diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/acpi/namespace.txt | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/block/null_blk.txt | 72 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/exynos5250-clock.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/module-signing.txt | 240 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 |
6 files changed, 323 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/acpi/namespace.txt b/Documentation/acpi/namespace.txt index 260f6a3661fa..1860cb3865c6 100644 --- a/Documentation/acpi/namespace.txt +++ b/Documentation/acpi/namespace.txt @@ -235,10 +235,6 @@ Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>. named object's type in the second column). In that case the object's directory in sysfs will contain the 'path' attribute whose value is the full path to the node from the namespace root. - struct acpi_device objects are created for the ACPI namespace nodes - whose _STA control methods return PRESENT or FUNCTIONING. The power - resource nodes or nodes without _STA are assumed to be both PRESENT - and FUNCTIONING. F: The struct acpi_device object is created for a fixed hardware feature (as indicated by the fixed feature flag's name in the second @@ -340,7 +336,7 @@ Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>. | +-------------+-------+----------------+ | | | | +- - - - - - - +- - - - - - +- - - - - - - -+ - | +-| * PNP0C0D:00 | \_SB_.LID0 | acpi:PNP0C0D: | + | +-| PNP0C0D:00 | \_SB_.LID0 | acpi:PNP0C0D: | | | +- - - - - - - +- - - - - - +- - - - - - - -+ | | | | +------------+------------+-----------------------+ @@ -390,6 +386,3 @@ Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>. attribute (as described earlier in this document). NOTE: N/A indicates the device object does not have the 'path' or the 'modalias' attribute. - NOTE: The PNP0C0D device listed above is highlighted (marked by "*") - to indicate it will be created only when its _STA methods return - PRESENT or FUNCTIONING. diff --git a/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt b/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b2830b435895 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/block/null_blk.txt @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +Null block device driver +================================================================================ + +I. Overview + +The null block device (/dev/nullb*) is used for benchmarking the various +block-layer implementations. It emulates a block device of X gigabytes in size. +The following instances are possible: + + Single-queue block-layer + - Request-based. + - Single submission queue per device. + - Implements IO scheduling algorithms (CFQ, Deadline, noop). + Multi-queue block-layer + - Request-based. + - Configurable submission queues per device. + No block-layer (Known as bio-based) + - Bio-based. IO requests are submitted directly to the device driver. + - Directly accepts bio data structure and returns them. + +All of them have a completion queue for each core in the system. + +II. Module parameters applicable for all instances: + +queue_mode=[0-2]: Default: 2-Multi-queue + Selects which block-layer the module should instantiate with. + + 0: Bio-based. + 1: Single-queue. + 2: Multi-queue. + +home_node=[0--nr_nodes]: Default: NUMA_NO_NODE + Selects what CPU node the data structures are allocated from. + +gb=[Size in GB]: Default: 250GB + The size of the device reported to the system. + +bs=[Block size (in bytes)]: Default: 512 bytes + The block size reported to the system. + +nr_devices=[Number of devices]: Default: 2 + Number of block devices instantiated. They are instantiated as /dev/nullb0, + etc. + +irq_mode=[0-2]: Default: 1-Soft-irq + The completion mode used for completing IOs to the block-layer. + + 0: None. + 1: Soft-irq. Uses IPI to complete IOs across CPU nodes. Simulates the overhead + when IOs are issued from another CPU node than the home the device is + connected to. + 2: Timer: Waits a specific period (completion_nsec) for each IO before + completion. + +completion_nsec=[ns]: Default: 10.000ns + Combined with irq_mode=2 (timer). The time each completion event must wait. + +submit_queues=[0..nr_cpus]: + The number of submission queues attached to the device driver. If unset, it + defaults to 1 on single-queue and bio-based instances. For multi-queue, + it is ignored when use_per_node_hctx module parameter is 1. + +hw_queue_depth=[0..qdepth]: Default: 64 + The hardware queue depth of the device. + +III: Multi-queue specific parameters + +use_per_node_hctx=[0/1]: Default: 0 + 0: The number of submit queues are set to the value of the submit_queues + parameter. + 1: The multi-queue block layer is instantiated with a hardware dispatch + queue for each CPU node in the system. diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/exynos5250-clock.