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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig22
-rw-r--r--security/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c32
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c10
-rw-r--r--security/inode.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c32
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c86
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c48
-rw-r--r--security/lsm_audit.c386
-rw-r--r--security/root_plug.c12
-rw-r--r--security/security.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c26
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c30
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h108
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c143
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c405
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c68
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.c119
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/common.h134
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/domain.c240
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/file.c156
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/realpath.c23
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c4
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h13
33 files changed, 1698 insertions, 446 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index bb244774e9d7..d23c839038f0 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -110,28 +110,8 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
See <http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6279> for
more information about this module.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
- int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
- depends on SECURITY
- default 0
- help
- This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
- from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
- can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
-
- For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
- a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
- On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
- Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional
- permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have
- this protection disabled.
-
- This value can be changed after boot using the
- /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index fa77021d9778..c67557cdaa85 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += lsm_audit.o
+endif
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index beac0258c2a8..48b7e0228fa3 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,28 @@
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
+/*
+ * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
+ * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
+ * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
+ * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
+ * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
+ * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
+ * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
+ *
+ * Warn if that happens, once per boot.
+ */
+static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(char *fname)
+{
+ static int warned;
+ if (!warned) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
+ " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
+ " capabilities.\n", fname);
+ warned = 1;
+ }
+}
+
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
@@ -464,6 +486,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+ /*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
@@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (new->euid == 0)
effective = true;
}
+skip:
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 5fda7df19723..b8186bac8b7e 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
- goto acc_check;
+ goto found;
if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
continue;
if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
@@ -499,11 +499,12 @@ int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
continue;
if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode))
continue;
-acc_check:
+
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE))
continue;
if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ))
continue;
+found:
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
@@ -527,7 +528,7 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
- goto acc_check;
+ goto found;
if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
continue;
if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
@@ -536,9 +537,10 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
continue;
if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev))
continue;
-acc_check:
+
if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD))
continue;
+found:
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c
index f3b91bfbe4cb..f7496c6a022b 100644
--- a/security/inode.c
+++ b/security/inode.c
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct dentry *parent;
- if (!dentry)
+ if (!dentry || IS_ERR(dentry))
return;
parent = dentry->d_parent;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 1e082bb987be..ff513ff737f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -22,18 +22,9 @@ static int ima_audit;
static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long audit;
- int rc, result = 0;
- char *op = "ima_audit";
- char *cause;
- rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
- if (rc || audit > 1)
- result = 1;
- else
- ima_audit = audit;
- cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled";
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
- op, cause, result, 0);
+ if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+ ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
@@ -50,23 +41,14 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
- current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+ current->pid, current_cred()->uid,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
audit_log_task_context(ab);
- switch (audit_msgno) {
- case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
- case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
- case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
- case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
- break;
- case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
- break;
- default:
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
- }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, op);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, cause);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
if (fname) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 50d572b74caf..63003a63aaee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
return rc;
}
-static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
{
if (!ima_used_chip)
return;
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
/*
* Calculate the boot aggregate hash
*/
-int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
{
struct hash_desc desc;
struct scatterlist sg;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 510186f0b72e..6bfc7eaebfda 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
* implemenents security file system for reporting
* current measurement list and IMA statistics
*/
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
*/
int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
{
+ /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
+ if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
+ return -EACCES;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
return 0;
return -EBUSY;
@@ -315,7 +319,7 @@ static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
.release = ima_release_policy
};
-int ima_fs_init(void)
+int __init ima_fs_init(void)
{
ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
@@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ int ima_fs_init(void)
goto out;
ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR,
+ S_IWUSR,
ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_measure_policy_ops);
if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
index ec79f1ee992c..b8dd693f8790 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
}
-void ima_iintcache_init(void)
+void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
{
iint_cache =
kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 0b0bb8c978cc..a40da7ae5900 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int ima_used_chip;
* a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
* list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
*/
-static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ err_out:
audit_cause, result, 0);
}
-int ima_init(void)
+int __init ima_init(void)
{
u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
int rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f4e7266f5aee..6f611874d10e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -29,20 +29,8 @@ int ima_initialized;
char *ima_hash = "sha1";
static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
{
- const char *op = "hash_setup";
- const char *hash = "sha1";
- int result = 0;
- int audit_info = 0;
-
- if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
- hash = "md5";
- ima_hash = str;
- } else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) {
- hash = "invalid_hash_type";
- result = 1;
- }
- integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash,
- result, audit_info);
+ if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+ ima_hash = "md5";
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
@@ -128,10 +116,6 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
{
int rc = 0;
- if (IS_ERR(file)) {
- pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename);
- return rc;
- }
iint->opencount++;
iint->readcount++;
@@ -141,6 +125,15 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
return rc;
}
+static void ima_update_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, int mask)
+{
+ iint->opencount++;
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+ iint->writecount++;
+ else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
+ iint->readcount++;
+}
+
/**
* ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
@@ -156,10 +149,10 @@ static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
* could result in a file measurement error.
*
- * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
- * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
*/
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask, int update_counts)
{
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -173,11 +166,8 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
- iint->opencount++;
- if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
- iint->writecount++;
- else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
- iint->readcount++;
+ if (update_counts)
+ ima_update_counts(iint, mask);
rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
if (rc < 0)
@@ -196,7 +186,19 @@ int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
- file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred);
+ file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
+ current_cred());
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ int audit_info = 0;
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name,
+ "add_measurement",
+ "dentry_open failed",
+ 1, audit_info);
+ file = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
}
out:
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@ out:
kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int mask, int function)
@@ -234,7 +237,16 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
+/*
+ * ima_opens_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
+ * - for nfsd exported files.
+ *
+ * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
+ * imbalance messages.
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -246,8 +258,14 @@ static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
return;
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
iint->opencount++;
+ if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ iint->readcount++;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ iint->writecount++;
mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
/**
* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
@@ -272,18 +290,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
return 0;
}
-/*
- * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
- *
- * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
-{
- opencount_get(file);
- return;
-}
-
/**
* ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index b5291ad5ef56..e1278399b345 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -45,24 +45,30 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
};
-/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+/*
+ * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
*/
+
+/*
+ * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
+ * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
+ * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
+ * and running executables.
