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* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2015-07-031-0/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all. Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and sysfs. Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced. There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement. Only filesystems mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but the test for empty directories was insufficient. So in my tree directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are created specially. Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and shows that the directory is empty. Special creation of directories for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about it's purpose. I asked container developers from the various container projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount points on proc and sysfs that are created specially. This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of proc and sysfs. I expected this to be the boring part of the work but unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags on the previous mount of proc and sysfs. So for now only the atime, read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep consistent are enforced. Dealing with the noexec and nosuid attributes remains for another time. This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed. Recently readlink of /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was converted) and is not now actively wrong. There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that I will mention briefly. It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount. At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem. With user namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename to outside of the bind mount. This is challenging to fix and doubly so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the performance part of pathname resolution. As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once they are recognized" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points. kernfs: Add support for always empty directories. proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints. fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories. vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
| * proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount pointsEric W. Biederman2015-07-011-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a directory that can not be added to. Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount point. Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting a permanently empty directory to the vfs. Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories. Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | switch ->put_link() from dentry to inodeAl Viro2015-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | only one instance looks at that argument at all; that sole exception wants inode rather than dentry. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link()Al Viro2015-05-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain it from current->nameidata Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventionsAl Viro2015-05-101-5/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_ that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns the symlink body. Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks. Stored pointer is ignored in all cases except the last one. Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call of ->put_link(). b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata). Now only the opaque pointer is. In the cases when we used the symlink body to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition to returning it. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotationsDavid Howells2015-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversalsAl Viro2015-02-221-0/+21
| | | | | | | use_pde()/unuse_pde() in ->follow_link()/->put_link() resp. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* fs: proc: use PDE() to get proc_dir_entryAlexander Kuleshov2015-02-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Use the PDE() helper to get proc_dir_entry instead of coding it directly. Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill proc_ns completelyAl Viro2014-12-101-2/+1
| | | | | | procfs inodes need only the ns_ops part; nsfs inodes don't need it at all Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* take the targets of /proc/*/ns/* symlinks to separate fsAl Viro2014-12-101-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | New pseudo-filesystem: nsfs. Targets of /proc/*/ns/* live there now. It's not mountable (not even registered, so it's not in /proc/filesystems, etc.). Files on it *are* bindable - we explicitly permit that in do_loopback(). This stuff lives in fs/nsfs.c now; proc_ns_fget() moved there as well. get_proc_ns() is a macro now (it's simply returning ->i_private; would have been an inline, if not for header ordering headache). proc_ns_inode() is an ex-parrot. The interface used in procfs is ns_get_path(path, task, ops) and ns_get_name(buf, size, task, ops). Dentries and inodes are never hashed; a non-counting reference to dentry is stashed in ns_common (removed by ->d_prune()) and reused by ns_get_path() if present. See ns_get_path()/ns_prune_dentry/nsfs_evict() for details of that mechanism. As the result, proc_ns_follow_link() has stopped poking in nd->path.mnt; it does nd_jump_link() on a consistent <vfsmount,dentry> pair it gets from ns_get_path(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* copy address of proc_ns_ops into ns_commonAl Viro2014-12-041-4/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* make proc_ns_operations work with struct ns_common * instead of void *Al Viro2014-12-041-1/+1
