@jwilk.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* ipsec: Add IV generator information to xfrm_stateHerbert Xu2015-05-281-9/+31
| | | | | | | This patch adds IV generator information to xfrm_state. This is currently obtained from our own list of algorithm descriptions. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* xfrm: Do not parse 32bits compiled xfrm netlink msg on 64bits hostFan Du2015-03-031-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | structure like xfrm_usersa_info or xfrm_userpolicy_info has different sizeof when compiled as 32bits and 64bits due to not appending pack attribute in their definition. This will result in broken SA and SP information when user trying to configure them through netlink interface. Inform user land about this situation instead of keeping silent, the upper test scripts would behave accordingly. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* netlink: make nlmsg_end() and genlmsg_end() voidJohannes Berg2015-01-181-9/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Contrary to common expectations for an "int" return, these functions return only a positive value -- if used correctly they cannot even return 0 because the message header will necessarily be in the skb. This makes the very common pattern of if (genlmsg_end(...) < 0) { ... } be a whole bunch of dead code. Many places also simply do return nlmsg_end(...); and the caller is expected to deal with it. This also commonly (at least for me) causes errors, because it is very common to write if (my_function(...)) /* error condition */ and if my_function() does "return nlmsg_end()" this is of course wrong. Additionally, there's not a single place in the kernel that actually needs the message length returned, and if anyone needs it later then it'll be very easy to just use skb->len there. Remove this, and make the functions void. This removes a bunch of dead code as described above. The patch adds lines because I did - return nlmsg_end(...); + nlmsg_end(...); + return 0; I could have preserved all the function's return values by returning skb->len, but instead I've audited all the places calling the affected functions and found that none cared. A few places actually compared the return value with <= 0 in dump functionality, but that could just be changed to < 0 with no change in behaviour, so I opted for the more efficient version. One instance of the error I've made numerous times now is also present in net/phonet/pn_netlink.c in the route_dumpit() function - it didn't check for <0 or <=0 and thus broke out of the loop every single time. I've preserved this since it will (I think) have caused the messages to userspace to be formatted differently with just a single message for every SKB returned to userspace. It's possible that this isn't needed for the tools that actually use this, but I don't even know what they are so couldn't test that changing this behaviour would be acceptable. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* xfrm: add XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL attribute to SA messagesdingzhi2014-11-031-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | After this commit, the attribute XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL is added when no ESN replay value is defined. Thus sequence number values are always notified to userspace. Signed-off-by: dingzhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Adrien Mazarguil <adrien.mazarguil@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* ipsec: Remove obsolete MAX_AH_AUTH_LENHerbert Xu2014-09-181-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While tracking down the MAX_AH_AUTH_LEN crash in an old kernel I thought that this limit was rather arbitrary and we should just get rid of it. In fact it seems that we've already done all the work needed to remove it apart from actually removing it. This limit was there in order to limit stack usage. Since we've already switched over to allocating scratch space using kmalloc, there is no longer any need to limit the authentication length. This patch kills all references to it, including the BUG_ONs that led me here. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlinkChristophe Gouault2014-09-021-3/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: Fix installation of AH IPsec SAsTobias Brunner2014-06-301-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | The SPI check introduced in ea9884b3acf3311c8a11db67bfab21773f6f82ba was intended for IPComp SAs but actually prevented AH SAs from getting installed (depending on the SPI). Fixes: ea9884b3acf3 ("xfrm: check user specified spi for IPComp") Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2014-06-031-11/+25
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: include/net/inetpeer.h net/ipv6/output_core.c Changes in net were fixing bugs in code removed in net-next. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: fix race between netns cleanup and state expire notificationMichal Kubecek2014-06-031-11/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xfrm_user module registers its pernet init/exit after xfrm itself so that its net exit function xfrm_user_net_exit() is executed before xfrm_net_exit() which calls xfrm_state_fini() to cleanup the SA's (xfrm states). This opens a window between zeroing net->xfrm.nlsk pointer and deleting all xfrm_state instances which may access it (via the timer). If an xfrm state expires in this window, xfrm_exp_state_notify() will pass null pointer as socket to nlmsg_multicast(). As the notifications are called inside rcu_read_lock() block, it is sufficient to retrieve the nlsk socket with rcu_dereference() and check the it for null. Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller2014-05-221-45/+8