+ */
static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
- .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
- .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
- {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
};
static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
@@ -71,6 +77,14 @@ static struct list_head *ima_measure;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+ ima_use_tcb = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+
/**
* ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
* @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -96,7 +110,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- int rc;
+ int rc = 0;
u32 osid, sid;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -109,7 +123,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
NULL);
break;
@@ -119,7 +133,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule,
NULL);
default:
@@ -164,11 +178,17 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
* ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
* the new measure_policy_rules.
*/
-void ima_init_policy(void)
+void __init ima_init_policy(void)
{
- int i;
+ int i, entries;
+
+ /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+ if (ima_use_tcb)
+ entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
+ else
+ entries = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
}
@@ -227,7 +247,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
- AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+ Audit_equal, args,
&entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..94b868494b31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
+/*
+ * common LSM auditing functions
+ *
+ * Based on code written for SELinux by :
+ * Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Author : Etienne Basset, <etienne.basset@ensta.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/un.h>
+#include <net/af_unix.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+
+/**
+ * ipv4_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return 0 on success
+ */
+int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct iphdr *ih;
+
+ ih = ip_hdr(skb);
+ if (ih == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+ ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+
+ if (proto)
+ *proto = ih->protocol;
+ /* non initial fragment */
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (ih->protocol) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+ struct dccp_hdr *dh = dccp_hdr(skb);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+ ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr *sh = sctp_hdr(skb);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+ ad->u.net.sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+/**
+ * ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
+ * @skb : the skb
+ * @ad : the audit data to fill
+ * @proto : the layer 4 protocol
+ *
+ * return 0 on success
+ */
+int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+{
+ int offset, ret = 0;
+ struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+ u8 nexthdr;
+
+ ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ if (ip6 == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
+ ret = 0;
+ /* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header
+ * skip them */
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ offset += sizeof(*ip6);
+ nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+ offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (proto)
+ *proto = nexthdr;
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
+ struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
+ ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+ struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+ sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+ if (sh == NULL)
+ break;
+ ad->u.net.sport = sh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = sh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static inline void print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
+ char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+ if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
+ if (port)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
+ __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+{
+ if (addr)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
+ if (port)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+}
+
+/**
+ * dump_common_audit_data - helper to dump common audit data
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ */
+static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = NULL;
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+
+ if (a->tsk)
+ tsk = a->tsk;
+ if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ }
+
+ switch (a->type) {
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
+ break;
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
+ break;
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
+ if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
+ struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
+ if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.fs.path);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ dentry->d_name.name);
+ }
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ } else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ inode = a->u.fs.inode;
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (dentry) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ dentry->d_name.name);
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+ }
+ if (inode)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id,
+ inode->i_ino);
+ break;
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
+ tsk = a->u.tsk;
+ if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ }
+ break;
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
+ if (a->u.net.sk) {
+ struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
+ struct unix_sock *u;
+ int len = 0;
+ char *p = NULL;
+
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+
+ print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
+ inet->sport,
+ "laddr", "lport");
+ print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
+ inet->dport,
+ "faddr", "fport");
+ break;
+ }
+ case AF_INET6: {
+ struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
+
+ print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
+ inet->sport,
+ "laddr", "lport");
+ print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
+ inet->dport,
+ "faddr", "fport");
+ break;
+ }
+ case AF_UNIX:
+ u = unix_sk(sk);
+ if (u->dentry) {
+ struct path path = {
+ .dentry = u->dentry,
+ .mnt = u->mnt
+ };
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &path);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!u->addr)
+ break;
+ len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
+ p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
+ audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
+ if (*p)
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
+ else
+ audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (a->u.net.family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
+ a->u.net.sport,
+ "saddr", "src");
+ print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
+ a->u.net.dport,
+ "daddr", "dest");
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
+ a->u.net.sport,
+ "saddr", "src");
+ print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
+ a->u.net.dport,
+ "daddr", "dest");
+ break;
+ }
+ if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
+ struct net_device *dev;
+
+ /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
+ dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, a->u.net.netif);
+ if (dev) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", dev->name);
+ dev_put(dev);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key_serial=%u", a->u.key_struct.key);
+ if (a->u.key_struct.key_desc) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " key_desc=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.key_struct.key_desc);
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+ } /* switch (a->type) */
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_lsm_audit - generic LSM auditing function
+ * @a: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * setup the audit buffer for common security information
+ * uses callback to print LSM specific information
+ */
+void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (a == NULL)
+ return;
+ /* we use GFP_ATOMIC so we won't sleep */
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
+
+ if (ab == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (a->lsm_pre_audit)
+ a->lsm_pre_audit(ab, a);
+
+ dump_common_audit_data(ab, a);
+
+ if (a->lsm_post_audit)
+ a->lsm_post_audit(ab, a);
+
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c
index 40fb4f15e27b..2f7ffa67c4d2 100644
--- a/security/root_plug.c
+++ b/security/root_plug.c
@@ -71,18 +71,6 @@ static int rootplug_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
static struct security_operations rootplug_security_ops = {
- /* Use the capability functions for some of the hooks */
- .ptrace_may_access = cap_ptrace_may_access,
- .ptrace_traceme = cap_ptrace_traceme,
- .capget = cap_capget,
- .capset = cap_capset,
- .capable = cap_capable,
-
- .bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,
-
- .task_fix_setuid = cap_task_fix_setuid,
- .task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
-
.bprm_check_security = rootplug_bprm_check_security,
};
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5284255c5cdf..dc7674fbfc7a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
struct security_operations *security_ops; /* Initialized to NULL */
-/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */
-unsigned long mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR;
-
static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
{
/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 4bf5d08a1f5c..7823e84dbe8d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
if (denied) {
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
rc = -EACCES;
- else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
+ else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2fcad7c33eaf..15c2a08a66f1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1980,10 +1980,6 @@ static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
u32 tsid, sid;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
sid = current_sid();
rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
@@ -2375,10 +2371,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
struct itimerval itimer;
- struct sighand_struct *psig;
u32 osid, sid;
int rc, i;
- unsigned long flags;
osid = tsec->osid;
sid = tsec->sid;
@@ -2398,22 +2392,20 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
- flush_signals(current);
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
- flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
- sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
- recalc_sigpending();
+ if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+ __flush_signals(current);
+ flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+ sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+ }
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
}
/* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
* wait permission to the new task SID. */
- read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- psig = current->parent->sighand;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
- wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
- read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ wake_up_interruptible(&current->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
}
/* superblock security operations */
@@ -4503,7 +4495,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
* when the packet is on it's final way out.
* NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
* is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
- if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
+ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 5c3434f7626f..ca835795a8b3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
#define _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_
+#include <linux/magic.h>
#include "flask.h"
#define SECSID_NULL 0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
#define SECSID_WILD 0xffffffff /* wildcard SID */
#define SECCLASS_NULL 0x0000 /* no class */
-#define SELINUX_MAGIC 0xf97cff8c
-
/* Identify specific policy version changes */
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE 15
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL 16
@@ -91,9 +90,11 @@ struct av_decision {
u32 auditallow;
u32 auditdeny;
u32 seqno;
+ u32 flags;
};
-int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid);
+/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
+#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index c6875fd3b9d6..dd7cc6de77f9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
{ AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
+ { AUDIT_TRIM, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT },
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 2d5136ec3d54..b4fc506e7a87 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -527,10 +527,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
goto out2;
length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
- "%x %x %x %x %u",
+ "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
- avd.seqno);
+ avd.seqno, avd.flags);
out2:
kfree(tcon);
out:
@@ -803,10 +803,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- if (count > PAGE_SIZE) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!page) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a90cab207d9a..ff17820d35ec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+ avd->flags = 0;
/*
* Check for all the invalid cases.
@@ -606,31 +607,6 @@ inval_class:
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Given a sid find if the type has the permissive flag set
- */
-int security_permissive_sid(u32 sid)
-{
- struct context *context;
- u32 type;
- int rc;
-
- read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-
- context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
- BUG_ON(!context);
-
- type = context->type;
- /*
- * we are intentionally using type here, not type-1, the 0th bit may
- * someday indicate that we are globally setting permissive in policy.
- */
- rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, type);
-
- read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
- return rc;
-}
-
static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
struct context *ncontext,
struct context *tcontext,
@@ -865,6 +841,10 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
requested, avd);
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index c0eb72013d67..72b18452e1a1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct dst_entry *dst;
int rc = 0;
- dst = skb->dst;
+ dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst) {
struct dst_entry *dst_test;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 42ef313f9856..243bec175be0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
/*
* Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
@@ -179,6 +180,20 @@ struct smack_known {
#define MAY_NOT 0
/*
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxa)
+ */
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 4
+
+/*
+ * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
+ * to save some stack
+ */
+struct smk_audit_info {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct common_audit_data a;
+#endif
+};
+/*
* These functions are in smack_lsm.c
*/
struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
@@ -186,8 +201,8 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
/*
* These functions are in smack_access.c
*/
-int smk_access(char *, char *, int);
-int smk_curacc(char *, u32);
+int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
int smack_to_cipso(const char *, struct smack_cipso *);
void smack_from_cipso(u32, char *, char *);
char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
@@ -237,4 +252,93 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
return sip->smk_inode;
}
+/*
+ * logging functions
+ */
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
+extern int log_policy;
+
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+ int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/*
+ * some inline functions to set up audit data
+ * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+ char type)
+{
+ memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+ a->a.type = type;
+ a->a.function = func;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ a->a.u.tsk = t;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct dentry *d)
+{
+ a->a.u.fs.path.dentry = d;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+ a->a.u.fs.path.mnt = m;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct inode *i)
+{
+ a->a.u.fs.inode = i;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct path p)
+{
+ a->a.u.fs.path = p;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ a->a.u.net.sk = sk;
+}
+
+#else /* no AUDIT */
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+ char type)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct task_struct *t)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct dentry *d)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct inode *i)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct path p)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
#endif /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index ac0a2707f6d4..513dc1aa16dd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -59,11 +59,18 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
*/
static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+/*
+ * what events do we log
+ * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
+ */
+int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+
/**
* smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
* @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
* @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
* @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : a pointer to the audit data
*
* This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
* access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
@@ -78,10 +85,12 @@ static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
* will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
* optimization.
*/
-int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
+int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+ struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
u32 may = MAY_NOT;
struct smack_rule *srp;
+ int rc = 0;
/*
* Hardcoded comparisons.
@@ -89,8 +98,10 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
* A star subject can't access any object.
*/
if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
- strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
- return -EACCES;
+ strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out_audit;
+ }
/*
* An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
* Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
@@ -100,20 +111,20 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
/*
* A star object can be accessed by any subject.
*/
if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
strcmp(object_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
/*
* An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
* with the same label.
*/
if (subject_label == object_label ||
strcmp(subject_label, object_label) == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
/*
* A hat subject can read any object.
* A floor object can be read by any subject.
@@ -121,10 +132,10 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known ||
strcmp(object_label, smack_known_floor.smk_known) == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known ||
strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_hat.smk_known) == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
}
/*
* Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
@@ -148,28 +159,36 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
* This is a bit map operation.
*/
if ((request & may) == request)
- return 0;
-
- return -EACCES;
+ goto out_audit;
+
+ rc = -EACCES;
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ if (a)
+ smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+#endif
+ return rc;
}
/**
* smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
* @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
* @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
*
* This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
* in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
* non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
* to override the rules.
*/
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
{
int rc;
+ char *sp = current_security();
- rc = smk_access(current_security(), obj_label, mode);
+ rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_audit;
/*
* Return if a specific label has been designated as the
@@ -177,14 +196,105 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
* have that label.
*/
if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != current->cred->security)
- return rc;
+ goto out_audit;
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ if (a)
+ smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+#endif
return rc;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * readable string
+ * @string : the string to fill
+ * @access : the int
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ if (access & MAY_READ)
+ string[i++] = 'r';
+ if (access & MAY_WRITE)
+ string[i++] = 'w';
+ if (access & MAY_EXEC)
+ string[i++] = 'x';
+ if (access & MAY_APPEND)
+ string[i++] = 'a';
+ string[i] = '\0';
+}
+/**
+ * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab : the audit_buffer
+ * @a : audit_data
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+ sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @subject_label : smack label of the requester
+ * @object_label : smack label of the object being accessed
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @result: result from smk_access
+ * @a: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.
