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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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... and don't bother in callers. Don't bother with zeroing i_blocks,
while we are at it - it's already been zeroed.
i_mode is not worth the effort; it has no common default value.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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D'oh...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reported-and-tested-by: Peter Palfrader <peter@palfrader.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/adobriyan/proc
* 'proc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/adobriyan/proc: (35 commits)
proc: remove fs/proc/proc_misc.c
proc: move /proc/vmcore creation to fs/proc/vmcore.c
proc: move pagecount stuff to fs/proc/page.c
proc: move all /proc/kcore stuff to fs/proc/kcore.c
proc: move /proc/schedstat boilerplate to kernel/sched_stats.h
proc: move /proc/modules boilerplate to kernel/module.c
proc: move /proc/diskstats boilerplate to block/genhd.c
proc: move /proc/zoneinfo boilerplate to mm/vmstat.c
proc: move /proc/vmstat boilerplate to mm/vmstat.c
proc: move /proc/pagetypeinfo boilerplate to mm/vmstat.c
proc: move /proc/buddyinfo boilerplate to mm/vmstat.c
proc: move /proc/vmallocinfo to mm/vmalloc.c
proc: move /proc/slabinfo boilerplate to mm/slub.c, mm/slab.c
proc: move /proc/slab_allocators boilerplate to mm/slab.c
proc: move /proc/interrupts boilerplate code to fs/proc/interrupts.c
proc: move /proc/stat to fs/proc/stat.c
proc: move rest of /proc/partitions code to block/genhd.c
proc: move /proc/cpuinfo code to fs/proc/cpuinfo.c
proc: move /proc/devices code to fs/proc/devices.c
proc: move rest of /proc/locks to fs/locks.c
...
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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For execute permission on a regular files we need to check if file has
any execute bits at all, regardless of capabilites.
This check is normally performed by generic_permission() but was also
added to the case when the filesystem defines its own ->permission()
method. In the latter case the filesystem should be responsible for
performing this check.
Move the check from inode_permission() inside filesystems which are
not calling generic_permission().
Create a helper function execute_ok() that returns true if the inode
is a directory or if any execute bits are present in i_mode.
Also fix up the following code:
- coda control file is never executable
- sysctl files are never executable
- hfs_permission seems broken on MAY_EXEC, remove
- hfsplus_permission is eqivalent to generic_permission(), remove
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
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With this patch all directory fops instances that have a readdir
that doesn't take the BKL are switched to generic_file_llseek.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
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* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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* keep references to ctl_table_head and ctl_table in /proc/sys inodes
* grab the former during operations, use the latter for access to
entry if that succeeds
* have ->d_compare() check if table should be seen for one who does lookup;
that allows us to avoid flipping inodes - if we have the same name resolve
to different things, we'll just keep several dentries and ->d_compare()
will reject the wrong ones.
* have ->lookup() and ->readdir() scan the table of our inode first, then
walk all ctl_table_header and scan ->attached_by for those that are
attached to our directory.
* implement ->getattr().
* get rid of insane amounts of tree-walking
* get rid of the need to know dentry in ->permission() and of the contortions
induced by that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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When reading from/writing to some table, a root, which this table came from,
may affect this table's permissions, depending on who is working with the
table.
The core hunk is at the bottom of this patch. All the rest is just pushing
the ctl_table_root argument up to the sysctl_perm() function.
This will be mostly (only?) used in the net sysctls.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good
reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects
that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata.
Together with the other patches of this series
- it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on
<dentry,vfsmount> pairs
- it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a
struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed
- it reduces the overall code size:
without patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux
with patch series:
text data bss dec hex filename
5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux
This patch:
Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack]
Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Acked-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bryan Wu <bryan.wu@analog.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix pointer mismatches in proc_sysctl.c. The proc_handler() method returns a
size_t through an arg pointer, but is given a pointer to a ssize_t to return
into.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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notify_change() already calls security_inode_setattr() before
calling iop->setattr.
Alan sayeth
This is a behaviour change on all of these and limits some behaviour of
existing established security modules
When inode_change_ok is called it has side effects. This includes
clearing the SGID bit on attribute changes caused by chmod. If you make
this change the results of some rulesets may be different before or after
the change is made.
I'm not saying the change is wrong but it does change behaviour so that
needs looking at closely (ditto all other attribute twiddles)
Signed-off-by: Steve Beattie <sbeattie@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Since the security checks are applied on each read and write of a sysctl file,
just like they are applied when calling sys_sysctl, they are redundant on the
standard VFS constructs. Since it is difficult to compute the security labels
on the standard VFS constructs we just mark the sysctl inodes in proc private
so selinux won't even bother with them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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With this change the sysctl inodes can be cached and nothing needs to be done
when removing a sysctl table.
For a cost of 2K code we will save about 4K of static tables (when we remove
de from ctl_table) and 70K in proc_dir_entries that we will not allocate, or
about half that on a 32bit arch.
The speed feels about the same, even though we can now cache the sysctl
dentries :(
We get the core advantage that we don't need to have a 1 to 1 mapping between
ctl table entries and proc files. Making it possible to have /proc/sys vary
depending on the namespace you are in. The currently merged namespaces don't
have an issue here but the network namespace under /proc/sys/net needs to have
different directories depending on which network adapters are visible. By
simply being a cache different directories being visible depending on who you
are is trivial to implement.
[akpm@osdl.org: fix uninitialised var]
[akpm@osdl.org: fix ARM build]
[bunk@stusta.de: make things static]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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