| | | | | | | We can do that now. And kill ->inum(), while we are at it - all instances are identical. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current ↵Eric W. Biederman2014-08-041-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | thread /proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self. /proc/thread-self points to the directory in proc containing information about the current thread. This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc. More importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other threads. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* fs/proc/inode.c: use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL)Monam Agarwal2014-04-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace rcu_assign_pointer(x, NULL) with RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) The rcu_assign_pointer() ensures that the initialization of a structure is carried out before storing a pointer to that structure. And in the case of the NULL pointer, there is no structure to initialize. So, rcu_assign_pointer(p, NULL) can be safely converted to RCU_INIT_POINTER(p, NULL) Signed-off-by: Monam Agarwal <monamagarwal123@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cacheJohannes Weiner2014-04-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reclaim will be leaving shadow entries in the page cache radix tree upon evicting the real page. As those pages are found from the LRU, an iput() can lead to the inode being freed concurrently. At this point, reclaim must no longer install shadow pages because the inode freeing code needs to ensure the page tree is really empty. Add an address_space flag, AS_EXITING, that the inode freeing code sets under the tree lock before doing the final truncate. Reclaim will check for this flag before installing shadow pages. Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Luigi Semenzato <semenzato@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Metin Doslu <metin@citusdata.com> Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Ozgun Erdogan <ozgun@citusdata.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: also fix proc_reg_get_unmapped_area() for !MMU caseJan Beulich2013-12-121-5/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit fad1a86e25e0 ("procfs: call default get_unmapped_area on MMU-present architectures"), as its title says, took care of only the MMU case, leaving the !MMU side still in the regressed state (returning -EIO in all cases where pde->proc_fops->get_unmapped_area is NULL). From the fad1a86e25e0 changelog: "Commit c4fe24485729 ("sparc: fix PCI device proc file mmap(2)") added proc_reg_get_unmapped_area in proc_reg_file_ops and proc_reg_file_ops_no_compat, by which now mmap always returns EIO if get_unmapped_area method is not defined for the target procfs file, which causes regression of mmap on /proc/vmcore. To address this issue, like get_unmapped_area(), call default current->mm->get_unmapped_area on MMU-present architectures if pde->proc_fops->get_unmapped_area, i.e. the one in actual file operation in the procfs file, is not defined" Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.12.x] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: clean up proc_reg_get_unmapped_area for 80-column limitHATAYAMA Daisuke2013-11-131-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | Clean up proc_reg_get_unmapped_area due to its 80-column limit violation. Signed-off-by: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: call default get_unmapped_area on MMU-present architecturesHATAYAMA Daisuke2013-10-161-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit c4fe24485729 ("sparc: fix PCI device proc file mmap(2)") added proc_reg_get_unmapped_area in proc_reg_file_ops and proc_reg_file_ops_no_compat, by which now mmap always returns EIO if get_unmapped_area method is not defined for the target procfs file, which causes regression of mmap on /proc/vmcore. To address this issue, like get_unmapped_area(), call default current->mm->get_unmapped_area on MMU-present architectures if pde->proc_fops->get_unmapped_area, i.e. the one in actual file operation in the procfs file, is not defined. Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Tested-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: fix unintended truncation of returned mapped addressHATAYAMA Daisuke2013-10-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, proc_reg_get_unmapped_area truncates upper 32-bit of the mapped virtual address returned from get_unmapped_area method in pde->proc_fops due to the variable rv of signed integer on x86_64. This is too small to have vitual address of unsigned long on x86_64 since on x86_64, signed integer is of 4 bytes while unsigned long is of 8 bytes. To fix this issue, use unsigned long instead. Fixes a regression added in commit c4fe24485729 ("sparc: fix PCI device proc file mmap(2)"). Signed-off-by: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Tested-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sparc: fix PCI device proc file mmap(2)Alexey Dobriyan2013-09-051-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | Commit 786d7e1612f0b0adb6046f19b906609e4fe8b1ba "Fix rmmod/read/write races in /proc entries" must have broken mmapping of PCI device proc files on Sparc. Notice how it adds wrapper around ->mmap but doesn't do it around ->get_unmapped_area. Add wrapper around ->get_unmapped_area. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* proc: Split the namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.hDavid Howells2013-05-011-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | Split the proc namespace stuff out into linux/proc_ns.h. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Include missing linux/magic.h inclusionsDavid Howells2013-04-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | Include missing linux/magic.h inclusions where the source file is currently expecting to get magic numbers through linux/proc_fs.h. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc: Delete create_proc_read_entry()David Howells2013-04-291-35/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | Delete create_proc_read_entry() as it no longer has any users. Also delete read_proc_t, write_proc_t, the read_proc member of the proc_dir_entry struct and the support functions that use them. This saves a pointer for every PDE allocated. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* try a saner locking for pde_opener...Al Viro2013-04-091-41/+21
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* deal with races between remove_proc_entry() and proc_reg_release()Al Viro2013-04-091-53/+32
| | | | | | | * serialize the call of ->release() on per-pdeo mutex * don't remove pdeo from per-pde list until we are through with it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: preparations for remove_proc_entry() race fixesAl Viro2013-04-091-122/+126
| | | | | | | | * leave ->proc_fops alone; make ->pde_users negative instead * trim pde_opener * move relevant code in fs/proc/inode.c Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: don't allow to use proc_create, create_proc_entry, etc. for directoriesAl Viro2013-04-091-2/+2