+ */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+ char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+ struct smack_audit_data *sad;
+ struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
+
+ /* check if we have to log the current event */
+ if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+ return;
+ if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
+ return;
+
+ if (a->function == NULL)
+ a->function = "unknown";
+
+ /* end preparing the audit data */
+ sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+ smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
+ sad->subject = subject_label;
+ sad->object = object_label;
+ sad->request = request_buffer;
+ sad->result = result;
+ a->lsm_pre_audit = smack_log_callback;
+
+ common_lsm_audit(a);
+}
+#else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
/**
@@ -209,7 +319,8 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
if (found)
smack[i] = '\0';
else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' ||
- string[i] == '/') {
+ string[i] == '/' || string[i] == '"' ||
+ string[i] == '\\' || string[i] == '\'') {
smack[i] = '\0';
found = 1;
} else
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 98b3195347ab..0023182078c7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-
#include "smack.h"
#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
@@ -103,14 +102,24 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ char *sp, *tsp;
rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(ctp), MAY_READWRITE);
+ sp = current_security();
+ tsp = task_security(ctp);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
+
+ /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
+ rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -125,14 +134,24 @@ static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
{
int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ char *sp, *tsp;
rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(task_security(ptp), current_security(), MAY_READWRITE);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
+
+ sp = current_security();
+ tsp = task_security(ptp);
+ /* we won't log here, because rc can be overriden */
+ rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_READWRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -327,8 +346,14 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
- return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ);
+ rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+ return rc;
}
/**
@@ -346,8 +371,12 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
- return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -361,10 +390,14 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
- sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
- return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+ sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+ return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/*
@@ -441,15 +474,20 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- int rc;
char *isp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
- rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
- rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
return rc;
@@ -466,18 +504,24 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
/*
* You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
*/
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE);
- if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc == 0) {
/*
* You also need write access to the containing directory
*/
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
-
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ }
return rc;
}
@@ -491,17 +535,24 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
*/
static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
/*
* You need write access to the thing you're removing
*/
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
- if (rc == 0)
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ if (rc == 0) {
/*
* You also need write access to the containing directory
*/
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ }
return rc;
}
@@ -525,15 +576,19 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
{
int rc;
char *isp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
- rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
- rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
-
return rc;
}
@@ -548,13 +603,15 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
*/
static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
* No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
*/
if (mask == 0)
return 0;
-
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -566,13 +623,16 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
* Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
*/
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -584,7 +644,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
*/
static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -602,6 +667,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
@@ -619,8 +685,11 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
} else
rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -672,7 +741,12 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
*/
static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
- return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
}
/*
@@ -686,6 +760,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
@@ -696,8 +771,10 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
} else
rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -856,12 +933,16 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
int rc = 0;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+ rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -875,7 +956,11 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
*/
static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
- return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
+ return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -889,8 +974,12 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
switch (cmd) {
case F_DUPFD:
case F_GETFD:
@@ -898,7 +987,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_GETLK:
case F_GETOWN:
case F_GETSIG:
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+ rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
break;
case F_SETFD:
case F_SETFL:
@@ -906,10 +995,10 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case F_SETLKW:
case F_SETOWN:
case F_SETSIG:
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
break;
default:
- rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
return rc;
@@ -944,14 +1033,21 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
{
struct file *file;
int rc;
+ char *tsp = tsk->cred->security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
/*
* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
*/
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
- rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->cred->security, MAY_WRITE);
+ /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+ rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- return 0;
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+ smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -964,7 +1060,10 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
int may = 0;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
/*
* This code relies on bitmasks.
*/
@@ -973,7 +1072,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
may |= MAY_WRITE;
- return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may);
+ return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
}
/*
@@ -1053,6 +1152,22 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
}
/**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access : the access requested
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
* smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
* @p: the task object
* @pgid: unused
@@ -1061,7 +1176,7 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
*/
static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1072,7 +1187,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
*/
static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1083,7 +1198,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1111,7 +1226,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1128,7 +1243,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1140,7 +1255,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
*/
static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1158,7 +1273,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
return rc;
}
@@ -1170,7 +1285,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
*/
static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_READ);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ);
}
/**
@@ -1181,7 +1296,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
*/
static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1199,18 +1314,23 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
/*
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0)
- return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_curacc(task_security(p), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
/*
* If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), task_security(p),
+ MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -1221,11 +1341,15 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
*/
static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ char *sp = current_security();
+ char *tsp = task_security(p);
int rc;
- rc = smk_access(current_security(), task_security(p), MAY_WRITE);
+ /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
+ rc = smk_access(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
- return 0;
+ goto out_log;
/*
* Allow the operation to succeed if either task
@@ -1239,8 +1363,12 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
* the smack value.
*/
if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
- return 0;
-
+ rc = 0;
+ /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
+ out_log:
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+ smack_log(sp, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -1456,12 +1584,19 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
int sk_lbl;
char *hostsp;
struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
rcu_read_lock();
hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
if (hostsp != NULL) {
sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
- rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+ ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family;
+ ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port;
+ ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
} else {
sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
rc = 0;
@@ -1657,6 +1792,25 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
}
/**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @shp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
+{
+ char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
+#endif
+ return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
* smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
* @shp: the object
* @shmflg: access requested
@@ -1665,11 +1819,10 @@ static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
*/
static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
- char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
int may;
may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
- return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
}
/**
@@ -1681,7 +1834,6 @@ static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
*/
static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
{
- char *ssp;
int may;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1704,9 +1856,7 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
-
- ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
- return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
}
/**
@@ -1720,11 +1870,10 @@ static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
int shmflg)
{
- char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
int may;
may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
- return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
}
/**
@@ -1766,6 +1915,25 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
}
/**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @sma : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
+{
+ char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
+#endif
+ return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
* smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
* @sma: the object
* @semflg: access requested
@@ -1774,11 +1942,10 @@ static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
*/
static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
- char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
int may;
may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
- return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
}
/**
@@ -1790,7 +1957,6 @@ static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
*/
static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
{
- char *ssp;
int may;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1819,8 +1985,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
return -EINVAL;
}
- ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
- return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
}
/**
@@ -1837,9 +2002,7 @@ static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter)
{
- char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
-
- return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE);
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1881,6 +2044,25 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
}
/**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @msq : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
+{
+ char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
+#endif
+ return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
* smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
* @msq: the object
* @msqflg: access requested
@@ -1889,11 +2071,10 @@ static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
*/
static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
- char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
int may;
may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
- return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
}
/**
@@ -1905,7 +2086,6 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
*/
static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
{
- char *msp;
int may;
switch (cmd) {
@@ -1927,8 +2107,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
return -EINVAL;
}
- msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
- return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
}
/**
@@ -1942,11 +2121,10 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
int msqflg)
{
- char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
- int rc;
+ int may;
- rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
- return smk_curacc(msp, rc);
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
}
/**
@@ -1962,9 +2140,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
{
- char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
-
- return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
}
/**
@@ -1977,10 +2153,14 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
{
char *isp = ipp->security;
- int may;
+ int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
- may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
- return smk_curacc(isp, may);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+ return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -2239,8 +2419,12 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
{
struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
- return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+ return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op),
+ MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -2255,8 +2439,11 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
- return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE);
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+ return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
}
/**
@@ -2371,7 +2558,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
char *csp;
int rc;
-
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
@@ -2389,13 +2576,19 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+ ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+ ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
/*
* Receiving a packet requires that the other end
* be able to write here. Read access is not required.