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2014-05-22 This is the last ipsec pull request before I leave for a three weeks vacation tomorrow. David, can you please take urgent ipsec patches directly into net/net-next during this time? I'll continue to run the ipsec/ipsec-next trees as soon as I'm back. 1) Simplify the xfrm audit handling, from Tetsuo Handa. 2) Codingstyle cleanup for xfrm_output, from abian Frederick. Please pull or let me know if there are problems. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Remove useless xfrm_audit struct.Tetsuo Handa2014-04-231-30/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit f1370cc4 "xfrm: Remove useless secid field from xfrm_audit." changed "struct xfrm_audit" to have either { audit_get_loginuid(current) / audit_get_sessionid(current) } or { INVALID_UID / -1 } pair. This means that we can represent "struct xfrm_audit" as "bool". This patch replaces "struct xfrm_audit" argument with "bool". Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: Remove useless secid field from xfrm_audit.Tetsuo Handa2014-04-221-21/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It seems to me that commit ab5f5e8b "[XFRM]: xfrm audit calls" is doing something strange at xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(). If secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) != 0, the caller calls audit_log_task_context() which basically does secid != 0 && security_secid_to_secctx(secid) == 0 case except that secid is obtained from current thread's context. Oh, what happens if secid passed to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() was obtained from other thread's context? It might audit current thread's context rather than other thread's context if security_secid_to_secctx() in xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() failed for some reason. Then, are all the caller of xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() passing either secid obtained from current thread's context or secid == 0? It seems to me that they are. If I didn't miss something, we don't need to pass secid to xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo() because audit_log_task_context() will obtain secid from current thread's context. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messagesEric W. Biederman2014-04-241-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2014-03-251-3/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt net/core/netpoll.c The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'. In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callersNikolay Aleksandrov2014-03-101-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct security_operations and to the internal function selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest. The path that needed the gfp argument addition is: security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -> all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -> selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only) Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well. CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org> CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | Merge branch 'master' of ↵David S. Miller2014-03-181-4/+4
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next Steffen Klassert says: ==================== One patch to rename a newly introduced struct. The rest is the rework of the IPsec virtual tunnel interface for ipv6 to support inter address family tunneling and namespace crossing. 1) Rename the newly introduced struct xfrm_filter to avoid a conflict with iproute2. From Nicolas Dichtel. 2) Introduce xfrm_input_afinfo to access the address family dependent tunnel callback functions properly. 3) Add and use a IPsec protocol multiplexer for ipv6. 4) Remove dst_entry caching. vti can lookup multiple different dst entries, dependent of the configured xfrm states. Therefore it does not make to cache a dst_entry. 5) Remove caching of flow informations. vti6 does not use the the tunnel endpoint addresses to do route and xfrm lookups. 6) Update the vti6 to use its own receive hook. 7) Remove the now unused xfrm_tunnel_notifier. This was used from vti and is replaced by the IPsec protocol multiplexer hooks. 8) Support inter address family tunneling for vti6. 9) Check if the tunnel endpoints of the xfrm state and the vti interface are matching and return an error otherwise. 10) Enable namespace crossing for vti devices. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | xfrm: rename struct xfrm_filterNicolas Dichtel2014-03-071-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | iproute2 already defines a structure with that name, let's use another one to avoid any conflict. CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2014-03-051-5/+0
