diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
26 files changed, 1964 insertions, 765 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index b32a459c0683..2b517d618672 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX - range 15 21 + range 15 22 default 19 help This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index dc3502e30b19..00afd85f1edb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -4,7 +4,14 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/ -selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o +selinux-y := avc.o \ + hooks.o \ + selinuxfs.o \ + netlink.o \ + nlmsgtab.o \ + netif.o \ + netnode.o \ + exports.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 81b3dff3cbf0..e8529e2f51e5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -661,9 +661,18 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, "daddr", "dest"); break; } - if (a->u.net.netif) - audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", - a->u.net.netif); + if (a->u.net.netif > 0) { + struct net_device *dev; + + /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */ + dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, + a->u.net.netif); + if (dev) { + audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s", + dev->name); + dev_put(dev); + } + } break; } } diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c index b6f96943be1f..87d2bb3ea355 100644 --- a/security/selinux/exports.c +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -17,10 +17,14 @@ #include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/ipc.h> +#include <asm/atomic.h> #include "security.h" #include "objsec.h" +/* SECMARK reference count */ +extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount; + int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { if (selinux_enabled) @@ -74,7 +78,7 @@ int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid); -int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid) +int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid) { if (selinux_enabled) { struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; @@ -84,4 +88,16 @@ int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid) } return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_relabel_packet_permission); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_relabel_packet_permission); + +void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) +{ + atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_inc); + +void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) +{ + atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9f3124b08867..be6de0b8734f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> - * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. - * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> * @@ -50,8 +50,11 @@ #include <net/icmp.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ +#include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <net/netlabel.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> +#include <asm/atomic.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ @@ -76,17 +79,23 @@ #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "netif.h" +#include "netnode.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX +#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4 + extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); extern int selinux_compat_net; extern struct security_operations *security_ops; +/* SECMARK reference count */ +atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP int selinux_enforcing = 0; @@ -153,6 +162,21 @@ getsecurity_exit: return len; } +/** + * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled + * + * Description: + * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK + * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than + * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is + * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. + * + */ +static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) +{ + return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0); +} + /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) @@ -321,8 +345,8 @@ enum { Opt_error = -1, Opt_context = 1, Opt_fscontext = 2, - Opt_defcontext = 4, - Opt_rootcontext = 8, + Opt_defcontext = 3, + Opt_rootcontext = 4, }; static match_table_t tokens = { @@ -366,150 +390,317 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, return rc; } -static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) { - char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; - char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; - const char *name; - u32 sid; - int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0; - struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; + struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode; + int rc = 0; - if (!data) - goto out; + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { + /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no + error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on + the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be + the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have + assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ + if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " + "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto out; + } + rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); + if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { + if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " + "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); + else + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " + "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, + sb->s_type->name, -rc); + goto out; + } + } - name = sb->s_type->name; + sbsec->initialized = 1; - if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { + if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); + else + printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", + sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, + labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); - /* NFS we understand. */ - if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { - struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; + /* Initialize the root inode. */ + rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); - if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) - goto out; + /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. + inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created + during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly + populates itself. */ + spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); +next_inode: + if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { + struct inode_security_struct *isec = + list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, + struct inode_security_struct, list); + struct inode *inode = isec->inode; + spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); + inode = igrab(inode); + if (inode) { + if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) + inode_doinit(inode); + iput(inode); + } + spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); + list_del_init(&isec->list); + goto next_inode; + } + spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); +out: + return rc; +} - if (d->context[0]) { - context = d->context; - seen |= Opt_context; - } - } else - goto out; +/* + * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security + * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying + * mount options, or whatever. + */ +static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, + char ***mount_options, int **mnt_opts_flags, + int *num_opts) +{ + int rc = 0, i; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + char *context = NULL; + u32 len; + char tmp; - } else { - /* Standard string-based options. */ - char *p, *options = data; + *num_opts = 0; + *mount_options = NULL; + *mnt_opts_flags = NULL; - while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { - int token; - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + if (!sbsec->initialized) + return -EINVAL; - if (!*p) - continue; + if (!ss_initialized) + return -EINVAL; - token = match_token(p, tokens, args); + /* + * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount + * settings this is going to need a mask + */ + tmp = sbsec->flags; + /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + if (tmp & 0x01) + (*num_opts)++; + tmp >>= 1; + } - switch (token) { - case Opt_context: - if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); - goto out_free; - } - context = match_strdup(&args[0]); - if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free; - } - if (!alloc) - alloc = 1; - seen |= Opt_context; - break; + *mount_options = kcalloc(*num_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!*mount_options) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free; + } - case Opt_fscontext: - if (seen & Opt_fscontext) { - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); - goto out_free; - } - fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); - if (!fscontext) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free; - } - if (!alloc) - alloc = 1; - seen |= Opt_fscontext; - break; + *mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(*num_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!*mnt_opts_flags) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_free; + } - case Opt_rootcontext: - if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) { - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); - goto out_free; - } - rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); - if (!rootcontext) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free; - } - if (!alloc) - alloc = 1; - seen |= Opt_rootcontext; - break; + i = 0; + if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { + rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + goto out_free; + (*mount_options)[i] = context; + (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { + rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + goto out_free; + (*mount_options)[i] = context; + (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { + rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + goto out_free; + (*mount_options)[i] = context; + (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { + struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; - case Opt_defcontext: - if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: " - "defcontext option is invalid " - "for this filesystem type\n"); - goto out_free; - } - if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) { - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); - goto out_free; - } - defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); - if (!defcontext) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free; - } - if (!alloc) - alloc = 1; - seen |= Opt_defcontext; - break; + rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + goto out_free; + (*mount_options)[i] = context; + (*mnt_opts_flags)[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; + } - default: - rc = -EINVAL; - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount " - "option\n"); - goto out_free; + BUG_ON(i != *num_opts); - } - } - } + return 0; + +out_free: + /* don't leak context string if security_sid_to_context had an error */ + if (*mount_options && i) + for (; i > 0; i--) + kfree((*mount_options)[i-1]); + kfree(*mount_options); + *mount_options = NULL; + kfree(*mnt_opts_flags); + *mnt_opts_flags = NULL; + *num_opts = 0; + return rc; +} - if (!seen) +static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, + u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) +{ + /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ + if (sbsec->initialized) + if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || + (old_sid != new_sid)) + return 1; + + /* check if we were passed the same options twice, + * aka someone passed context=a,context=b + */ + if (!sbsec->initialized) + if (sbsec->flags & flag) + return 1; + return 0; +} +/* + * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point + * labeling information. + */ +static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, char **mount_options, + int *flags, int num_opts) +{ + int rc = 0, i; + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + const char *name = sb->s_type->name; + struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; + u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; + u32 defcontext_sid = 0; + + mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); + + if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!num_opts) { + /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, + after the initial policy is loaded and the security + server is ready to handle calls. */ + spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); + if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) + list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); + spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); + goto out; + } + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "Unable to set superblock options before " + "the security server is initialized\n"); goto out; + } - /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ - if (fscontext) { - rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid); + /* + * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. + * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more + * than once with different security options. + */ + for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { + u32 sid; + rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], + strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", - fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); - goto out_free; + mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); + goto out; } + switch (flags[i]) { + case FSCONTEXT_MNT: + fscontext_sid = sid; + + if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, + fscontext_sid)) + goto out_double_mount; + + sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; + break; + case CONTEXT_MNT: + context_sid = sid; - rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); + if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, + context_sid)) + goto out_double_mount; + + sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; + break; + case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: + rootcontext_sid = sid; + + if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, + rootcontext_sid)) + goto out_double_mount; + + sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; + + break; + case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: + defcontext_sid = sid; + + if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, + defcontext_sid)) + goto out_double_mount; + + sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; + + break; + default: + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + } + + if (sbsec->initialized) { + /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ + if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts) + goto out_double_mount; + rc = 0; + goto out; + } + + if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) + sbsec->proc = 1; + + /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ + rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); + if (rc) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", + __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); + goto out; + } + + /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ + if (fscontext_sid) { + + rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec); if (rc) - goto out_free; + goto out; - sbsec->sid = sid; + sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; } /* @@ -517,182 +708,250 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set * the superblock context if not already set. */ - if (context) { - rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", - context, sb->s_id, name, rc); - goto out_free; - } - - if (!fscontext) { - rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); + if (context_sid) { + if (!fscontext_sid) { + rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec); if (rc) - goto out_free; - sbsec->sid = sid; + goto out; + sbsec->sid = context_sid; } else { - rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); + rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec); if (rc) - goto out_free; + goto out; } - sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; + if (!rootcontext_sid) + rootcontext_sid = context_sid; + sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; } - if (rootcontext) { - struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode; - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", - rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); - goto out_free; - } - - rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); + if (rootcontext_sid) { + rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec); if (rc) - goto out_free; + goto out; - isec->sid = sid; - isec->initialized = 1; + root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; + root_isec->initialized = 1; } - if (defcontext) { - rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", - defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc); - goto out_free; + if (defcontext_sid) { + if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " + "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); + goto out; } - if (sid == sbsec->def_sid) - goto out_free; - - rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec); - if (rc) - goto out_free; + if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { + rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, + sbsec, tsec); + if (rc) + goto out; + } - sbsec->def_sid = sid; + sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } -out_free: - if (alloc) { - kfree(context); - kfree(defcontext); - kfree(fscontext); - kfree(rootcontext); - } + rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: + mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); return rc; +out_double_mount: + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " + "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); + goto out; } -static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, + struct super_block *newsb) { - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; - struct inode *inode = root->d_inode; - int rc = 0; + const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; + struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; - mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); - if (sbsec->initialized) - goto out; + int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); + int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); + int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); - if (!ss_initialized) { - /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, - after the initial policy is loaded and the security - server is ready to handle calls. */ - spin_lock(&sb_security_lock); - if (list_empty(&sbsec->list)) - list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head); - spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock); - goto out; + /* we can't error, we can't save the info, this shouldn't get called + * this early in the boot process. */ + BUG_ON(!ss_initialized); + + /* this might go away sometime down the line if there is a new user + * of clone, but for now, nfs better not get here... */ + BUG_ON(newsbsec->initialized); + + /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ + BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized); + + mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); + + newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; + + newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; + newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; + newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; + + if (set_context) { + u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; + + if (!set_fscontext) + newsbsec->sid = sid; + if (!set_rootcontext) { + struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; + newisec->sid = sid; + } + newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; } + if (set_rootcontext) { + const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode; + const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; + struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode; + struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; - /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); - if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", - __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc); - goto out; + newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; } - rc = try_context_mount(sb, data); - if (rc) + sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); + mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); +} + +/* + * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec + */ +static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; + char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; + int rc = 0; + char *p, *options = data; + /* selinux only know about a fixed number of mount options */ + char *mnt_opts[NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS]; + int mnt_opts_flags[NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS], num_mnt_opts = 0; + + if (!data) goto out; - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { - /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no - error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on - the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be - the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have - assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ - if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " - "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); - rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; - goto out; - } - rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); - if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { - if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " - "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", - sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); - else - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " - "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, - sb->s_type->name, -rc); + /* with the nfs patch this will become a goto out; */ + if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) { + const char *name = sb->s_type->name; + /* NFS we understand. */ + if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) { + struct nfs_mount_data *d = data; + + if (d->version != NFS_MOUNT_VERSION) + goto out; + + if (d->context[0]) { + context = kstrdup(d->context, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!context) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + } + goto build_flags; + } else goto out; - } } - if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) - sbsec->proc = 1; + /* Standard string-based options. */ + while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { + int token; + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; - sbsec->initialized = 1; + if (!*p) + continue; - if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", - sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); - } - else { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", - sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, - labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); - } + token = match_token(p, tokens, args); - /* Initialize the root inode. */ - rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root); + switch (token) { + case Opt_context: + if (context || defcontext) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + goto out_err; + } + context = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!context) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + break; + + case Opt_fscontext: + if (fscontext) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + goto out_err; + } + fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!fscontext) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + break; + + case Opt_rootcontext: + if (rootcontext) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + goto out_err; + } + rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!rootcontext) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + break; + + case Opt_defcontext: + if (context || defcontext) { + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); + goto out_err; + } + defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); + if (!defcontext) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out_err; + } + break; + + default: + rc = -EINVAL; + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); + goto out_err; - /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. - inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created - during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly - populates itself. */ - spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); -next_inode: - if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = - list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, - struct inode_security_struct, list); - struct inode *inode = isec->inode; - spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); - inode = igrab(inode); - if (inode) { - if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode)) - inode_doinit(inode); - iput(inode); } - spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); - list_del_init(&isec->list); - goto next_inode; } - spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); + +build_flags: + if (fscontext) { + mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext; + mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (context) { + mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context; + mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (rootcontext) { + mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext; + mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; + } + if (defcontext) { + mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext; + mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; + } + out: - mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); + rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, mnt_opts, mnt_opts_flags, num_mnt_opts); +out_err: + kfree(context); + kfree(defcontext); + kfree(fscontext); + kfree(rootcontext); return rc; } @@ -3158,7 +3417,7 @@ out: #endif /* IPV6 */ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, - char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto) + char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto) { int ret = 0; @@ -3167,7 +3426,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; - *len = 4; *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr : &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr); break; @@ -3177,7 +3435,6 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); if (ret || !addrp) break; - *len = 16; *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr : &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr); break; @@ -3186,36 +3443,48 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad, break; } + if (unlikely(ret)) + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," + " unable to parse packet\n"); + return ret; } /** - * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet + * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet * @skb: the packet - * @sid: the packet's SID + * @family: protocol family + * @sid: the packet's peer label SID * * Description: - * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine - * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is - * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are - * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec - * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel - * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to - * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(). + * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine + * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in + * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function + * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) + * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different + * peer labels. * */ -static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid) +static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) { + int err; u32 xfrm_sid; u32 nlbl_sid; + u32 nlbl_type; selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); - if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, - (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ? - SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid), - &nlbl_sid) != 0) - nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL; - *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid); + selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); + + err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); + if (unlikely(err)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," + " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; } /* socket security operations */ @@ -3281,6 +3550,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, if (sock->sk) { sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; sksec->sid = isec->sid; + sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock); } @@ -3373,7 +3643,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in break; } - err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid); + err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid); if (err) goto out; @@ -3584,131 +3854,182 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, return 0; } -static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, - struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len) +static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, + u32 peer_sid, + struct avc_audit_data *ad) { - int err = 0; - u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0; - struct socket *sock; - u16 sock_class = 0; - u32 sock_sid = 0; - - read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - sock = sk->sk_socket; - if (sock) { - struct inode *inode; - inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); - if (inode) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - isec = inode->i_security; - sock_sid = isec->sid; - sock_class = isec->sclass; - } - } - read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - if (!sock_sid) - goto out; + int err; + u32 if_sid; + u32 node_sid; - if (!skb->dev) - goto out; + err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid); + if (err) + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, + SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); + if (err) + return err; - err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL); + err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) - goto out; + return err; + return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, + SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); +} - switch (sock_class) { +static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, + u16 family, + char *addrp) +{ + int err; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + u16 sk_class; + u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm; + u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid; + + sk_sid = sksec->sid; + sk_class = sksec->sclass; + + switch (sk_class) { case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV; node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV; recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; break; - case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV; node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV; recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; break; - case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV; node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV; recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG; break; - default: netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV; node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV; + recv_perm = 0; break; } - err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); + err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid); if (err) - goto out; - - err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); if (err) - goto out; + return err; - err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); + err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) - goto out; + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); + if (err) + return err; - if (recv_perm) { - u32 port_sid; + if (!recv_perm) + return 0; + err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, + sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), + &port_sid); + if (unlikely(err)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in" + " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat()," + " network port label not found\n"); + return err; + } + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad); +} - err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, - sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), - &port_sid); - if (err) - goto out; +static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, + u16 family, char *addrp) +{ + int err; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + u32 peer_sid; + u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; - err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid, - sock_class, recv_perm, ad); + if (selinux_compat_net) + err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad, + family, addrp); + else + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + PACKET__RECV, ad); + if (err) + return err; + + if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) { + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); + if (err) + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, + SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad); + } else { + err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad); + if (err) + return err; + err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad); } -out: return err; } static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { - u16 family; - char *addrp; - int len, err = 0; - struct avc_audit_data ad; + int err; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + u16 family = sk->sk_family; + u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; + struct avc_audit_data ad; + char *addrp; - family = sk->sk_family; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) - goto out; + return 0; /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]"; + ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif; ad.u.net.family = family; - - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL); + err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); if (err) - goto out; + return err; - if (selinux_compat_net) - err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family, - addrp, len); - else - err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, - PACKET__RECV, &ad); - if (err) - goto out; + /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing + * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the + * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function + * as fast and as clean as possible. */ + if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer) + return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, + family, addrp); - err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad); - if (err) - goto out; + if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) { + u32 peer_sid; + + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); + if (err) + return err; + err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family, + peer_sid, &ad); + if (err) + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, + PEER__RECV, &ad); + } + + if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, + PACKET__RECV, &ad); + if (err) + return err; + } - err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); -out: return err; } @@ -3759,18 +4080,25 @@ out: static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; - int err = 0; + u16 family; - if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) + if (sock) + family = sock->sk->sk_family; + else if (skb && skb->sk) + family = skb->sk->sk_family; + else + goto out; + + if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); else if (skb) - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid); + selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); - if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) - err = -EINVAL; +out: *secid = peer_secid; - - return err; + if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) @@ -3790,6 +4118,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) newssec->sid = ssec->sid; newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid; + newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec); } @@ -3813,6 +4142,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent) if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) isec->sid = sksec->sid; + sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent); } @@ -3825,7 +4155,9 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 newsid; u32 peersid; - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid); + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid); + if (err) + return err; if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) { req->secid = sksec->sid; req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; @@ -3863,7 +4195,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid); + selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid); } static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, @@ -3910,149 +4242,260 @@ out: #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER -static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev, - struct avc_audit_data *ad, - u16 family, char *addrp, int len) +static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, + u16 family) { - int err = 0; - u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0; - struct socket *sock; - struct inode *inode; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; + char *addrp; + u32 peer_sid; + struct avc_audit_data ad; + u8 secmark_active; + u8 peerlbl_active; - sock = sk->sk_socket; - if (!sock) - goto out; + if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) + return NF_ACCEPT; - inode = SOCK_INODE(sock); - if (!inode) - goto out; + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return NF_ACCEPT; - isec = inode->i_security; - - err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL); - if (err) - goto out; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net.family = family; + if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + + if (peerlbl_active) + if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family, + peer_sid, &ad) != 0) + return NF_DROP; + + if (secmark_active) + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, + SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) + return NF_DROP; + + return NF_ACCEPT; +} + +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +{ + return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET); +} - switch (isec->sclass) { +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) +static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +{ + return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6); +} +#endif /* IPV6 */ + +static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk, + int ifindex, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, + u16 family, char *addrp) +{ + int err; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + u16 sk_class; + u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm; + u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid; + + sk_sid = sksec->sid; + sk_class = sksec->sclass; + + switch (sk_class) { case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND; node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND; send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; break; - case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND; node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND; send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; break; - case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND; node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND; send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG; break; - default: netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND; node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND; + send_perm = 0; break; } - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); + err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid); if (err) - goto out; + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad); + return err; - err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid); + err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); if (err) - goto out; - - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); + return err; + err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad); if (err) - goto out; + return err; - if (send_perm) { - u32 port_sid; - - err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, - sk->sk_type, - sk->sk_protocol, - ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), - &port_sid); - if (err) - goto out; + if (send_perm != 0) + return 0; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass, - send_perm, ad); + err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, + sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), + &port_sid); + if (unlikely(err)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in" + " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat()," + " network port label not found\n"); + return err; } -out: - return err; + return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad); } -static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, - struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct net_device *in, - const struct net_device *out, - int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), - u16 family) +static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, + int ifindex, + struct avc_audit_data *ad, + u16 family, + char *addrp, + u8 proto) { - char *addrp; - int len, err = 0; - struct sock *sk; - struct avc_audit_data ad; - struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out; + struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - u8 proto; - - sk = skb->sk; - if (!sk) - goto out; + if (sk == NULL) + return NF_ACCEPT; sksec = sk->sk_security; - AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.netif = dev->name; - ad.u.net.family = family; + if (selinux_compat_net) { + if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex, + ad, family, addrp)) + return NF_DROP; + } else { + if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, + SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad)) + return NF_DROP; + } - err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto); - if (err) - goto out; + if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) + if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto)) + return NF_DROP; - if (selinux_compat_net) - err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad, - family, addrp, len); - else - err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, - PACKET__SEND, &ad); + return NF_ACCEPT; +} - if (err) - goto out; +static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, + u16 family) +{ + u32 secmark_perm; + u32 peer_sid; + struct sock *sk; + struct avc_audit_data ad; + char *addrp; + u8 proto; + u8 secmark_active; + u8 peerlbl_active; - err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto); -out: - return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT; + AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; + ad.u.net.family = family; + if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) + return NF_DROP; + + /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing + * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the + * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function + * as fast and as clean as possible. */ + if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer) + return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad, + family, addrp, proto); + + /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec + * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks + * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks + * when the packet is on it's final way out. + * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst + * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */ + if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); + peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled(); + if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the + * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being + * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label + * directly from the packet */ + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + peer_sid = sksec->sid; + secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; + } else { + if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; + } + + if (secmark_active) + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, + SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) + return NF_DROP; + + if (peerlbl_active) { + u32 if_sid; + u32 node_sid; + + if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, + SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) + return NF_DROP; + + if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) + return NF_DROP; + if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, + SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) + return NF_DROP; + } + + return NF_ACCEPT; } -static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, - struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct net_device *in, - const struct net_device *out, - int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) { - return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET); + return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET); } #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) - -static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum, - struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct net_device *in, - const struct net_device *out, - int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) { - return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6); + return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6); } - #endif /* IPV6 */ #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ @@ -4710,6 +5153,11 @@ static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); } +static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) +{ + return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid); +} + static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { kfree(secdata); @@ -4800,6 +5248,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs, .sb_mount = selinux_mount, .sb_umount = selinux_umount, + .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts, + .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts, + .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts, .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security, .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security, @@ -4898,6 +5349,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr, .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx, + .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid, .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx, .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect, @@ -5031,22 +5483,40 @@ security_initcall(selinux_init); #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) -static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = { - .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last, - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET, - .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, - .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, +static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = { + { + .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = PF_INET, + .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, + .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, + }, + { + .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = PF_INET, + .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, + .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + } }; #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) -static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = { - .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last, - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .pf = PF_INET6, - .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, - .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, +static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = { + { + .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = PF_INET6, + .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, + .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, + }, + { + .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = PF_INET6, + .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, + .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + } }; #endif /* IPV6 */ @@ -5054,22 +5524,27 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = { static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) { int err = 0; + u32 iter; if (!selinux_enabled) goto out; printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); - err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); - if (err) - panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err); + for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) { + err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]); + if (err) + panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", + err); + } #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) - - err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); - if (err) - panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err); - + for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) { + err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]); + if (err) + panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", + err); + } #endif /* IPV6 */ out: @@ -5081,11 +5556,15 @@ __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) { + u32 iter; + printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); - nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op); + for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) + nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]); #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) - nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op); + for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) + nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]); #endif /* IPV6 */ } #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h index 049bf69429b6..399f868c5c8f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__ENFORCE_DEST, "enforce_dest") S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv") S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send") + S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, "recvfrom") + S_(SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, "sendto") S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_RECV, "tcp_recv") S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__TCP_SEND, "tcp_send") S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__UDP_RECV, "udp_recv") @@ -45,6 +47,8 @@ S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__RAWIP_SEND, "rawip_send") S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_RECV, "dccp_recv") S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__DCCP_SEND, "dccp_send") + S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, "ingress") + S_(SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, "egress") S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto") S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__NEWCONN, "newconn") S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__ACCEPTFROM, "acceptfrom") @@ -149,6 +153,10 @@ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send") S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv") S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto") + S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_IN, "flow_in") + S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, "flow_out") + S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, "forward_in") + S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_OUT, "forward_out") S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view") S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read") S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write") @@ -159,3 +167,4 @@ S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND, "node_bind") S_(SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET, DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, "name_connect") S_(SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, "mmap_zero") + S_(SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, "recv") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h index eda89a2ec635..84c9abc80978 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ #define NODE__ENFORCE_DEST 0x00000040UL #define NODE__DCCP_RECV 0x00000080UL #define NODE__DCCP_SEND 0x00000100UL +#define NODE__RECVFROM 0x00000200UL +#define NODE__SENDTO 0x00000400UL #define NETIF__TCP_RECV 0x00000001UL #define NETIF__TCP_SEND 0x00000002UL #define NETIF__UDP_RECV 0x00000004UL @@ -300,6 +302,8 @@ #define NETIF__RAWIP_SEND 0x00000020UL #define NETIF__DCCP_RECV 0x00000040UL #define NETIF__DCCP_SEND 0x00000080UL +#define NETIF__INGRESS 0x00000100UL +#define NETIF__EGRESS 0x00000200UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL #define NETLINK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL @@ -792,6 +796,10 @@ #define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL #define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL #define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL +#define PACKET__FLOW_IN 0x00000008UL +#define PACKET__FLOW_OUT 0x00000010UL +#define PACKET__FORWARD_IN 0x00000020UL +#define PACKET__FORWARD_OUT 0x00000040UL #define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL #define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL #define KEY__WRITE 0x00000004UL @@ -824,3 +832,4 @@ #define DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND 0x00400000UL #define DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT 0x00800000UL #define MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO 0x00000001UL +#define PEER__RECV 0x00000001UL diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 553607a19e92..80c28fa6621c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct avc_audit_data { struct inode *inode; } fs; struct { - char *netif; + int netif; struct sock *sk; u16 family; __be16 dport; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h index e77de0e62ea0..b1b0d1d8f950 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h @@ -64,3 +64,10 @@ S_(NULL) S_("dccp_socket") S_("memprotect") + S_(NULL) + S_(NULL) + S_(NULL) + S_(NULL) + S_(NULL) + S_(NULL) + S_("peer") diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h index a9c2b20f14b5..09e9dd23ee1a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #define SECCLASS_KEY 58 #define SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET 60 #define SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT 61 +#define SECCLASS_PEER 68 /* * Security identifier indices for initial entities diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netif.h b/security/selinux/include/netif.h index 8bd6f9992d2b..ce23edd128b3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/netif.