* This is the simplist possible security model
* for networking.
*/
- rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc != 0)
netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
return rc;
@@ -2524,6 +2717,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct iphdr *hdr;
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -2537,11 +2731,17 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
strncpy(smack, smack_known_huh.smk_known, SMK_MAXLEN);
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
+ ad.a.u.net.family = family;
+ ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
+ ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
/*
* Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
* here. Read access is not required.
*/
- rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+ rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
@@ -2643,6 +2843,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *keyp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -2658,8 +2859,13 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
*/
if (cred->security == NULL)
return -EACCES;
-
- return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+ ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+ ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+ return smk_access(cred->security, keyp->security,
+ MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
@@ -2828,15 +3034,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
.ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
- .capget = cap_capget,
- .capset = cap_capset,
- .capable = cap_capable,
.syslog = smack_syslog,
- .settime = cap_settime,
- .vm_enough_memory = cap_vm_enough_memory,
-
- .bprm_set_creds = cap_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_secureexec = cap_bprm_secureexec,
.sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
.sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
@@ -2860,8 +3058,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
.inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
.inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
- .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
- .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
@@ -2882,7 +3078,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.cred_commit = smack_cred_commit,
.kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
.kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
- .task_fix_setuid = cap_task_fix_setuid,
.task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
@@ -2896,7 +3091,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.task_kill = smack_task_kill,
.task_wait = smack_task_wait,
.task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
- .task_prctl = cap_task_prctl,
.ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
.ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
@@ -2923,9 +3117,6 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
.sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
- .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send,
- .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv,
-
.d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
.getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 11d2cb19d7a6..f83a80980726 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */
SMK_NETLBLADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
+ SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */
};
/*
@@ -775,7 +776,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
struct sockaddr_in newname;
char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
char *sp;
- char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX];
+ char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX + 1];
char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
int rc;
struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
@@ -1192,6 +1193,69 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
};
/**
+ * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d\n", log_policy);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (i < 0 || i > 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ log_policy = i;
+ return count;
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_logging,
+ .write = smk_write_logging,
+};
+/**
* smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
* @sb: the empty superblock
* @data: unused
@@ -1221,6 +1285,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
{"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_ONLYCAP] =
{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOGGING] =
+ {"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
/* last one */ {""}
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index ddfb9cccf468..fdd1f4b8c448 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -28,7 +28,13 @@ static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = {
"disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
};
-/* Table for profile. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_control_array is a static data which contains
+ *
+ * (1) functionality name used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile .
+ * (2) initial values for "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ * (3) max values for "struct tomoyo_profile".
+ */
static struct {
const char *keyword;
unsigned int current_value;
@@ -39,7 +45,13 @@ static struct {
[TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 },
};
-/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_profile is a structure which is used for holding the mode of access
+ * controls. TOMOYO has 4 modes: disabled, learning, permissive, enforcing.
+ * An administrator can define up to 256 profiles.
+ * The ->profile of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for remembering
+ * the profile's number (0 - 255) assigned to that domain.
+ */
static struct tomoyo_profile {
unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment;
@@ -428,7 +440,6 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
const char *name = ptr->name;
const int len = strlen(name);
- ptr->total_len = len;
ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
@@ -866,7 +877,6 @@ static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
return NULL;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
mutex_lock(&lock);
ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
if (ptr)
@@ -880,7 +890,6 @@ static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
ok:
mutex_unlock(&lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return ptr;
}
@@ -1009,7 +1018,19 @@ static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
return 0;
}
-/* Structure for policy manager. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_policy_manager_entry is a structure which is used for holding list of
+ * domainnames or programs which are permitted to modify configuration via
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_policy_manager_list .
+ * (2) "manager" is a domainname or a program's pathname.
+ * (3) "is_domain" is a bool which is true if "manager" is a domainname, false
+ * otherwise.
+ * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
struct list_head list;
/* A path to program or a domainname. */
@@ -1018,7 +1039,36 @@ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
};
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_policy_manager_list is used for holding list of domainnames or
+ * programs which are permitted to modify configuration via
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo '<kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ * (if you want to specify by a domainname)
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * # echo '/usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ * (if you want to specify by a program's location)
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete <kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete /usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
@@ -1050,7 +1100,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
saved_manager = tomoyo_save_name(manager);
if (!saved_manager)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
@@ -1072,7 +1121,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -1117,10 +1165,9 @@ static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
list);
if (ptr->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
head->read_eof = done;
@@ -1197,13 +1244,11 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
struct task_struct *p;
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (p)
domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
} else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) {
down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
@@ -1447,15 +1492,14 @@ static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
ignore_global_allow_read
= TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
- "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
- "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
- domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
- transition_failed,
- ignore_global_allow_read)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE
+ "%u\n%s%s%s\n",
+ domain->domainname->name,
+ domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+ transition_failed,
+ ignore_global_allow_read);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
head->read_step = 2;
acl_loop:
if (head->read_step == 3)
@@ -1463,24 +1507,22 @@ acl_loop:
/* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
- &domain->acl_info_list) {
+ &domain->acl_info_list) {
struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr
= list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info,
- list);
- if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) {
- done = false;
+ list);
+ done = tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
if (!done)
break;
head->read_step = 3;
tail_mark:
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n");
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
head->read_step = 1;
if (head->read_single_domain)
break;
@@ -1550,11 +1592,10 @@ static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
if (domain->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
- domain->domainname->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+ domain->domainname->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
head->read_eof = done;
@@ -1594,13 +1635,11 @@ static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
const int pid = head->read_step;
struct task_struct *p;
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (p)
domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
if (domain)
tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
domain->domainname->name);
@@ -2138,7 +2177,13 @@ static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count);
}
-/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR).
+ * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals.
+ */
static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
.open = tomoyo_open,
.release = tomoyo_release,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 678f4ff16aa4..6d6ba09af457 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -26,16 +26,43 @@
struct dentry;
struct vfsmount;
-/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_page_buffer is a structure which is used for holding a pathname
+ * obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair.
+ * As of now, it is 4096 bytes. If users complain that 4096 bytes is too small
+ * (because TOMOYO escapes non ASCII printable characters using \ooo format),
+ * we will make the buffer larger.
+ */
struct tomoyo_page_buffer {
char buffer[4096];
};
-/* Structure for holding a token. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_path_info is a structure which is used for holding a string data
+ * used by TOMOYO.
+ * This structure has several fields for supporting pattern matching.
+ *
+ * (1) "name" is the '\0' terminated string data.
+ * (2) "hash" is full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)).
+ * This allows tomoyo_pathcmp() to compare by hash before actually compare
+ * using strcmp().
+ * (3) "const_len" is the length of the initial segment of "name" which
+ * consists entirely of non wildcard characters. In other words, the length
+ * which we can compare two strings using strncmp().
+ * (4) "is_dir" is a bool which is true if "name" ends with "/",
+ * false otherwise.
+ * TOMOYO distinguishes directory and non-directory. A directory ends with
+ * "/" and non-directory does not end with "/".
+ * (5) "is_patterned" is a bool which is true if "name" contains wildcard
+ * characters, false otherwise. This allows TOMOYO to use "hash" and
+ * strcmp() for string comparison if "is_patterned" is false.
+ * (6) "depth" is calculated using the number of "/" characters in "name".
+ * This allows TOMOYO to avoid comparing two pathnames which never match
+ * (e.g. whether "/var/www/html/index.html" matches "/tmp/sh-thd-\$").
+ */
struct tomoyo_path_info {
const char *name;
u32 hash; /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
- u16 total_len; /* = strlen(name) */
u16 const_len; /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name) */
bool is_dir; /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/") */
bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
@@ -51,7 +78,20 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info {
*/
#define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
-/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_path_info_with_data is a structure which is used for holding a
+ * pathname obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair.
+ *
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" consists of "struct tomoyo_path_info"
+ * and buffer for the pathname, while "struct tomoyo_page_buffer" consists of
+ * buffer for the pathname only.
+ *
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" is intended to allow TOMOYO to release
+ * both "struct tomoyo_path_info" and buffer for the pathname by single kfree()
+ * so that we don't need to return two pointers to the caller. If the caller
+ * puts "struct tomoyo_path_info" on stack memory, we will be able to remove
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data".
+ */
struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
/* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tomoyo_free(). */
struct tomoyo_path_info head;
@@ -61,7 +101,15 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
};
/*
- * Common header for holding ACL entries.
+ * tomoyo_acl_info is a structure which is used for holding
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to the ->acl_info_list of
+ * "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
+ * (2) "type" which tells
+ * (a) type & 0x7F : type of the entry (either
+ * "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" or
+ * "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record")
+ * (b) type & 0x80 : whether the entry is marked as "deleted".
*
* Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows
* "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and
@@ -81,7 +129,28 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_info {
/* This ACL entry is deleted. */
#define TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED 0x80
-/* Structure for domain information. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_info is a structure which is used for holding permissions
+ * (e.g. "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so") given to each domain.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_list .
+ * (2) "acl_info_list" which is linked to "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * (3) "domainname" which holds the name of the domain.
+ * (4) "profile" which remembers profile number assigned to this domain.
+ * (5) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if this domain is marked as
+ * "deleted", false otherwise.
+ * (6) "quota_warned" is a bool which is used for suppressing warning message
+ * when learning mode learned too much entries.
+ * (7) "flags" which remembers this domain's attributes.
+ *
+ * A domain's lifecycle is an analogy of files on / directory.
+ * Multiple domains with the same domainname cannot be created (as with
+ * creating files with the same filename fails with -EEXIST).
+ * If a process reached a domain, that process can reside in that domain after
+ * that domain is marked as "deleted" (as with a process can access an already
+ * open()ed file after that file was unlink()ed).
+ */
struct tomoyo_domain_info {
struct list_head list;
struct list_head acl_info_list;
@@ -108,10 +177,18 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info {
#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED 2
/*
- * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
- * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
- * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
- * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ * tomoyo_single_path_acl_record is a structure which is used for holding an
+ * entry with one pathname operation (e.g. open(), mkdir()).
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
+ * (3) "filename" is the pathname.
+ *
+ * Directives held by this structure are "allow_read/write", "allow_execute",
+ * "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir",
+ * "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock",
+ * "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite".
*/
struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
@@ -120,7 +197,18 @@ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
};
-/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_double_path_acl_record is a structure which is used for holding an
+ * entry with two pathnames operation (i.e. link() and rename()).
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
+ * (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
+ * (3) "filename1" is the source/old pathname.
+ * (4) "filename2" is the destination/new pathname.
+ *
+ * Directives held by this structure are "allow_rename" and "allow_link".
+ */
struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
u8 perm;
@@ -153,7 +241,29 @@ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
#define TOMOYO_VERBOSE 2
#define TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX 3
-/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_io_buffer is a structure which is used for reading and modifying
+ * configuration via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ * It has many fields. ->read_var1 , ->read_var2 , ->write_var1 are used as
+ * cursors.
+ *
+ * Since the content of /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy is a list of
+ * "struct tomoyo_domain_info" entries and each "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
+ * entry has a list of "struct tomoyo_acl_info", we need two cursors when
+ * reading (one is for traversing tomoyo_domain_list and the other is for
+ * traversing "struct tomoyo_acl_info"->acl_info_list ).
+ *
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * "select ", TOMOYO seeks the cursor ->read_var1 and ->write_var1 to the
+ * domain with the domainname specified by the rest of that line (NULL is set
+ * if seek failed).