|\ \ \ | |/ / |/| / | |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c net/ipv6/sit.c The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this. The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Clone states properly on migrationSteffen Klassert2014-02-201-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We loose a lot of information of the original state if we clone it with xfrm_state_clone(). In particular, there is no crypto algorithm attached if the original state uses an aead algorithm. This patch add the missing information to the clone state. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | ipsec: add support of limited SA dumpNicolas Dichtel2014-02-171-1/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The goal of this patch is to allow userland to dump only a part of SA by specifying a filter during the dump. The kernel is in charge to filter SA, this avoids to generate useless netlink traffic (it save also some cpu cycles). This is particularly useful when there is a big number of SA set on the system. Note that I removed the union in struct xfrm_state_walk to fix a problem on arm. struct netlink_callback->args is defined as a array of 6 long and the first long is used in xfrm code to flag the cb as initialized. Hence, we must have: sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) <= sizeof(long) * 5. With the union, it was false on arm (sizeof(struct xfrm_state_walk) was sizeof(long) * 7), due to the padding. In fact, whatever the arch is, this union seems useless, there will be always padding after it. Removing it will not increase the size of this struct (and reduce it on arm). Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | xfrm: avoid creating temporary SA when there are no listenersHoria Geanta2014-02-131-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the case when KMs have no listeners, km_query() will fail and temporary SAs are garbage collected immediately after their allocation. This causes strain on memory allocation, leading even to OOM since temporary SA alloc/free cycle is performed for every packet and garbage collection does not keep up the pace. The sane thing to do is to make sure we have audience before temporary SA allocation. Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | xfrm: Don't prohibit AH from using ESN featureFan Du2014-02-121-1/+2
|/ | | | | | | | Clear checking when user try to use ESN through netlink keymgr for AH. As only ESP and AH support ESN feature according to RFC. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds2014-01-251-34/+28
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) BPF debugger and asm tool by Daniel Borkmann. 2) Speed up create/bind in AF_PACKET, also from Daniel Borkmann. 3) Correct reciprocal_divide and update users, from Hannes Frederic Sowa and Daniel Borkmann. 4) Currently we only have a "set" operation for the hw timestamp socket ioctl, add a "get" operation to match. From Ben Hutchings. 5) Add better trace events for debugging driver datapath problems, also from Ben Hutchings. 6) Implement auto corking in TCP, from Eric Dumazet. Basically, if we have a small send and a previous packet is already in the qdisc or device queue, defer until TX completion or we get more data. 7) Allow userspace to manage ipv6 temporary addresses, from Jiri Pirko. 8) Add a qdisc bypass option for AF_PACKET sockets, from Daniel Borkmann. 9) Share IP header compression code between Bluetooth and IEEE802154 layers, from Jukka Rissanen. 10) Fix ipv6 router reachability probing, from Jiri Benc. 11) Allow packets to be captured on macvtap devices, from Vlad Yasevich. 12) Support tunneling in GRO layer, from Jerry Chu. 13) Allow bonding to be configured fully using netlink, from Scott Feldman. 14) Allow AF_PACKET users to obtain the VLAN TPID, just like they can already get the TCI. From Atzm Watanabe. 15) New "Heavy Hitter" qdisc, from Terry Lam. 16) Significantly improve the IPSEC support in pktgen, from Fan Du. 17) Allow ipv4 tunnels to cache routes, just like sockets. From Tom Herbert. 18) Add Proportional Integral Enhanced packet scheduler, from Vijay Subramanian. 19) Allow openvswitch to mmap'd netlink, from Thomas Graf. 20) Key TCP metrics blobs also by source address, not just destination address. From Christoph Paasch. 21) Support 10G in generic phylib. From Andy Fleming. 22) Try to short-circuit GRO flow compares using device provided RX hash, if provided. From Tom Herbert. The wireless and netfilter folks have been busy little bees too. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2064 commits) net/cxgb4: Fix referencing freed adapter ipv6: reallocate addrconf router for ipv6 address when lo device up fib_frontend: fix possible NULL pointer dereference rtnetlink: remove IFLA_BOND_SLAVE definition rtnetlink: remove check for fill_slave_info in rtnl_have_link_slave_info qlcnic: update version to 5.3.55 qlcnic: Enhance logic to calculate msix vectors. qlcnic: Refactor interrupt coalescing code for all adapters. qlcnic: Update poll controller code path qlcnic: Interrupt code cleanup qlcnic: Enhance Tx timeout debugging. qlcnic: Use bool for rx_mac_learn. bonding: fix u64 division rtnetlink: add missing IFLA_BOND_AD_INFO_UNSPEC sfc: Use the correct maximum TX DMA ring size for SFC9100 Add Shradha Shah as the sfc driver maintainer. net/vxlan: Share RX skb de-marking and checksum checks with ovs tulip: cleanup by using ARRAY_SIZE() ip_tunnel: clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() in case dst_link_failure() is called net/cxgb4: Don't retrieve stats during recovery ...