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/exynos5250-clock.txt index 46f5c791ea0d..0f2f920e8734 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/exynos5250-clock.txt +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/exynos5250-clock.txt @@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ clock which they consume. mixer 343 hdmi 344 g2d 345 + mdma0 346 + smmu_mdma0 347 [Clock Muxes] diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 50680a59a2ff..b9e9bd854298 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1529,6 +1529,8 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. * atapi_dmadir: Enable ATAPI DMADIR bridge support + * disable: Disable this device. + If there are multiple matching configurations changing the same attribute, the last one is used. diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2b40e04d3c49 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ + ============================== + KERNEL MODULE SIGNING FACILITY + ============================== + +CONTENTS + + - Overview. + - Configuring module signing. + - Generating signing keys. + - Public keys in the kernel. + - Manually signing modules. + - Signed modules and stripping. + - Loading signed modules. + - Non-valid signatures and unsigned modules. + - Administering/protecting the private key. + + +======== +OVERVIEW +======== + +The kernel module signing facility cryptographically signs modules during +installation and then checks the signature upon loading the module. This +allows increased kernel security by disallowing the loading of unsigned modules +or modules signed with an invalid key. Module signing increases security by +making it harder to load a malicious module into the kernel. The module +signature checking is done by the kernel so that it is not necessary to have +trusted userspace bits. + +This facility uses X.509 ITU-T standard certificates to encode the public keys +involved. The signatures are not themselves encoded in any industrial standard +type. The facility currently only supports the RSA public key encryption +standard (though it is pluggable and permits others to be used). The possible +hash algorithms that can be used are SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and +SHA-512 (the algorithm is selected by data in the signature). + + +========================== +CONFIGURING MODULE SIGNING +========================== + +The module signing facility is enabled by going to the "Enable Loadable Module +Support" section of the kernel configuration and turning on + + CONFIG_MODULE_SIG "Module signature verification" + +This has a number of options available: + + (1) "Require modules to be validly signed" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE) + + This specifies how the kernel should deal with a module that has a + signature for which the key is not known or a module that is unsigned. + + If this is off (ie. "permissive"), then modules for which the key is not + available and modules that are unsigned are permitted, but the kernel will + be marked as being tainted. + + If this is on (ie. "restrictive"), only modules that have a valid + signature that can be verified by a public key in the kernel's possession + will be loaded. All other modules will generate an error. + + Irrespective of the setting here, if the module has a signature block that + cannot be parsed, it will be rejected out of hand. + + + (2) "Automatically sign all modules" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL) + + If this is on then modules will be automatically signed during the + modules_install phase of a build. If this is off, then the modules must + be signed manually using: + + scripts/sign-file + + + (3) "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?" + + This presents a choice of which hash algorithm the installation phase will + sign the modules with: + + CONFIG_SIG_SHA1 "Sign modules with SHA-1" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA224 "Sign modules with SHA-224" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA256 "Sign modules with SHA-256" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA384 "Sign modules with SHA-384" + CONFIG_SIG_SHA512 "Sign modules with SHA-512" + + The algorithm selected here will also be built into the kernel (rather + than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have + their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop. + + +======================= +GENERATING SIGNING KEYS +======================= + +Cryptographic keypairs are required to generate and check signatures. A +private key is used to generate a signature and the corresponding public key is +used to check it. The private key is only needed during the build, after which +it can be deleted or stored securely. The public key gets built into the +kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are +loaded. + +Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new +keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files: + + signing_key.priv + signing_key.x509 + +during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built +into vmlinux) using parameters in the: + + x509.genkey + +file (which is also generated if it does not already exist). + +It is strongly recommended that you provide your own x509.genkey file. + +Most notably, in the x509.genkey file, the req_distinguished_name section +should be altered from the default: + + [ req_distinguished_name ] + O = Magrathea + CN = Glacier signing key + emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2 + +The generated RSA key size can also be set with: + + [ req ] + default_bits = 4096 + + +It is also possible to manually generate the key private/public files using the +x509.genkey key generation configuration file in the root node of the Linux +kernel sources tree and the openssl command. The following is an example to +generate the public/private key files: + + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \ + -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ + -keyout signing_key.priv + + +========================= +PUBLIC KEYS IN THE KERNEL +========================= + +The kernel contains a ring of public keys that can be viewed by root. They're +in a keyring called ".system_keyring" that can be seen by: + + [root@deneb ~]# cat /proc/keys + ... + 223c7853 I------ 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 keyring .system_keyring: 1 + 302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 [] + ... + +Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file +placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory +whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key +and will be added to the keyring. + +Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and +add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database). + +Finally, it is possible to add additional public keys by doing: + + keyctl padd asymmetric "" [.system_keyring-ID] <[key-file] + +e.g.: + + keyctl padd asymmetric "" 0x223c7853 <my_public_key.x509 + +Note, however, that the kernel will only permit keys to be added to +.system_keyring _if_ the new key's X.509 wrapper is validly signed by a key +that is already resident in the .system_keyring at the time the key was added. + + +========================= +MANUALLY SIGNING MODULES +========================= + +To manually sign a module, use the scripts/sign-file tool available in +the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments: + + 1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256) + 2. The private key filename + 3. The public key filename + 4. The kernel module to be signed + +The following is an example to sign a kernel module: + + scripts/sign-file sha512 kernel-signkey.priv \ + kernel-signkey.x509 module.ko + +The hash algorithm used does not have to match the one configured, but if it +doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the +kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself. + + +============================ +SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING +============================ + +A signed module has a digital signature simply appended at the end. The string +"~Module signature appended~." at the end of the module's file confirms that a +signature is present but it does not confirm that the signature is valid! + +Signed modules are BRITTLE as the signature is outside of the defined ELF +container. Thus they MAY NOT be stripped once the signature is computed and +attached. Note the entire module is the signed payload, including any and all +debug information present at the time of signing. + + +====================== +LOADING SIGNED MODULES +====================== + +Modules are loaded with insmod, modprobe, init_module() or finit_module(), +exactly as for unsigned modules as no processing is done in userspace. The +signature checking is all done within the kernel. + + +========================================= +NON-VALID SIGNATURES AND UNSIGNED MODULES +========================================= + +If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is enabled or enforcemodulesig=1 is supplied on +the kernel command line, the kernel will only load validly signed modules +for which it has a public key. Otherwise, it will also load modules that are +unsigned. Any module for which the kernel has a key, but which proves to have +a signature mismatch will not be permitted to load. + +Any module that has an unparseable signature will be rejected. + + +========================================= +ADMINISTERING/PROTECTING THE PRIVATE KEY +========================================= + +Since the private key is used to sign modules, viruses and malware could use +the private key to sign modules and compromise the operating system. The +private key must be either destroyed or moved to a secure location and not kept +in the root node of the kernel source tree. diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt index 3c12d9a7ed00..8a984e994e61 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt @@ -16,8 +16,12 @@ ip_default_ttl - INTEGER Default: 64 (as recommended by RFC1700) ip_no_pmtu_disc - BOOLEAN - Disable Path MTU Discovery. - default FALSE + Disable Path MTU Discovery. If enabled and a + fragmentation-required ICMP is received, the PMTU to this + destination will be set to min_pmtu (see below). You will need + to raise min_pmtu to the smallest interface MTU on your system + manually if you want to avoid locally generated fragments. + Default: FALSE min_pmtu - INTEGER default 552 - minimum discovered Path MTU |