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * "delete ", TOMOYO deletes an entry or a domain specified by the rest of that
+ * line (->write_var1 is set to NULL if a domain was deleted).
+ * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with
+ * neither "select " nor "delete ", an entry or a domain specified by that line
+ * is appended.
+ */
struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 2d6748741a26..1d8b16960576 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -19,11 +19,63 @@
/* The initial domain. */
struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_list is used for holding list of domains.
+ * The ->acl_info_list of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for holding
+ * permissions (e.g. "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so") given to each domain.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "delete allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * A domain is added by
+ *
+ * # echo "<kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo "delete <kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * and all domains are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
+ *
+ * Normally, a domainname is monotonically getting longer because a domainname
+ * which the process will belong to if an execve() operation succeeds is
+ * defined as a concatenation of "current domainname" + "pathname passed to
+ * execve()".
+ * See tomoyo_domain_initializer_list and tomoyo_domain_keeper_list for
+ * exceptions.
+ */
LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list);
DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_initializer_list .
+ * (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a
+ * domainname". This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified.
+ * (3) "program" which is a program's pathname.
+ * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ * (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false
+ * otherwise.
+ * (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last
+ * component of a domainname", false otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* This may be NULL */
@@ -34,7 +86,23 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
bool is_last_name;
};
-/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_keeper_list .
+ * (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a
+ * domainname".
+ * (3) "program" which is a program's pathname.
+ * This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified.
+ * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ * (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false
+ * otherwise.
+ * (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last
+ * component of a domainname", false otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
@@ -45,7 +113,16 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
bool is_last_name;
};
-/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_alias_entry is a structure which is used for holding "alias" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_alias_list .
+ * (2) "original_name" which is a dereferenced pathname.
+ * (3) "aliased_name" which is a symlink's pathname.
+ * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_alias_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name;
@@ -67,14 +144,12 @@ void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
{
/* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
spin_lock(&lock);
if (!is_delete)
domain->flags |= flags;
else
domain->flags &= ~flags;
spin_unlock(&lock);
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
}
/**
@@ -94,7 +169,42 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
return cp0;
}
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_initializer_list is used for holding list of programs which
+ * triggers reinitialization of domainname. Normally, a domainname is
+ * monotonically getting longer. But sometimes, we restart daemon programs.
+ * It would be convenient for us that "a daemon started upon system boot" and
+ * "the daemon restarted from console" belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO
+ * provides a way to shorten domainnames.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^initialize_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, /usr/sbin/httpd will belong to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain.
+ *
+ * You may specify a domainname using "from" keyword.
+ * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * domain to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain.
+ *
+ * You may add "no_" prefix to "initialize_domain".
+ * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd" and
+ * "no_initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd"
+ * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain
+ * unless executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" domain.
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
@@ -135,7 +245,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
if (!saved_program)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
@@ -161,7 +270,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -193,13 +301,12 @@ bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
from = " from ";
domain = ptr->domainname->name;
}
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
- "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
- "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, from,
- domain)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+ "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
+ "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name,
+ from, domain);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
return done;
@@ -273,7 +380,44 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
return flag;
}
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_domain_keeper_list is used for holding list of domainnames which
+ * suppresses domain transition. Normally, a domainname is monotonically
+ * getting longer. But sometimes, we want to suppress domain transition.
+ * It would be convenient for us that programs executed from a login session
+ * belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to suppress domain
+ * transition.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^keep_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, any process which belongs to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain will remain in that domain,
+ * unless explicitly specified by "initialize_domain" or "no_keep_domain".
+ *
+ * You may specify a program using "from" keyword.
+ * "keep_domain /bin/pwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash"
+ * will cause "/bin/pwd" executed from "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash"
+ * domain to remain in "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain.
+ *
+ * You may add "no_" prefix to "keep_domain".
+ * "keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" and
+ * "no_keep_domain /usr/bin/passwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" will
+ * cause "/usr/bin/passwd" to belong to
+ * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /usr/bin/passwd" domain, unless
+ * explicitly specified by "initialize_domain".
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
@@ -296,7 +440,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
int error = -ENOMEM;
bool is_last_name = false;
@@ -315,7 +458,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
if (!saved_domainname)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
@@ -341,7 +483,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -394,13 +535,12 @@ bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
from = " from ";
program = ptr->program->name;
}
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
- "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
- "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
- ptr->domainname->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+ "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
+ "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
+ ptr->domainname->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
return done;
@@ -446,7 +586,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
return flag;
}
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_alias_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_alias_list is used for holding list of symlink's pathnames which are
+ * allowed to be passed to an execve() request. Normally, the domainname which
+ * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds is calculated
+ * using dereferenced pathnames. But some programs behave differently depending
+ * on the name passed to argv[0]. For busybox, calculating domainname using
+ * dereferenced pathnames will cause all programs in the busybox to belong to
+ * the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to allow use of symlink's
+ * pathname for checking execve()'s permission and calculating domainname which
+ * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^alias /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if /bin/cat is a symlink to /bin/busybox and execution
+ * of /bin/cat is requested, permission is checked for /bin/cat rather than
+ * /bin/busybox and domainname which the current process will belong to after
+ * execve() succeeds is calculated using /bin/cat rather than /bin/busybox .
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
@@ -476,7 +645,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_save_name(aliased_name);
if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
@@ -499,7 +667,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -522,12 +689,11 @@ bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list);
if (ptr->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
- ptr->original_name->name,
- ptr->aliased_name->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
+ ptr->original_name->name,
+ ptr->aliased_name->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
return done;
@@ -567,7 +733,6 @@ int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
name.name = domainname;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
/* Is there an active domain? */
list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
@@ -581,7 +746,6 @@ int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
break;
}
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return 0;
}
@@ -600,7 +764,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
domain = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
if (domain)
@@ -619,7 +782,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
domain->domainname != saved_domainname)
continue;
flag = false;
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
for_each_process(p) {
if (tomoyo_real_domain(p) != domain)
@@ -628,7 +790,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
break;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
if (flag)
continue;
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
@@ -651,7 +812,6 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
}
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return domain;
}
@@ -739,7 +899,7 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
}
/* Check execute permission. */
- retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp);
+ retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index 2316da8ec5bc..5ae3a571559f 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -14,21 +14,50 @@
#include "realpath.h"
#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
-/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "allow_read" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_globally_readable_list .