| * xfrm: checkpatch erros with space prohibitedWeilong Chen2014-01-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix checkpatch error "space prohibited xxx". Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: checkpatch errors with spaceWeilong Chen2014-01-021-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch cleanup some space errors. Signed-off-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: export verify_userspi_info for pkfey and netlink interfaceFan Du2013-12-161-24/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to check against valid IPcomp spi range, export verify_userspi_info for both pfkey and netlink interface. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: check user specified spi for IPCompFan Du2013-12-161-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IPComp connection between two hosts is broken if given spi bigger than 0xffff. OUTSPI=0x87 INSPI=0x11112 ip xfrm policy update dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 dir out action allow \ tmpl dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $OUTSPI ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 dir in action allow \ tmpl src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $INSPI ip xfrm state add src 192.168.1.101 dst 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $INSPI \ comp deflate ip xfrm state add dst 192.168.1.101 src 192.168.1.109 proto comp spi $OUTSPI \ comp deflate tcpdump can capture outbound ping packet, but inbound packet is dropped with XfrmOutNoStates errors. It looks like spi value used for IPComp is expected to be 16bits wide only. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locksFan Du2013-12-061-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By semantics, xfrm layer is fully name space aware, so will the locks, e.g. xfrm_state/pocliy_lock. Ensure exclusive access into state/policy link list for different name space with one global lock is not right in terms of semantics aspect at first place, as they are indeed mutually independent with each other, but also more seriously causes scalability problem. One practical scenario is on a Open Network Stack, more than hundreds of lxc tenants acts as routers within one host, a global xfrm_state/policy_lock becomes the bottleneck. But onces those locks are decoupled in a per-namespace fashion, locks contend is just with in specific name space scope, without causing additional SPD/SAD access delay for other name space. Also this patch improve scalability while as without changing original xfrm behavior. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: Using the right namespace to migrate key infoFan Du2013-12-061-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | because the home agent could surely be run on a different net namespace other than init_net. The original behavior could lead into inconsistent of key info. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| * xfrm: Try to honor policy index if it's supplied by userFan Du2013-12-061-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | xfrm code always searches for unused policy index for newly created policy regardless whether or not user space policy index hint supplied. This patch enables such feature so that using "ip xfrm ... index=xxx" can be used by user to set specific policy index. Currently this beahvior is broken, so this patch make it happen as expected. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* | audit: convert all sessionid declaration to unsigned intEric Paris2014-01-131-6/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | Right now the sessionid value in the kernel is a combination of u32, int, and unsigned int. Just use unsigned int throughout. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* xfrm: Guard IPsec anti replay window against replay bitmapFan Du2013-09-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For legacy IPsec anti replay mechanism: bitmap in struct xfrm_replay_state could only provide a 32 bits window size limit in current design, thus user level parameter sadb_sa_replay should honor this limit, otherwise misleading outputs("replay=244") by setkey -D will be: 192.168.25.2 192.168.22.2 esp mode=transport spi=147561170(0x08cb9ad2) reqid=0(0x00000000) E: aes-cbc 9a8d7468 7655cf0b 719d27be b0ddaac2 A: hmac-sha1 2d2115c2 ebf7c126 1c54f186 3b139b58 264a7331 seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013 diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s) last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s) current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes) allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0 sadb_seq=1 pid=4854 refcnt=0 192.168.22.2 192.168.25.2 esp mode=transport spi=255302123(0x0f3799eb) reqid=0(0x00000000) E: aes-cbc 6485d990 f61a6bd5 e5660252 608ad282 A: hmac-sha1 0cca811a eb4fa893 c47ae56c 98f6e413 87379a88 seq=0x00000000 replay=244 flags=0x00000000 state=mature created: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 current: Sep 17 14:00:22 2013 diff: 22(s) hard: 30(s) soft: 26(s) last: Sep 17 14:00:00 2013 hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s) current: 1408(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes) allocated: 22 hard: 0 soft: 0 sadb_seq=0 pid=4854 refcnt=0 And also, optimizing xfrm_replay_check window checking by setting the desirable x->props.replay_window with only doing the comparison once for all when xfrm_state is first born. Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: Fix replay size checking on async eventsSteffen Klassert2013-09-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | We pass the wrong netlink attribute to xfrm_replay_verify_len(). It should be XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL and not XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL as we currently doing. This causes memory corruptions if the replay esn attribute has incorrect length. Fix this by passing the right attribute to xfrm_replay_verify_len(). Reported-by: Michael Rossberg <michael.rossberg@tu-ilmenau.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* xfrm: force a garbage collection after deleting a policyPaul Moore2013-05-311-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | In some cases after deleting a policy from the SPD the policy would remain in the dst/flow/route cache for an extended period of time which caused problems for SELinux as its dynamic network access controls key off of the number of XFRM policy and state entries. This patch corrects this problem by forcing a XFRM garbage collection whenever a policy is sucessfully removed. Reported-by: Ondrej Moris <omoris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* xfrm_user: constify netlink dispatch tableMathias Krause2013-03-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | There is no need to modify the netlink dispatch table at runtime. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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