diff options
49 files changed, 3337 insertions, 226 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index c1b9aa8c5a52..90c12c591168 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -566,6 +566,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. possible to determine what the correct size should be. This option provides an override for these situations. + ca_keys= [KEYS] This parameter identifies a specific key(s) on + the system trusted keyring to be used for certificate + trust validation. + format: { id:<keyid> | builtin } + ccw_timeout_log [S390] See Documentation/s390/CommonIO for details. @@ -1313,6 +1318,23 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted. Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" } Default: "ima-ng" + ima.ahash_minsize= [IMA] Minimum file size for asynchronous hash usage + Format: <min_file_size> + Set the minimal file size for using asynchronous hash. + If left unspecified, ahash usage is disabled. + + ahash performance varies for different data sizes on + different crypto accelerators. This option can be used + to achieve the best performance for a particular HW. + + ima.ahash_bufsize= [IMA] Asynchronous hash buffer size + Format: <bufsize> + Set hashing buffer size. Default: 4k. + + ahash performance varies for different chunk sizes on + different crypto accelerators. This option can be used + to achieve best performance for particular HW. + init= [KNL] Format: <full_path> Run specified binary instead of /sbin/init as init diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index a4c33f1a7c6d..8727c194ca16 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -1150,20 +1150,24 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; + time_t expiry; }; Before calling the method, the caller will fill in data and datalen with the payload blob parameters; quotalen will be filled in with the default - quota size from the key type and the rest will be cleared. + quota size from the key type; expiry will be set to TIME_T_MAX and the + rest will be cleared. If a description can be proposed from the payload contents, that should be attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These - are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. + are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If + set, the expiry time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from + this data. - The method should return 0 if success ful or a negative error code + The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code otherwise. @@ -1172,7 +1176,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload - struct as filled in by the preparse() method. + struct as filled in by the preparse() method. It will always be called + after preparse() returns successfully, even if instantiate() or update() + succeed. (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 0320c7d4b3e1..4870f28403f5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -32,8 +32,39 @@ config X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select ASN1 select OID_REGISTRY help - This option procides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key + This option provides support for parsing X.509 format blobs for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a public key packet found inside the certificate. +config PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + tristate "PKCS#7 message parser" + depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + select ASN1 + select OID_REGISTRY + help + This option provides support for parsing PKCS#7 format messages for + signature data and provides the ability to verify the signature. + +config PKCS7_TEST_KEY + tristate "PKCS#7 testing key type" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + help + This option provides a type of key that can be loaded up from a + PKCS#7 message - provided the message is signed by a trusted key. If + it is, the PKCS#7 wrapper is discarded and reading the key returns + just the payload. If it isn't, adding the key will fail with an + error. + + This is intended for testing the PKCS#7 parser. + +config SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION + bool "Support for PE file signature verification" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + select ASN1 + select OID_REGISTRY + help + This option provides support for verifying the signature(s) on a + signed PE binary. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 0727204aab68..e47fcd9ac5e8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -25,3 +25,40 @@ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h + +# +# PKCS#7 message handling +# +obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER) += pkcs7_message.o +pkcs7_message-y := \ + pkcs7-asn1.o \ + pkcs7_parser.o \ + pkcs7_trust.o \ + pkcs7_verify.o + +$(obj)/pkcs7_parser.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h +$(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.o: $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.c $(obj)/pkcs7-asn1.h + +clean-files += pkcs7-asn1.c pkcs7-asn1.h + +# +# PKCS#7 parser testing key +# +obj-$(CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY) += pkcs7_test_key.o +pkcs7_test_key-y := \ + pkcs7_key_type.o + +# +# Signed PE binary-wrapped key handling +# +obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION) += verify_signed_pefile.o + +verify_signed_pefile-y := \ + verify_pefile.o \ + mscode_parser.o \ + mscode-asn1.o + +$(obj)/mscode_parser.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h +$(obj)/mscode-asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode-asn1.c $(obj)/mscode-asn1.h + +clean-files += mscode-asn1.c mscode-asn1.h diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h index 515b63430812..a63c551c6557 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ +int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id); + static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key) { return key->type_data.p[1]; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index b77eb5304788..eb8cd46961a5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -23,6 +23,35 @@ static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers); static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); /* + * Match asymmetric key id with partial match + * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>" + */ +int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id) +{ + size_t idlen, kidlen; + + if (!kid || !id) + return 0; + + /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */ + if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0) + id += 3; + + /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */ + idlen = strlen(id); + kidlen = strlen(kid); + if (idlen > kidlen) + return 0; + + kid += kidlen - idlen; + if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0) + return 