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: switch /proc/self away from proc_dir_entryAl Viro2013-04-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | Just have it pinned in dcache all along and let procfs ->kill_sb() drop it before kill_anon_super(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* vfs,proc: guarantee unique inodes in /procLinus Torvalds2013-03-221-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dave Jones found another /proc issue with his Trinity tool: thanks to the namespace model, we can have multiple /proc dentries that point to the same inode, aliasing directories in /proc/<pid>/net/ for example. This ends up being a total disaster, because it acts like hardlinked directories, and causes locking problems. We rely on the topological sort of the inodes pointed to by dentries, and if we have aliased directories, that odering becomes unreliable. In short: don't do this. Multiple dentries with the same (directory) inode is just a bad idea, and the namespace code should never have exposed things this way. But we're kind of stuck with it. This solves things by just always allocating a new inode during /proc dentry lookup, instead of using "iget_locked()" to look up existing inodes by superblock and number. That actually simplies the code a bit, at the cost of potentially doing more inode [de]allocations. That said, the inode lookup wasn't free either (and did a lot of locking of inodes), so it is probably not that noticeable. We could easily keep the old lookup model for non-directory entries, but rather than try to be excessively clever this just implements the minimal and simplest workaround for the problem. Reported-and-tested-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Analyzed-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/proc: clean up printksAndrew Morton2013-02-271-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | - use pr_foo() throughout - remove a couple of duplicated KERN_WARNINGs, via WARN(KERN_WARNING "...") - nuke a few warnings which I've never seen happen, ever. Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* saner proc_get_inode() calling conventionsAl Viro2013-02-261-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | Make it drop the pde in *all* cases when no new reference to it is put into an inode - both when an inode had already been set up (as we were already doing) and when inode allocation has failed. Makes for simpler logics in callers... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super()Maxim Patlasov2013-02-261-6/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | If proc_get_inode() succeeded, but d_make_root() failed, pde_put() for proc_root will be called twice: the first time due to iput() called from d_make_root() and the second time directly in the end of proc_fill_super(). Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* new helper: file_inode(file)Al Viro2013-02-221-7/+7
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc: Fix the namespace inode permission checks.Eric W. Biederman2012-11-201-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the proc namespace files into symlinks so that we won't cache the dentries for the namespace files which can bypass the ptrace_may_access checks. To support the symlinks create an additional namespace inode with it's own set of operations distinct from the proc pid inode and dentry methods as those no longer make sense. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* proc: no need to initialize proc_inode->fd in proc_get_inode()yan2012-10-061-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | proc_get_inode() obtains the inode via a call to iget_locked(). iget_locked() calls alloc_inode() which will call proc_alloc_inode() which clears proc_inode.fd, so there is no need to clear this field in proc_get_inode(). If iget_locked() instead found the inode via find_inode_fast(), that inode will not have I_NEW set so this change has no effect. Signed-off-by: yan <clouds.yan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge tag 'writeback' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wfg/linuxLinus Torvalds2012-05-281-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull writeback tree from Wu Fengguang: "Mainly from Jan Kara to avoid iput() in the flusher threads." * tag 'writeback' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wfg/linux: writeback: Avoid iput() from flusher thread vfs: Rename end_writeback() to clear_inode() vfs: Move waiting for inode writeback from end_writeback() to evict_inode() writeback: Refactor writeback_single_inode() writeback: Remove wb->list_lock from writeback_single_inode() writeback: Separate inode requeueing after writeback writeback: Move I_DIRTY_PAGES handling writeback: Move requeueing when I_SYNC set to writeback_sb_inodes() writeback: Move clearing of I_SYNC into inode_sync_complete() writeback: initialize global_dirty_limit fs: remove 8 bytes of padding from struct writeback_control on 64 bit builds mm: page-writeback.c: local functions should not be exposed globally
| * vfs: Rename end_writeback() to clear_inode()Jan Kara2012-05-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After we moved inode_sync_wait() from end_writeback() it doesn't make sense to call the function end_writeback() anymore. Rename it to clear_inode() which well says what the function really does - set I_CLEAR flag. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
* | userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriateEric W. Biederman2012-05-151-2/+2
|/ | | | | Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.hDavid Howells2012-03-281-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove all #inclusions of asm/system.h preparatory to splitting and killing it. Performed with the following command: perl -p -i -e 's!^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>.*\n!!' `grep -Irl '^#\s*include\s*<asm/system[.]h>' *` Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* switch open-coded instances of d_make_root() to new helperAl Viro2012-03-201-12/+3
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: clean proc_fill_super() upAl Viro2012-03-201-4/+3
