diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 349 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/random.h | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/secure_seq.h | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/secure_seq.c | 184 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/dccp/ipv4.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/dccp/ipv6.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/inetpeer.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/route.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 1 |
14 files changed, 223 insertions, 361 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 729281961f22..c35a785005b0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1300,345 +1300,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = { }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -/******************************************************************** - * - * Random functions for networking - * - ********************************************************************/ - -/* - * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number - * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed - * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique - * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats - * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number. - * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin. - * - * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total - * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash, - * compensated for by changing the secret periodically. - */ - -/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */ -#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) -#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z))) -#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) - -/* - * The generic round function. The application is so specific that - * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally - * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility. - * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation - */ -#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \ - (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s))) -#define K1 0 -#define K2 013240474631UL -#define K3 015666365641UL - -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) - -static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12]) -{ - __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3]; - - /* Round 1 */ - ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3); - ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7); - ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11); - ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19); - ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3); - ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7); - ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11); - ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19); - ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3); - ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7); - ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11); - ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19); - - /* Round 2 */ - ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3); - ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5); - ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9); - ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13); - ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3); - ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5); - ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9); - ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13); - ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3); - ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5); - ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9); - ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13); - - /* Round 3 */ - ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3); - ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9); - ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11); - ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15); - ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3); - ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9); - ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11); - ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15); - ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3); - ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9); - ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11); - ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15); - - return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */ - /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */ -} -#endif - -#undef ROUND -#undef F -#undef G -#undef H -#undef K1 -#undef K2 -#undef K3 - -/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */ -#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ) -/* - * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time): - * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange - * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest) - * - * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described - * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that - * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock - * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent - * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the - * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1) - * - * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of - * 4.55 hours. - * - * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU. - * Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> - * - */ -#define COUNT_BITS 8 -#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1) -#define HASH_BITS 24 -#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1) +static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned; -static struct keydata { - __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */ - __u32 secret[12]; -} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2]; - -static unsigned int ip_cnt; - -static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work); - -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator); - -/* - * Lock avoidance: - * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data. - * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced. - * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function - * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy. - * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt. - * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread - * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never - * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant - * ISN is generated, nothing fatal. - */ -static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work) +static int __init random_int_secret_init(void) { - struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)]; - - get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret)); - keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS; - smp_wmb(); - ip_cnt++; - schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, - round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL)); -} - -static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void) -{ - struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1]; - - smp_rmb(); - - return keyptr; -} - -static __init int seqgen_init(void) -{ - rekey_seq_generator(NULL); + get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret)); return 0; } -late_initcall(seqgen_init); - -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) -__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport) -{ - __u32 seq; - __u32 hash[12]; - struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr(); - - /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer. - * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform. - */ - - memcpy(hash, saddr, 16); - hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport; - memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7); - - seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK; - seq += keyptr->count; - - seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()); - - return seq; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number); -#endif - -/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number(). - * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>. - */ -__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr) -{ - struct keydata *keyptr; - __u32 hash[4]; - - keyptr = get_keyptr(); - - /* - * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination. - * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector, - * which is then hashed with random data. - */ - hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr; - hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9]; - hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10]; - hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11]; - - return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); -} - -__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]) -{ - const struct keydata *keyptr; - __u32 hash[4]; - - keyptr = get_keyptr(); - - hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr[0]; - hash[1] = (__force __u32)daddr[1]; - hash[2] = (__force __u32)daddr[2]; - hash[3] = (__force __u32)daddr[3]; - - return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_INET - -__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport) -{ - __u32 seq; - __u32 hash[4]; - struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr(); - - /* - * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints - * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport). - * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is - * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data. - */ - hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; - hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; - hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport; - hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11]; - - seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK; - seq += keyptr->count; - /* - * As close as possible to RFC 793, which - * suggests using a 250 kHz clock. - * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks. - * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate. - * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but - * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq - * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes). - * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s) - */ - seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6; - - return seq; -} - -/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */ -u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport) -{ - struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr(); - u32 hash[4]; - - /* - * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search - * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data. - */ - hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; - hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; - hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10]; - hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11]; - - return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral); - -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) -u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, - __be16 dport) -{ - struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr(); - u32 hash[12]; - - memcpy(hash, saddr, 16); - hash[4] = (__force u32)dport; - memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7); - - return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash); -} -#endif - -#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE) -/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value - * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange - * 0-31 hash(source, dest) - */ -u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport) -{ - u64 seq; - __u32 hash[4]; - struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr(); - - hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; - hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; - hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport; - hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11]; - - seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); - seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS); - - seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()); - seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1; - - return seq; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number); -#endif - -#endif /* CONFIG_INET */ - +late_initcall(random_int_secret_init); /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but @@ -1646,17 +1315,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number); * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of * depleting entropy is too high */ -DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash); +DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash); unsigned int get_random_int(void) { - struct keydata *keyptr; __u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); - int ret; + unsigned int ret; - keyptr = get_keyptr(); hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles(); - - ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret); + md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret); + ret = hash[0]; put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash); return ret; diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index ce29a040c8dc..d13059f3ea32 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -57,18 +57,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]); -extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr); -extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]); -extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport); -extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, - __be16 dport); -extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport); -extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport); -extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport); - #ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; #endif diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d97f6892c019 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ +#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ + +#include <linux/types.h> + +extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr); +extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]); +extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport); +extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, + __be16 dport); +extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport); +extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport); +extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport); +extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport); + +#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */ diff --git a/net/core/Makefile b/net/core/Makefile index 8a04dd22cf77..0d357b1c4e57 100644 --- a/net/core/Makefile +++ b/net/core/Makefile @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \ - gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o + gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45329d7c9dd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/cryptohash.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/cache.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/hrtimer.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include <net/secure_seq.h> + +static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned; + +static int __init net_secret_init(void) +{ + get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret)); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(net_secret_init); + +static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq) +{ + /* + * As close as possible to RFC 793, which + * suggests using a 250 kHz clock. + * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks. + * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate. + * For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but + * we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq + * overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes). + * Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s) + */ + return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6); +} + +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) +__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport) +{ + u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4]; + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + u32 i; + + memcpy(hash, saddr, 16); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i]; + secret[4] = net_secret[4] + + (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport); + for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i]; + + md5_transform(hash, secret); + + return seq_scale(hash[0]); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number); + +u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr, + __be16 dport) +{ + u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4]; + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + u32 i; + + memcpy(hash, saddr, 16); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i]; + secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport; + for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i]; + + md5_transform(hash, secret); + + return hash[0]; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_INET +__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr) +{ + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + + hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr; + hash[1] = net_secret[13]; + hash[2] = net_secret[14]; + hash[3] = net_secret[15]; + + md5_transform(hash, net_secret); + + return hash[0]; +} + +__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]) +{ + __u32 hash[4]; + + memcpy(hash, daddr, 16); + md5_transform(hash, net_secret); + + return hash[0]; +} + +__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport) +{ + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + + hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; + hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; + hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport; + hash[3] = net_secret[15]; + + md5_transform(hash, net_secret); + + return seq_scale(hash[0]); +} + +u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport) +{ + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + + hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; + hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; + hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14]; + hash[3] = net_secret[15]; + + md5_transform(hash, net_secret); + + return hash[0]; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral); +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE) +u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport) +{ + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + u64 seq; + + hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr; + hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr; + hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport; + hash[3] = net_secret[15]; + + md5_transform(hash, net_secret); + + seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32); + seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()); + seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1; + + return seq; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number); + +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) +u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, + __be16 sport, __be16 dport) +{ + u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4]; + u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS]; + u64 seq; + u32 i; + + memcpy(hash, saddr, 16); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i]; + secret[4] = net_secret[4] + + (((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport); + for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++) + secret[i] = net_secret[i]; + + md5_transform(hash, secret); + + seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32); + seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()); + seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1; + + return seq; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number); +#endif +#endif diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c index 8c36adfd1919..332639b56f4d 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <net/timewait_sock.h> #include <net/tcp_states.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include "ackvec.h" #include "ccid.h" diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index 8dc4348774a5..b74f76117dcf 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <net/transp_v6.h> #include <net/ip6_checksum.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include "dccp.h" #include "ipv6.h" @@ -69,13 +70,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr); } -static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr, - __be16 sport, __be16 dport ) -{ - return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport); -} - -static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb) +static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb) { return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32, ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32, diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c index 3c0369a3a663..984ec656b03b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/inet_hashtables.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <net/ip.h> /* diff --git a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c index e38213817d0a..86f13c67ea85 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/net.h> #include <net/ip.h> #include <net/inetpeer.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> /* * Theory of operations. diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c index 3e61faf23a9a..f52d41ea0690 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/netfilter.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h> diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 6afc4eb50591..e3dec1c9f09d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ #include <linux/sysctl.h> #endif #include <net/atmclip.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp4) \ ((u32)(oldflp4->flowi4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK))) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index 955b8e65b69e..1c12b8ec849d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ #include <net/timewait_sock.h> #include <net/xfrm.h> #include <net/netdma.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <linux/inet.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c index b53197233709..73f1a00a96af 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/inet_hashtables.h> #include <net/inet6_hashtables.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <net/ip.h> int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw) diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c index 78aa53492b3e..d1fb63f4aeb7 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include <net/timewait_sock.h> #include <net/netdma.h> #include <net/inet_common.h> +#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