+ * (2) "filename" is a pathname which is allowed to open(O_RDONLY).
+ * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
bool is_deleted;
};
-/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_pattern_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "tomoyo_pattern_list" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_pattern_list .
+ * (2) "pattern" is a pathname pattern which is used for converting pathnames
+ * to pathname patterns during learning mode.
+ * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_pattern_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
bool is_deleted;
};
-/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry is a structure which is used for holding
+ * "deny_rewrite" entries.
+ * It has following fields.
+ *
+ * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_no_rewrite_list .
+ * (2) "pattern" is a pathname which is by default not permitted to modify
+ * already existing content.
+ * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry {
struct list_head list;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
@@ -141,7 +170,31 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
struct tomoyo_domain_info *
const domain, const bool is_delete);
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_globally_readable_list is used for holding list of pathnames which
+ * are by default allowed to be open()ed for reading by any process.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^allow_read /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, any process is allowed to
+ * open("/lib/libc-2.5.so", O_RDONLY).
+ * One exception is, if the domain which current process belongs to is marked
+ * as "ignore_global_allow_read", current process can't do so unless explicitly
+ * given "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so" to the domain which current process
+ * belongs to.
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
@@ -166,7 +219,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
if (!saved_filename)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
@@ -187,7 +239,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -249,17 +300,44 @@ bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
list);
if (ptr->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
- ptr->filename->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
+ ptr->filename->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
return done;
}
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry". */
+/* tomoyo_pattern_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are used for
+ * converting pathnames to pathname patterns during learning mode.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^file_pattern /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if a process which belongs to a domain which is in
+ * learning mode requested open("/proc/1/mounts", O_RDONLY),
+ * "allow_read /proc/\$/mounts" is automatically added to the domain which that
+ * process belongs to.
+ *
+ * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to use /proc/\$/ instead of
+ * /proc/self/ when current process needs to access only current process's
+ * information. As of now, LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for
+ * calculating pathname. Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function
+ * which pretends as if /proc/self/ is not a symlink; so that we can forbid
+ * current process from accessing other process's information.
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
@@ -284,7 +362,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
if (!saved_pattern)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
@@ -305,7 +382,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -373,17 +449,44 @@ bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list);
if (ptr->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n",
- ptr->pattern->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN
+ "%s\n", ptr->pattern->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
return done;
}
-/* The list for "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry". */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_no_rewrite_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are by
+ * default forbidden to modify already written content of a file.
+ *
+ * An entry is added by
+ *
+ * # echo 'deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and is deleted by
+ *
+ * # echo 'delete deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * and all entries are retrieved by
+ *
+ * # grep ^deny_rewrite /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy
+ *
+ * In the example above, if a process requested to rewrite /var/log/messages ,
+ * the process can't rewrite unless the domain which that process belongs to
+ * has "allow_rewrite /var/log/messages" entry.
+ *
+ * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to add "\040(deleted)" suffix
+ * when we want to allow rewriting already unlink()ed file. As of now,
+ * LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for calculating pathname.
+ * Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function which doesn't append
+ * " (deleted)" suffix if the file is already unlink()ed; so that we don't
+ * need to worry whether the file is already unlink()ed or not.
+ */
static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
@@ -407,7 +510,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
if (!saved_pattern)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
@@ -428,7 +530,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
error = 0;
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -489,11 +590,10 @@ bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list);
if (ptr->is_deleted)
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n",
- ptr->pattern->name)) {
- done = false;
+ done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE
+ "%s\n", ptr->pattern->name);
+ if (!done)
break;
- }
}
up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
return done;
@@ -745,7 +845,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
if (!saved_filename)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
if (is_delete)
goto delete;
@@ -800,7 +899,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
}
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -836,7 +934,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
saved_filename2 = tomoyo_save_name(filename2);
if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
return -ENOMEM;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
if (is_delete)
goto delete;
@@ -884,7 +981,6 @@ static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
}
out:
up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return error;
}
@@ -1025,13 +1121,11 @@ int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
*
* @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
* @filename: Check permission for "execute".
- * @tmp: Buffer for temporary use.
*
* Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise.
*/
int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
- struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp)
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
{
const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
index 40927a84cb6e..5f2e33263371 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c
@@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
= roundup(size, max(sizeof(void *), sizeof(long)));
if (word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX)
return NULL;
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
mutex_lock(&lock);
if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) {
if (!tomoyo_quota_for_elements ||
@@ -251,7 +250,6 @@ void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
}
}
mutex_unlock(&lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return ptr;
}
@@ -267,7 +265,16 @@ static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename;
*/
#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256
-/* Structure for string data. */
+/*
+ * tomoyo_name_entry is a structure which is used for linking
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info" into tomoyo_name_list .
+ *
+ * Since tomoyo_name_list manages a list of strings which are shared by
+ * multiple processes (whereas "struct tomoyo_path_info" inside
+ * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" is not shared), a reference counter will
+ * be added to "struct tomoyo_name_entry" rather than "struct tomoyo_path_info"
+ * when TOMOYO starts supporting garbage collector.
+ */
struct tomoyo_name_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct tomoyo_path_info entry;
@@ -281,10 +288,10 @@ struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list {
};
/*
- * The list for "struct tomoyo_name_entry".
- *
- * This list is updated only inside tomoyo_save_name(), thus
- * no global mutex exists.
+ * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO.
+ * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g.
+ * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of
+ * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
*/
static struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
@@ -318,7 +325,6 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
return NULL;
}
hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
mutex_lock(&lock);
list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH],
list) {
@@ -366,7 +372,6 @@ const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&lock);
- /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index e42be5c4f055..3194d09fe0f4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -262,6 +262,10 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
}
+/*
+ * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
+ * registering TOMOYO.
+ */
static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
.name = "tomoyo",
.cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 41c6ebafb9c5..0fd588a629cf 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -17,13 +17,11 @@ struct path;
struct inode;
struct linux_binprm;
struct pt_regs;
-struct tomoyo_page_buffer;
int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
const char *filename, const u8 perm);
int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
- struct tomoyo_page_buffer *buf);
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename);
int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
struct path *path, const int flag);
int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
@@ -90,17 +88,10 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
return current_cred()->security;
}
-/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
*task)
{
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
- const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
-
- put_cred(cred);
- return domain;
- /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
}
#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */
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