| | | | | | | | First of all, there's no need to zero ->i_uid/->i_gid on root inode - both had been set to zero already. Moreover, let's take the iput() on failure to the failure exit it belongs to... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount optionsVasiliy Kulikov2012-01-101-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for mount options to restrict access to /proc/PID/ directories. The default backward-compatible "relaxed" behaviour is left untouched. The first mount option is called "hidepid" and its value defines how much info about processes we want to be available for non-owners: hidepid=0 (default) means the old behavior - anybody may read all world-readable /proc/PID/* files. hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their own. Sensitive files like cmdline, sched*, status are now protected against other users. As permission checking done in proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched, programs expecting specific files' modes are not confused. hidepid=2 means hidepid=1 plus all /proc/PID/ will be invisible to other users. It doesn't mean that it hides whether a process exists (it can be learned by other means, e.g. by kill -0 $PID), but it hides process' euid and egid. It compicates intruder's task of gathering info about running processes, whether some daemon runs with elevated privileges, whether another user runs some sensitive program, whether other users run any program at all, etc. gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info (as in hidepid=0 mode). This group should be used instead of putting nonroot user in sudoers file or something. However, untrusted users (like daemons, etc.) which are not supposed to monitor the tasks in the whole system should not be added to the group. hidepid=1 or higher is designed to restrict access to procfs files, which might reveal some sensitive private information like precise keystrokes timings: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3 hidepid=1/2 doesn't break monitoring userspace tools. ps, top, pgrep, and conky gracefully handle EPERM/ENOENT and behave as if the current user is the only user running processes. pstree shows the process subtree which contains "pstree" process. Note: the patch doesn't deal with setuid/setgid issues of keeping preopened descriptors of procfs files (like https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/7/368). We rely on that the leaked information like the scheduling counters of setuid apps doesn't threaten anybody's privacy - only the user started the setuid program may read the counters. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs: parse mount optionsVasiliy Kulikov2012-01-101-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for procfs mount options. Actual mount options are coming in the next patches. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* vfs: fix the stupidity with i_dentry in inode destructorsAl Viro2012-01-031-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Seeing that just about every destructor got that INIT_LIST_HEAD() copied into it, there is no point whatsoever keeping this INIT_LIST_HEAD in inode_init_once(); the cost of taking it into inode_init_always() will be negligible for pipes and sockets and negative for everything else. Not to mention the removal of boilerplate code from ->destroy_inode() instances... Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* filesystems: add set_nlink()Miklos Szeredi2011-11-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Replace remaining direct i_nlink updates with a new set_nlink() updater function. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Tested-by: Toshiyuki Okajima <toshi.okajima@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
* procfs: return ENOENT on opening a being-removed proc entryDaisuke Ogino2011-07-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change the return value to ENOENT. This return value is then returned when opening the proc entry that have been removed. For example, open("/proc/bus/pci/XX/YY") when the corresponding device is being hot-removed. Signed-off-by: Daisuke Ogino <ogino.daisuke@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Jesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org> Acked-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ns: proc files for namespace naming policy.Eric W. Biederman2011-05-101-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ to allow controlling the namespaces of a process. This addresses three specific problems that can make namespaces hard to work with. - Namespaces require a dedicated process to pin them in memory. - It is not possible to use a namespace unless you are the child of the original creator. - Namespaces don't have names that userspace can use to talk about them. The namespace files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ can be opened and the file descriptor can be used to talk about a specific namespace, and to keep the specified namespace alive. A namespace can be kept alive by either holding the file descriptor open or bind mounting the file someplace else. aka: mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /some/filesystem/path mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<N> /some/filesystem/path This allows namespaces to be named with userspace policy. It requires additional support to make use of these filedescriptors and that will be comming in the following patches. Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* procfs: kill the global proc_mnt variableOleg Nesterov2011-03-231-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | After the previous cleanup in proc_get_sb() the global proc_mnt has no reasons to exists, kill it. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* unfuck proc_sysctl ->d_compare()Al Viro2011-03-081-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | a) struct inode is not going to be freed under ->d_compare(); however, the thing PROC_I(inode)->sysctl points to just might. Fortunately, it's enough to make freeing that sucker delayed, provided that we don't step on its ->unregistering, clear the pointer to it in PROC_I(inode) before dropping the reference and check if it's NULL in ->d_compare(). b) I'm not sure that we *can* walk into NULL inode here (we recheck dentry->seq between verifying that it's still hashed / fetching dentry->d_inode and passing it to ->d_compare() and there's no negative hashed dentries in /proc/sys/*), but if we can walk into that, we really should not have ->d_compare() return 0 on it! Said that, I really suspect that this check can be simply killed. Nick? Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* proc: ->low_ino cleanupAlexey Dobriyan2011-01-131-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | - ->low_ino is write-once field -- reading it under locks is unnecessary. - /proc/$PID stuff never reaches pde_put()/free_proc_entry() -- PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST check never triggers. - in proc_get_inode(), inode number always matches proc dir entry, so save one parameter. Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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