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/netif.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com> * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -15,7 +17,7 @@ #ifndef _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ #define _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ -int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid); +int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid); #endif /* _SELINUX_NETIF_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h index 218e3f77c350..00a2809c8506 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h @@ -46,13 +46,17 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, struct sk_security_struct *newssec); -int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid); +int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, + u32 *type, + u32 *sid); void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock); int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock); int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask); int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, struct avc_audit_data *ad); int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, @@ -83,9 +87,11 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone( } static inline int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, - u32 base_sid, + u16 family, + u32 *type, u32 *sid) { + *type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_NONE; *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } @@ -106,6 +112,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, } static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, struct avc_audit_data *ad) { return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netnode.h b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1b94450d11d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/netnode.h @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* + * Network node table + * + * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs. This + * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is + * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on + * a per-packet basis. + * + * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + */ + +/* + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007 + * + * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_NETNODE_H +#define _SELINUX_NETNODE_H + +int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid); + +#endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 642a9fd319ad..c6c2bb4ebacc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */ unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */ + unsigned char flags; /* which mount options were specified */ unsigned char proc; /* proc fs */ struct mutex lock; struct list_head isec_head; @@ -95,17 +96,25 @@ struct bprm_security_struct { }; struct netif_security_struct { - struct net_device *dev; /* back pointer */ - u32 if_sid; /* SID for this interface */ - u32 msg_sid; /* default SID for messages received on this interface */ + int ifindex; /* device index */ + u32 sid; /* SID for this interface */ +}; + +struct netnode_security_struct { + union { + __be32 ipv4; /* IPv4 node address */ + struct in6_addr ipv6; /* IPv6 node address */ + } addr; + u32 sid; /* SID for this node */ + u16 family; /* address family */ }; struct sk_security_struct { struct sock *sk; /* back pointer to sk object */ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */ u32 peer_sid; /* SID of peer */ -#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL u16 sclass; /* sock security class */ +#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL enum { /* NetLabel state */ NLBL_UNSET = 0, NLBL_REQUIRE, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 39337afffec2..23137c17f917 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -25,13 +25,14 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS 19 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB 20 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS 21 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP 22 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE #else -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP #endif struct netlbl_lsm_secattr; @@ -39,8 +40,19 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr; extern int selinux_enabled; extern int selinux_mls_enabled; +/* Policy capabilities */ +enum { + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, + __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX +}; +#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) + +extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; + int security_load_policy(void * data, size_t len); +int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap); + #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32 struct av_decision { u32 allowed; @@ -77,8 +89,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, int security_port_sid(u16 domain, u16 type, u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid); -int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid, - u32 *msg_sid); +int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid); int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, u32 *out_sid); @@ -88,10 +99,15 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); +int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, + u32 xfrm_sid, + u32 *peer_sid); + int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses); int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms); int security_get_reject_unknown(void); int security_get_allow_unknown(void); +int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values); #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */ @@ -108,7 +124,6 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, - u32 base_sid, u32 *sid); int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, @@ -116,7 +131,6 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, #else static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid( struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, - u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) { return -EIDRM; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 31929e39f5ca..36b0510efa7b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk) } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount; + +static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) +{ + return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0); +} + int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad); int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, @@ -43,6 +50,11 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid); } #else +static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad) { diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index e87ab948104c..013d3117a86b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, @@ -29,14 +31,6 @@ #define SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE 64 #define SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX 1024 -#undef DEBUG - -#ifdef DEBUG -#define DEBUGP printk -#else -#define DEBUGP(format, args...) -#endif - struct sel_netif { struct list_head list; @@ -49,174 +43,226 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sel_netif_list); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netif_lock); static struct list_head sel_netif_hash[SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE]; -static inline u32 sel_netif_hasfn(struct net_device *dev) +/** + * sel_netif_hashfn - Hashing function for the interface table + * @ifindex: the network interface + * + * Description: + * This is the hashing function for the network interface table, it returns the + * bucket number for the given interface. + * + */ +static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(int ifindex) { - return (dev->ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1)); + return (ifindex & (SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE - 1)); } -/* - * All of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we optimize - * for that case. +/** + * sel_netif_find - Search for an interface record + * @ifindex: the network interface + * + * Description: + * Search the network interface table and return the record matching @ifindex. + * If an entry can not be found in the table return NULL. + * */ -static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(struct net_device *dev) +static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(int ifindex) { - struct list_head *pos; - int idx = sel_netif_hasfn(dev); + int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ifindex); + struct sel_netif *netif; - __list_for_each_rcu(pos, &sel_netif_hash[idx]) { - struct sel_netif *netif = list_entry(pos, - struct sel_netif, list); - if (likely(netif->nsec.dev == dev)) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list) + /* all of the devices should normally fit in the hash, so we + * optimize for that case */ + if (likely(netif->nsec.ifindex == ifindex)) return netif; - } + return NULL; } +/** + * sel_netif_insert - Insert a new interface into the table + * @netif: the new interface record + * + * Description: + * Add a new interface record to the network interface hash table. Returns + * zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif) { - int idx, ret = 0; + int idx; - if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX) { - ret = -ENOSPC; - goto out; - } + if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX) + return -ENOSPC; - idx = sel_netif_hasfn(netif->nsec.dev); + idx = sel_netif_hashfn(netif->nsec.ifindex); list_add_rcu(&netif->list, &sel_netif_hash[idx]); sel_netif_total++; -out: - return ret; + + return 0; } +/** + * sel_netif_free - Frees an interface entry + * @p: the entry's RCU field + * + * Description: + * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu() + * function so that memory allocated to a hash table interface entry can be + * released safely. + * + */ static void sel_netif_free(struct rcu_head *p) { struct sel_netif *netif = container_of(p, struct sel_netif, rcu_head); - - DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name); kfree(netif); } +/** + * sel_netif_destroy - Remove an interface record from the table + * @netif: the existing interface record + * + * Description: + * Remove an existing interface record from the network interface table. + * + */ static void sel_netif_destroy(struct sel_netif *netif) { - DEBUGP("%s: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, netif->nsec.dev->name); - list_del_rcu(&netif->list); sel_netif_total--; call_rcu(&netif->rcu_head, sel_netif_free); } -static struct sel_netif *sel_netif_lookup(struct net_device *dev) +/** + * sel_netif_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network interface using the policy + * @ifindex: the network interface + * @sid: interface SID + * + * Description: + * This function determines the SID of a network interface by quering the + * security policy. The result is added to the network interface table to + * speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on + * failure. + * + */ +static int sel_netif_sid_slow(int ifindex, u32 *sid) { int ret; - struct sel_netif *netif, *new; - struct netif_security_struct *nsec; - - netif = sel_netif_find(dev); - if (likely(netif != NULL)) - goto out; - - new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!new) { - netif = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - goto out; + struct sel_netif *netif; + struct sel_netif *new = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; + + /* NOTE: we always use init's network namespace since we don't + * currently support containers */ + + dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifindex); + if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow()," + " invalid network interface (%d)\n", ifindex); + return -ENOENT; } - - nsec = &new->nsec; - ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &nsec->if_sid, &nsec->msg_sid); - if (ret < 0) { - kfree(new); - netif = ERR_PTR(ret); + spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); + netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex); + if (netif != NULL) { + *sid = netif->nsec.sid; + ret = 0; goto out; } - - nsec->dev = dev; - - spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); - - netif = sel_netif_find(dev); - if (netif) { - spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); - kfree(new); + new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (new == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - + ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid); + if (ret != 0) + goto out; + new->nsec.ifindex = ifindex; ret = sel_netif_insert(new); - spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); - - if (ret) { - kfree(new); - netif = ERR_PTR(ret); + if (ret != 0) goto out; - } + *sid = new->nsec.sid; - netif = new; - - DEBUGP("new: ifindex=%u name=%s if_sid=%u msg_sid=%u\n", dev->ifindex, dev->name, - nsec->if_sid, nsec->msg_sid); out: - return netif; -} - -static void sel_netif_assign_sids(u32 if_sid_in, u32 msg_sid_in, u32 *if_sid_out, u32 *msg_sid_out) -{ - if (if_sid_out) - *if_sid_out = if_sid_in; - if (msg_sid_out) - *msg_sid_out = msg_sid_in; -} - -static int sel_netif_sids_slow(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid) -{ - int ret = 0; - u32 tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid; - - ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &tmp_if_sid, &tmp_msg_sid); - if (!ret) - sel_netif_assign_sids(tmp_if_sid, tmp_msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid); + spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); + dev_put(dev); + if (unlikely(ret)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow()," + " unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n", + ifindex); + kfree(new); + } return ret; } -int sel_netif_sids(struct net_device *dev, u32 *if_sid, u32 *msg_sid) +/** + * sel_netif_sid - Lookup the SID of a network interface + * @ifindex: the network interface + * @sid: interface SID + * + * Description: + * This function determines the SID of a network interface using the fastest + * method possible. First the interface table is queried, but if an entry + * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the + * table to speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values + * on failure. + * + */ +int sel_netif_sid(int ifindex, u32 *sid) { - int ret = 0; struct sel_netif *netif; rcu_read_lock(); - netif = sel_netif_lookup(dev); - if (IS_ERR(netif)) { + netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex); + if (likely(netif != NULL)) { + *sid = netif->nsec.sid; rcu_read_unlock(); - ret = sel_netif_sids_slow(dev, if_sid, msg_sid); - goto out; + return 0; } - sel_netif_assign_sids(netif->nsec.if_sid, netif->nsec.msg_sid, if_sid, msg_sid); rcu_read_unlock(); -out: - return ret; + + return sel_netif_sid_slow(ifindex, sid); } -static void sel_netif_kill(struct net_device *dev) +/** + * sel_netif_kill - Remove an entry from the network interface table + * @ifindex: the network interface + * + * Description: + * This function removes the entry matching @ifindex from the network interface + * table if it exists. + * + */ +static void sel_netif_kill(int ifindex) { struct sel_netif *netif; spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); - netif = sel_netif_find(dev); + netif = sel_netif_find(ifindex); if (netif) sel_netif_destroy(netif); spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); } +/** + * sel_netif_flush - Flush the entire network interface table + * + * Description: + * Remove all entries from the network interface table. + * + */ static void sel_netif_flush(void) { int idx; + struct sel_netif *netif; spin_lock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); - for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++) { - struct sel_netif *netif; - + for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; idx++) list_for_each_entry(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list) sel_netif_destroy(netif); - } spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock); } @@ -239,7 +285,7 @@ static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this, return NOTIFY_DONE; if (event == NETDEV_DOWN) - sel_netif_kill(dev); + sel_netif_kill(dev->ifindex); return NOTIFY_DONE; } @@ -250,10 +296,10 @@ static struct notifier_block sel_netif_netdev_notifier = { static __init int sel_netif_init(void) { - int i, err = 0; + int i, err; if (!selinux_enabled) - goto out; + return 0; for (i = 0; i < SEL_NETIF_HASH_SIZE; i++) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netif_hash[i]); @@ -265,7 +311,6 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void) if (err) panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err); -out: return err; } diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 66e013d6f6f6..0fa2be4149e8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -36,6 +36,33 @@ #include "security.h" /** + * selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup + * @skb: the packet + * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes + * @sid: the SID + * + * Description: + * Query the SELinux security server to lookup the correct SID for the given + * security attributes. If the query is successful, cache the result to speed + * up future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, + u32 *sid) +{ + int rc; + + rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid); + if (rc == 0 && + (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) && + (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)) + netlbl_cache_add(skb, secattr); + + return rc; +} + +/** * selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid - Label a socket using the NetLabel mechanism * @sk: the socket to label * @sid: the SID to use @@ -137,14 +164,14 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, * lock as other threads could have access to ssec */ rcu_read_lock(); selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, ssec->sk->sk_family); - newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass; rcu_read_unlock(); } /** * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid - Get the sid of a packet using NetLabel * @skb: the packet - * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes + * @family: protocol family + * @type: NetLabel labeling protocol type * @sid: the SID * * Description: @@ -153,7 +180,10 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(struct sk_security_struct *ssec, * assign to the packet. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ -int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) +int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, + u32 *type, + u32 *sid) { int rc; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; @@ -164,15 +194,12 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) } netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr); - if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) { - rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid); - if (rc == 0 && - (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) && - (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)) - netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr); - } else + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) + rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, sid); + else *sid = SECSID_NULL; + *type = secattr.type; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); return rc; @@ -190,13 +217,10 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) */ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; u32 nlbl_peer_sid; - sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; - rcu_read_lock(); if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQUIRE) { @@ -207,9 +231,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock) netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE && - security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, - SECINITSID_NETMSG, - &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0) + security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0) sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); @@ -234,11 +256,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock) { int rc = 0; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; - rcu_read_lock(); if (sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_REQUIRE) rc = selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid(sk, sksec->sid); @@ -292,6 +311,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) * selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb - Do an inbound access check using NetLabel * @sksec: the sock's sk_security_struct * @skb: the packet + * @family: protocol family * @ad: the audit data * * Description: @@ -302,6 +322,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) */ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 family, struct avc_audit_data *ad) { int rc; @@ -313,16 +334,10 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec, return 0; netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr); - if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) { - rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, - SECINITSID_NETMSG, - &nlbl_sid); - if (rc == 0 && - (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) && - (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)) - netlbl_cache_add(skb, &secattr); - } else + rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); + if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE) + rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, &nlbl_sid); + else nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); if (rc != 0) diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f3c526f2cacb --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +/* + * Network node table + * + * SELinux must keep a mapping of network nodes to labels/SIDs. This + * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is + * needed to reduce the lookup overhead since most of these queries happen on + * a per-packet basis. + * + * Author: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * This code is heavily based on the "netif" concept originally developed by + * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * (see security/selinux/netif.c for more information) + * + */ + +/* + * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2007 + * + * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + */ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/in.h> +#include <linux/in6.h> +#include <linux/ip.h> +#include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <net/ip.h> +#include <net/ipv6.h> +#include <asm/bug.h> + +#include "objsec.h" + +#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE 256 +#define SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT 16 + +struct sel_netnode { + struct netnode_security_struct nsec; + + struct list_head list; + struct rcu_head rcu; +}; + +/* NOTE: we are using a combined hash table for both IPv4 and IPv6, the reason + * for this is that I suspect most users will not make heavy use of both + * address families at the same time so one table will usually end up wasted, + * if this becomes a problem we can always add a hash table for each address + * family later */ + +static LIST_HEAD(sel_netnode_list); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_netnode_lock); +static struct list_head sel_netnode_hash[SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE]; + +/** + * sel_netnode_free - Frees a node entry + * @p: the entry's RCU field + * + * Description: + * This function is designed to be used as a callback to the call_rcu() + * function so that memory allocated to a hash table node entry can be + * released safely. + * + */ +static void sel_netnode_free(struct rcu_head *p) +{ + struct sel_netnode *node = container_of(p, struct sel_netnode, rcu); + kfree(node); +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4 - IPv4 hashing function for the node table + * @addr: IPv4 address + * + * Description: + * This is the IPv4 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns + * the bucket number for the given IP address. + * + */ +static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(__be32 addr) +{ + /* at some point we should determine if the mismatch in byte order + * affects the hash function dramatically */ + return (addr & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1)); +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6 - IPv6 hashing function for the node table + * @addr: IPv6 address + * + * Description: + * This is the IPv6 hashing function for the node interface table, it returns + * the bucket number for the given IP address. + * + */ +static u32 sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr) +{ + /* just hash the least significant 32 bits to keep things fast (they + * are the most likely to be different anyway), we can revisit this + * later if needed */ + return (addr->s6_addr32[3] & (SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE - 1)); +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_find - Search for a node record + * @addr: IP address + * @family: address family + * + * Description: + * Search the network node table and return the record matching @addr. If an + * entry can not be found in the table return NULL. + * + */ +static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family) +{ + u32 idx; + struct sel_netnode *node; + + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(__be32 *)addr); + break; + case PF_INET6: + idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr); + break; + default: + BUG(); + } + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list) + if (node->nsec.family == family) + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(__be32 *)addr) + return node; + break; + case PF_INET6: + if (ipv6_addr_equal(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6, + addr)) + return node; + break; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_insert - Insert a new node into the table + * @node: the new node record + * + * Description: + * Add a new node record to the network address hash table. Returns zero on + * success, negative values on failure. + * + */ +static int sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) +{ + u32 idx; + u32 count = 0; + struct sel_netnode *iter; + + switch (node->nsec.family) { + case PF_INET: + idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(node->nsec.addr.ipv4); + break; + case PF_INET6: + idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(&node->nsec.addr.ipv6); + break; + default: + BUG(); + } + list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx]); + + /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check + * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */ + list_for_each_entry(iter, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list) + if (++count > SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) { + list_del_rcu(&iter->list); + call_rcu(&iter->rcu, sel_netnode_free); + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_destroy - Remove a node record from the table + * @node: the existing node record + * + * Description: + * Remove an existing node record from the network address table. + * + */ +static void sel_netnode_destroy(struct sel_netnode *node) +{ + list_del_rcu(&node->list); + call_rcu(&node->rcu, sel_netnode_free); +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a network address using the policy + * @addr: the IP address + * @family: the address family + * @sid: node SID + * + * Description: + * This function determines the SID of a network address by quering the + * security policy. The result is added to the network address table to + * speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on + * failure. + * + */ +static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) +{ + int ret; + struct sel_netnode *node; + struct sel_netnode *new = NULL; + + spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); + node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family); + if (node != NULL) { + *sid = node->nsec.sid; + ret = 0; + goto out; + } + new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (new == NULL) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + switch (family) { + case PF_INET: + ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET, + addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), + &new->nsec.sid); + new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr; + break; + case PF_INET6: + ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6, + addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), + &new->nsec.sid); + ipv6_addr_copy(&new->nsec.addr.ipv6, addr); + break; + default: + BUG(); + } + if (ret != 0) + goto out; + new->nsec.family = family; + ret = sel_netnode_insert(new); + if (ret != 0) + goto out; + *sid = new->nsec.sid; + +out: + spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); + if (unlikely(ret)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING + "SELinux: failure in sel_netnode_sid_slow()," + " unable to determine network node label\n"); + kfree(new); + } + return ret; +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_sid - Lookup the SID of a network address + * @addr: the IP address + * @family: the address family + * @sid: node SID + * + * Description: + * This function determines the SID of a network address using the fastest + * method possible. First the address table is queried, but if an entry + * can't be found then the policy is queried and the result is added to the + * table to speedup future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values + * on failure. + * + */ +int sel_netnode_sid(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) +{ + struct sel_netnode *node; + + rcu_read_lock(); + node = sel_netnode_find(addr, family); + if (node != NULL) { + *sid = node->nsec.sid; + rcu_read_unlock(); + return 0; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return sel_netnode_sid_slow(addr, family, sid); +} + +/** + * sel_netnode_flush - Flush the entire network address table + * + * Description: + * Remove all entries from the network address table. + * + */ +static void sel_netnode_flush(void) +{ + u32 idx; + struct sel_netnode *node; + + spin_lock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); + for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; idx++) + list_for_each_entry(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx], list) + sel_netnode_destroy(node); + spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock); +} + +static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) +{ + if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { + sel_netnode_flush(); + synchronize_net(); + } + return 0; +} + +static __init int sel_netnode_init(void) +{ + int iter; + int ret; + + if (!selinux_enabled) + return 0; + + for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_NETNODE_HASH_SIZE; iter++) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_netnode_hash[iter]); + + ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET, + SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0); + if (ret != 0) + panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret); + + return ret; +} + +__initcall(sel_netnode_init); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 2fa483f26113..a85740530afc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ * * Added conditional policy language extensions * + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added support for the policy capability bitmap + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify @@ -35,6 +40,11 @@ #include "objsec.h" #include "conditional.h" +/* Policy capability filenames */ +static char *policycap_names[] = { + "network_peer_controls" +}; + unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT @@ -72,6 +82,9 @@ static int *bool_pending_values = NULL; static struct dentry *class_dir = NULL; static unsigned long last_class_ino; +/* global data for policy capabilities */ +static struct dentry *policycap_dir = NULL; + extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val); /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a security operation. */ @@ -111,10 +124,11 @@ enum sel_inos { static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1; -#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000 -#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000 -#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000 -#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff +#define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET 0x01000000 +#define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET 0x02000000 +#define SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET 0x04000000 +#define SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET 0x08000000 +#define SEL_INO_MASK 0x00ffffff #define TMPBUFLEN 12 static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, @@ -263,6 +277,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = { /* declaration for sel_write_load */ static int sel_make_bools(void); static int sel_make_classes(void); +static int sel_make_policycap(void); /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */ static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, @@ -323,6 +338,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, } ret = sel_make_classes(); + if (ret) { + length = ret; + goto out1; + } + + ret = sel_make_policycap(); if (ret) length = ret; else @@ -1222,7 +1243,7 @@ static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) static void sel_avc_stats_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { } -static struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = { +static const struct seq_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_seq_ops = { .start = sel_avc_stats_seq_start, .next = sel_avc_stats_seq_next, .show = sel_avc_stats_seq_show, @@ -1399,6 +1420,24 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = { .read = sel_read_perm, }; +static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int value; + char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; + ssize_t length; + unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + + value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK); + length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value); + + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); +} + +static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = { + .read = sel_read_policycap, +}; + static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, struct dentry *dir) { @@ -1545,6 +1584,36 @@ out: return rc; } +static int sel_make_policycap(void) +{ + unsigned int iter; + struct dentry *dentry = NULL; + struct inode *inode = NULL; + + sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir); + + for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) { + if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names)) + dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, + policycap_names[iter]); + else + dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown"); + + if (dentry == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO); + if (inode == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops; + inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET; + d_add(dentry, inode); + } + + return 0; +} + static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned long *ino) { @@ -1673,6 +1742,18 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent) class_dir = dentry; + dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities"); + if (!dentry) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + + ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry, &sel_last_ino); + if (ret) + goto err; + + policycap_dir = dentry; + out: return ret; err: diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 9e70a160d7da..cd10e27fc9e6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules) h->nel = 0; h->nslot = nslot; h->mask = mask; - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:%d avtab hash slots allocated." + printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:%d avtab hash slots allocated. " "Num of rules:%d\n", h->nslot, nrules); return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index fb5d70a6628d..feaf0a5b828f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -537,15 +537,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext); case AVTAB_MEMBER: - /* Only polyinstantiate the MLS attributes if - the type is being polyinstantiated */ - if (newcontext->type != tcontext->type) { - /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */ - return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext); - } else { - /* Use the related object MLS attributes. */ - return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext); - } + /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */ + return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext); default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -569,7 +562,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, if (!selinux_mls_enabled) return; - secattr->mls_lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1; + secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1; secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL; } @@ -589,7 +582,7 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, if (!selinux_mls_enabled) return; - context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->mls_lvl + 1; + context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1; context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens; } @@ -612,8 +605,8 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, return 0; rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat, - &secattr->mls_cat); - if (rc == 0 && secattr->mls_cat != NULL) + &secattr->attr.mls.cat); + if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL) secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT; return rc; @@ -640,7 +633,7 @@ int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, return 0; rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat, - secattr->mls_cat); + secattr->attr.mls.cat); if (rc != 0) goto import_netlbl_cat_failure; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index b582aae3c62c..bd7d6a00342d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ * * Added conditional policy language extensions * + * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> + * + * Added support for the policy capability bitmap + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify @@ -102,6 +107,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + } }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) @@ -183,6 +193,8 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p) if (rc) goto out_free_symtab; + ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps); + out: return rc; @@ -673,8 +685,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]); } kfree(p->type_attr_map); - kfree(p->undefined_perms); + ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); return; } @@ -1554,6 +1566,10 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN); p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN); + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP && + ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp) != 0) + goto bad; + info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers); if (!info) { printk(KERN_ERR "security: unable to find policy compat info " diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index ed6fc687c66f..c4ce996e202c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -241,6 +241,8 @@ struct policydb { /* type -> attribute reverse mapping */ struct ebitmap *type_attr_map; + struct ebitmap policycaps; + unsigned int policyvers; unsigned int reject_unknown : 1; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f83b19daed16..f96dec1f9258 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -16,12 +16,13 @@ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com> * * Added support for NetLabel + * Added support for the policy capability bitmap * * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com> * * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions * - * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. + * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> @@ -59,6 +60,8 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; +int selinux_policycap_netpeer; + /* * This is declared in avc.c */ @@ -1299,6 +1302,12 @@ bad: goto out; } +static void security_load_policycaps(void) +{ + selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, + POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER); +} + extern void selinux_complete_init(void); static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); @@ -1346,6 +1355,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) avtab_cache_destroy(); return -EINVAL; } + security_load_policycaps(); policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; ss_initialized = 1; seqno = ++latest_granting; @@ -1404,6 +1414,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) POLICY_WRLOCK; memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb); sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); + security_load_policycaps(); seqno = ++latest_granting; policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers; POLICY_WRUNLOCK; @@ -1478,11 +1489,8 @@ out: * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface. * @name: interface name * @if_sid: interface SID - * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets */ -int security_netif_sid(char *name, - u32 *if_sid, - u32 *msg_sid) +int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) { int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; @@ -1510,11 +1518,8 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, goto out; } *if_sid = c->sid[0]; - *msg_sid = c->sid[1]; - } else { + } else *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF; - *msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG; - } out: POLICY_RDUNLOCK; @@ -1744,6 +1749,9 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0, cmp = 0; + while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') + path++; + POLICY_RDLOCK; for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { @@ -2046,6 +2054,91 @@ out: return rc; } +/** + * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs + * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID + * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type + * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID + * + * Description: + * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be + * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function + * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function + * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below: + * + * | function return | @sid + * ------------------------------+-----------------+----------------- + * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL + * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label> + * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label> + * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL + * + */ +int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, + u32 xfrm_sid, + u32 *peer_sid) +{ + int rc; + struct context *nlbl_ctx; + struct context *xfrm_ctx; + + /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases + * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a + * single or absent peer SID/label */ + if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) { + *peer_sid = nlbl_sid; + return 0; + } + /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label + * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label + * is present */ + if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) { + *peer_sid = xfrm_sid; + return 0; + } + + /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both + * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the + * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */ + if (!selinux_mls_enabled) { + *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; + return 0; + } + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid); + if (!nlbl_ctx) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n", + nlbl_sid); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_slowpath; + } + xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid); + if (!xfrm_ctx) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "security_sid_mls_cmp: unrecognized SID %d\n", + xfrm_sid); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_slowpath; + } + rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES); + +out_slowpath: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + if (rc == 0) + /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS + * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID + * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label + * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most + * expressive */ + *peer_sid = xfrm_sid; + else + *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; + return rc; +} + static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) { struct class_datum *datum = d; @@ -2151,6 +2244,60 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void) return policydb.allow_unknown; } +/** + * security_get_policycaps - Query the loaded policy for its capabilities + * @len: the number of capability bits + * @values: the capability bit array + * + * Description: + * Get an array of the policy capabilities in @values where each entry in + * @values is either true (1) or false (0) depending the policy's support of + * that feature. The policy capabilities are defined by the + * POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_* enums. The size of the array is stored in @len and it + * is up to the caller to free the array in @values. Returns zero on success, + * negative values on failure. + * + */ +int security_get_policycaps(int *len, int **values) +{ + int rc = -ENOMEM; + unsigned int iter; + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + + *values = kcalloc(POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (*values == NULL) + goto out; + for (iter = 0; iter < POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) + (*values)[iter] = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, iter); + *len = POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; + +out: + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + return rc; +} + +/** + * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability + * @req_cap: capability + * + * Description: + * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the + * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is + * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported. + * + */ +int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap) +{ + int rc; + + POLICY_RDLOCK; + rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap); + POLICY_RDUNLOCK; + + return rc; +} + struct selinux_audit_rule { u32 au_seqno; struct context au_ctxt; @@ -2400,50 +2547,10 @@ void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) } #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL -/* - * NetLabel cache structure - */ -#define NETLBL_CACHE(x) ((struct selinux_netlbl_cache *)(x)) -#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_NONE 0 -#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID 1 -#define NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS 2 -struct selinux_netlbl_cache { - u32 type; - union { - u32 sid; - struct mls_range mls_label; - } data; -}; - -/** - * security_netlbl_cache_free - Free the NetLabel cached data - * @data: the data to free - * - * Description: - * This function is intended to be used as the free() callback inside the - * netlbl_lsm_cache structure. - * - */ -static void security_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data) -{ - struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache; - - if (data == NULL) - return; - - cache = NETLBL_CACHE(data); - switch (cache->type) { - case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS: - ebitmap_destroy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat); - break; - } - kfree(data); -} - /** * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes - * @ctx: the SELinux context + * @sid: the SELinux SID * * Description: * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in @@ -2452,60 +2559,46 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_free(const void *data) * */ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, - struct context *ctx) + u32 sid) { - struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache = NULL; + u32 *sid_cache; - secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); - if (secattr->cache == NULL) - return; - - cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (cache == NULL) + sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (sid_cache == NULL) return; - - cache->type = NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS; - if (ebitmap_cpy(&cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat, - &ctx->range.level[0].cat) != 0) { - kfree(cache); + secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); + if (secattr->cache == NULL) { + kfree(sid_cache); return; } - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit = - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit; - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node = - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node; - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens; - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens = ctx->range.level[0].sens; - secattr->cache->free = security_netlbl_cache_free; - secattr->cache->data = (void *)cache; + *sid_cache = sid; + secattr->cache->free = kfree; + secattr->cache->data = sid_cache; secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE; } /** * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes - * @base_sid: the SELinux SID to use as a context for MLS only attributes * @sid: the SELinux SID * * Description: * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux - * SID/context then use the context in @base_sid as the foundation. If - * possibile the 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; - * this is to allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to - * SID conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative - * values on failure. + * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the + * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to + * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID + * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on + * failure. * */ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, - u32 base_sid, u32 *sid) { int rc = -EIDRM; struct context *ctx; struct context ctx_new; - struct selinux_netlbl_cache *cache; if (!ss_initialized) { *sid = SECSID_NULL; @@ -2515,40 +2608,13 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, POLICY_RDLOCK; if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) { - cache = NETLBL_CACHE(secattr->cache->data); - switch (cache->type) { - case NETLBL_CACHE_T_SID: - *sid = cache->data.sid; - rc = 0; - break; - case NETLBL_CACHE_T_MLS: - ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid); - if (ctx == NULL) - goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; - - ctx_new.user = ctx->user; - ctx_new.role = ctx->role; - ctx_new.type = ctx->type; - ctx_new.range.level[0].sens = - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].sens; - ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit = - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.highbit; - ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.node = - cache->data.mls_label.level[0].cat.node; - ctx_new.range.level[1].sens = - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].sens; - ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit = - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.highbit; - ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.node = - cache->data.mls_label.level[1].cat.node; - - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); - break; - default: - goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; - } + *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; + rc = 0; + } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) { + *sid = secattr->attr.secid; + rc = 0; } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) { - ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, base_sid); + ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG); if (ctx == NULL) goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; @@ -2558,7 +2624,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr); if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) { if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat, - secattr->mls_cat) != 0) + secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0) goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return; ctx_new.range.level[1].cat.highbit = ctx_new.range.level[0].cat.highbit; @@ -2575,7 +2641,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, if (rc != 0) goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup; - security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, &ctx_new); + security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid); ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); } else { diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index e07603969033..7e158205d081 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -46,11 +46,14 @@ #include <net/checksum.h> #include <net/udp.h> #include <asm/semaphore.h> +#include <asm/atomic.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" #include "xfrm.h" +/* Labeled XFRM instance counter */ +atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); /* * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context @@ -293,6 +296,9 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, BUG_ON(!uctx); err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0); + if (err == 0) + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + return err; } @@ -340,10 +346,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp) struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security; int rc = 0; - if (ctx) + if (ctx) { rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); + if (rc == 0) + atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + } return rc; } @@ -360,6 +369,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct BUG_ON(!x); err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid); + if (err == 0) + atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); return err; } @@ -382,10 +393,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security; int rc = 0; - if (ctx) + if (ctx) { rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL); + if (rc == 0) + atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount); + } return rc; } |