0; + + return 1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match); + +/* * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow: * @@ -34,9 +63,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) { const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); const char *spec = description; - const char *id, *kid; + const char *id; ptrdiff_t speclen; - size_t idlen, kidlen; if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec) return 0; @@ -55,23 +83,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) speclen = id - spec; id++; - /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */ - kid = asymmetric_key_id(key); - if (!kid) - return 0; - - idlen = strlen(id); - kidlen = strlen(kid); - if (idlen > kidlen) - return 0; - - kid += kidlen - idlen; - if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0) - return 0; - - if (speclen == 2 && - memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0) - return 1; + if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0) + return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id); if (speclen == subtype->name_len && memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0) @@ -156,7 +169,7 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); if (subtype) { - subtype->destroy(prep->payload); + subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]); module_put(subtype->owner); } kfree(prep->type_data[1]); @@ -164,29 +177,6 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) } /* - * Instantiate a asymmetric_key defined key. The key was preparsed, so we just - * have to transfer the data here. - */ -static int asymmetric_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - int ret; - - pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); - if (ret == 0) { - key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; - key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; - key->payload.data = prep->payload; - prep->type_data[0] = NULL; - prep->type_data[1] = NULL; - prep->payload = NULL; - } - pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); - return ret; -} - -/* * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a asymmetric key */ static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) @@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { .name = "asymmetric", .preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse, .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, - .instantiate = asymmetric_key_instantiate, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = asymmetric_key_match, .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6d09ba48c41c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +--- Microsoft individual code signing data blob parser +--- +--- Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +--- Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) +--- +--- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +--- modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence +--- as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version +--- 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. +--- + +MSCode ::= SEQUENCE { + type SEQUENCE { + contentType ContentType, + parameters ANY + }, + content SEQUENCE { + digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + digest OCTET STRING ({ mscode_note_digest }) + } +} + +ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_content_type }) + +DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mscode_note_digest_algo }), + parameters ANY OPTIONAL +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..214a992123cd --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MSCODE: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include "verify_pefile.h" +#include "mscode-asn1.h" + +/* + * Parse a Microsoft Individual Code Signing blob + */ +int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx) +{ + const void *content_data; + size_t data_len; + int ret; + + ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx->pkcs7, &content_data, &data_len, 1); + + if (ret) { + pr_debug("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); + return ret; + } + + pr_devel("Data: %zu [%*ph]\n", data_len, (unsigned)(data_len), + content_data); + + return asn1_ber_decoder(&mscode_decoder, ctx, content_data, data_len); +} + +/* + * Check the content type OID + */ +int mscode_note_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + enum OID oid; + + oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + if (oid == OID__NR) { + char buffer[50]; + + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + /* + * pesign utility had a bug where it was putting + * OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId + * So allow both OIDs. + */ + if (oid != OID_msPeImageDataObjId && + oid != OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose) { + pr_err("Unexpected content type OID %u\n", oid); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the digest algorithm OID + */ +int mscode_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pefile_context *ctx = context; + char buffer[50]; + enum OID oid; + + oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + switch (oid) { + case OID_md4: + ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4; + break; + case OID_md5: + ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + case OID_sha1: + ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + break; + case OID_sha256: + ctx->digest_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256; + break; + + case OID__NR: + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + pr_err("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer); + return -EBADMSG; + + default: + pr_err("Unsupported content type: %u\n", oid); + return -ENOPKG; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the digest we're guaranteeing with this certificate + */ +int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pefile_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->digest = value; + ctx->digest_len = vlen; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a5a14ef28c86 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + contentType ContentType, + content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL +} + +ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }) + +SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + version INTEGER, + digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, + contentInfo ContentInfo, + certificates CHOICE { + certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates, + certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates + } OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_note_certificate_list }), + crls CHOICE { + crlSet [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists, + crlSequence [3] IMPLICIT CRLSequence + } OPTIONAL, + signerInfos SignerInfos +} + +ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + contentType ContentType, + content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL +} + +Data ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_note_data }) + +DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= CHOICE { + daSet SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + daSequence SEQUENCE OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier +} + +DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), + parameters ANY OPTIONAL +} + +-- +-- Certificates and certificate lists +-- +ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates ::= SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate + +ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + certificate Certificate, -- X.509 + extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate -- PKCS#6 +} + +ExtendedCertificate ::= Certificate -- cheating + +Certificates ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate + +CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList + +CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate -- This may be defined incorrectly + +CRLSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateList + +Certificate ::= ANY ({ pkcs7_extract_cert }) -- X.509 + +-- +-- Signer information +-- +SignerInfos ::= CHOICE { + siSet SET OF SignerInfo, + siSequence SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo +} + +SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version INTEGER, + issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, + digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }), + authenticatedAttributes CHOICE { + aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute + ({ pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs }), + aaSequence [2] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF AuthenticatedAttribute + -- Explicit because easier to compute digest on + -- sequence of attributes and then reuse encoded + -- sequence in aaSequence. + } OPTIONAL, + digestEncryptionAlgorithm + DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo }), + encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest, + unauthenticatedAttributes CHOICE { + uaSet [1] IMPLICIT SET OF UnauthenticatedAttribute, + uaSequence [3] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OF UnauthenticatedAttribute + } OPTIONAL +} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info }) + +IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { + issuer Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }), + serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial }) +} + +CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + +SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute + +AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), + values SET OF ANY ({ pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr }) +} + +UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { + type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), + values SET OF ANY +} + +DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), + parameters ANY OPTIONAL +} + +EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature }) + +--- +--- X.500 Name +--- +Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { + attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }), + attributeValue ANY +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c2091f7bd15d --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/* Testing module to load key from trusted PKCS#7 message + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7key: "fmt +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> +#include "pkcs7_parser.h" + +/* + * Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob. + */ +static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + const void *data, *saved_prep_data; + size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen; + bool trusted; + int ret; + + kenter(""); + + saved_prep_data = prep->data; + saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen; + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(pkcs7); + goto error; + } + + ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free; + + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free; + if (!trusted) + pr_warn("PKCS#7 message doesn't chain back to a trusted key\n"); + + ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free; + + prep->data = data; + prep->datalen = datalen; + ret = user_preparse(prep); + prep->data = saved_prep_data; + prep->datalen = saved_prep_datalen; + +error_free: + pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); +error: + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * user defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an + * arbitrary blob of data as the payload + */ +struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = { + .name = "pkcs7_test", + .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, + .preparse = pkcs7_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .match = user_match, + .revoke = user_revoke, + .destroy = user_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = user_read, +}; + +/* + * Module stuff + */ +static int __init pkcs7_key_init(void) +{ + return register_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7); +} + +static void __exit pkcs7_key_cleanup(void) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_pkcs7); +} + +module_init(pkcs7_key_init); +module_exit(pkcs7_key_cleanup); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..42e56aa7d277 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,396 @@ +/* PKCS#7 parser + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include "public_key.h" +#include "pkcs7_parser.h" +#include "pkcs7-asn1.h" + +struct pkcs7_parse_context { + struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; /* SignedInfo being constructed */ + struct pkcs7_signed_info **ppsinfo; + struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate cache */ + struct x509_certificate **ppcerts; + unsigned long data; /* Start of data */ + enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ + unsigned x509_index; + unsigned sinfo_index; +}; + +/** + * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free + */ +void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + struct x509_certificate *cert; + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; + + if (pkcs7) { + while (pkcs7->certs) { + cert = pkcs7->certs; + pkcs7->certs = cert->next; + x509_free_certificate(cert); + } + while (pkcs7->crl) { + cert = pkcs7->crl; + pkcs7->crl = cert->next; + x509_free_certificate(cert); + } + while (pkcs7->signed_infos) { + sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; + pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next; + mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); + kfree(sinfo->sig.digest); + kfree(sinfo); + } + kfree(pkcs7); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message); + +/** + * pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message + * @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed + * @datalen: The size of the encoded message + */ +struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx; + struct pkcs7_message *msg; + long ret; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!msg) + goto error_no_sig; + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx) + goto error_no_ctx; + ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->sinfo) + goto error_no_sinfo; + + ctx->msg = msg; + ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; + ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; + ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos; + + /* Attempt to decode the signature */ + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_decode; + + while (ctx->certs) { + struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs; + ctx->certs = cert->next; + x509_free_certificate(cert); + } + mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); + kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest); + kfree(ctx->sinfo); + kfree(ctx); + return msg; + +error_decode: + mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); + kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest); + kfree(ctx->sinfo); +error_no_sinfo: + kfree(ctx); +error_no_ctx: + pkcs7_free_message(msg); +error_no_sig: + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message); + +/** + * pkcs7_get_content_data - Get access to the PKCS#7 content + * @pkcs7: The preparsed PKCS#7 message to access + * @_data: Place to return a pointer to the data + * @_data_len: Place to return the data length + * @want_wrapper: True if the ASN.1 object header should be included in the data + * + * Get access to the data content of the PKCS#7 message, including, optionally, + * the header of the ASN.1 object that contains it. Returns -ENODATA if the + * data object was missing from the message. + */ +int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + const void **_data, size_t *_data_len, + bool want_wrapper) +{ + size_t wrapper; + + if (!pkcs7->data) + return -ENODATA; + + wrapper = want_wrapper ? pkcs7->data_hdrlen : 0; + *_data = pkcs7->data - wrapper; + *_data_len = pkcs7->data_len + wrapper; + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_get_content_data); + +/* + * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how + * to interpret it. + */ +int pkcs7_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen); + if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) { + char buffer[50]; + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + printk("PKCS7: Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n", + (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the digest algorithm for the signature. + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + switch (ctx->last_oid) { + case OID_md4: + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD4; + break; + case OID_md5: + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + case OID_sha1: + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + break; + case OID_sha256: + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256; + break; + default: + printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); + return -ENOPKG; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the public key algorithm for the signature. + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + switch (ctx->last_oid) { + case OID_rsaEncryption: + ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo = PKEY_ALGO_RSA; + break; + default: + printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); + return -ENOPKG; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract a certificate and store it in the context. + */ +int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + struct x509_certificate *x509; + + if (tag != ((ASN1_UNIV << 6) | ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) { + pr_debug("Cert began with tag %02x at %lu\n", + tag, (unsigned long)ctx - ctx->data); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + /* We have to correct for the header so that the X.509 parser can start + * from the beginning. Note that since X.509 stipulates DER, there + * probably shouldn't be an EOC trailer - but it is in PKCS#7 (which + * stipulates BER). + */ + value -= hdrlen; + vlen += hdrlen; + + if (((u8*)value)[1] == 0x80) + vlen += 2; /* Indefinite length - there should be an EOC */ + + x509 = x509_cert_parse(value, vlen); + if (IS_ERR(x509)) + return PTR_ERR(x509); + + pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject); + pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint); + + x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index; + *ctx->ppcerts = x509; + ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Save the certificate list + */ +int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + pr_devel("Got cert list (%02x)\n", tag); + + *ctx->ppcerts = ctx->msg->certs; + ctx->msg->certs = ctx->certs; + ctx->certs = NULL; + ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in + * the context. + */ +int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + pr_debug("Got data\n"); + + ctx->msg->data = value; + ctx->msg->data_len = vlen; + ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen; + ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse authenticated attributes + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value); + + switch (ctx->last_oid) { + case OID_messageDigest: + if (tag != ASN1_OTS) + return -EBADMSG; + ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value; + ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen; + return 0; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3] + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + /* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */ + ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1); + ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the issuing certificate serial number + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value; + ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the issuer's name + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value; + ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note the signature data + */ +int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + MPI mpi; + + BUG_ON(ctx->sinfo->sig.pkey_algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA); + + mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(value, vlen); + if (!mpi) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0] = mpi; + ctx->sinfo->sig.nr_mpi = 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note a signature information block + */ +int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; + + ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index; + *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo; + ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next; + ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->sinfo) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d25f4d15370f --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser internal definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include "x509_parser.h" + +#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ + pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ + pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +struct pkcs7_signed_info { + struct pkcs7_signed_info *next; + struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */ + unsigned index; + bool trusted; + + /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ + const void *msgdigest; + unsigned msgdigest_len; + + /* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */ + unsigned authattrs_len; + const void *authattrs; + + /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */ + const void *raw_serial; + unsigned raw_serial_size; + unsigned raw_issuer_size; + const void *raw_issuer; + + /* Message signature. + * + * This contains the generated digest of _either_ the Content Data or + * the Authenticated Attributes [RFC2315 9.3]. If the latter, one of + * the attributes contains the digest of the the Content Data within + * it. + */ + struct public_key_signature sig; +}; + +struct pkcs7_message { + struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */ + struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos; + + /* Content Data (or NULL) */ + enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of Data */ + size_t data_hdrlen; /* Length of Data ASN.1 header */ + const void *data; /* Content Data (or 0) */ +}; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b6b045131403 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +/* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message. + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/asn1.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include "public_key.h" +#include "pkcs7_parser.h" + +/* + * Request an asymmetric key. + */ +static struct key *pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( + struct key *keyring, + const char *signer, size_t signer_len, + const char *authority, size_t auth_len) +{ + key_ref_t key; + char *id; + + kenter(",%zu,,%zu", signer_len, auth_len); + + /* Construct an identifier. */ + id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!id) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); + id[signer_len + 0] = ':'; + id[signer_len + 1] = ' '; + memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len); + id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0; + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); + + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, id); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n", + id, PTR_ERR(key)); + kfree(id); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(key); + } + } + + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); + return key_ref_to_ptr(key); +} + +/** + * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. + */ +int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, + struct key *trust_keyring) +{ + struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig; + struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p; + struct key *key; + bool trusted; + int ret; + + kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index); + + for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) { + if (x509->seen) { + if (x509->verified) { + trusted = x509->trusted; + goto verified; + } + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]"); + return -ENOKEY; + } + x509->seen = true; + + /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted + * keys. + */ + key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( + trust_keyring, + x509->subject, strlen(x509->subject), + x509->fingerprint, strlen(x509->fingerprint)); + if (!IS_ERR(key)) + /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message + * is apparently the same as one we already trust. + * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate + * the signature on the descendant. + */ + goto matched; + if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we + * don't know them, then we can't accept them. + */ + if (x509->next == x509) { + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]"); + return -ENOKEY; + } + + might_sleep(); + last = x509; + sig = &last->sig; + } + + /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the + * trusted keys. + */ + if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) { + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]"); + return -ENOKEY; + } + + key = pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key( + trust_keyring, + last->issuer, strlen(last->issuer), + last->authority, strlen(last->authority)); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY; + x509 = last; + +matched: + ret = verify_signature(key, sig); + trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags); + key_put(key); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENOMEM) + return ret; + kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + +verified: + x509->verified = true; + for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { + p->verified = true; + p->trusted = trusted; + } + sinfo->trusted = trusted; + kleave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} + +/** + * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate + * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points + * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise + * + * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects + * keys we already know and trust. + * + * Returns, in order of descending priority: + * + * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid + * key, or: + * + * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust + * keyring, or: + * + * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a + * chain. + * + * (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in + * the message. + * + * May also return -ENOMEM. + */ +int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trust_keyring, + bool *_trusted) +{ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; + struct x509_certificate *p; + int cached_ret = 0, ret; + + for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) + p->seen = false; + + for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); + if (ret < 0) { + if (ret == -ENOPKG) { + cached_ret = -ENOPKG; + } else if (ret == -ENOKEY) { + if (cached_ret == 0) + cached_ret = -ENOKEY; + } else { + return ret; + } + } + *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; + } + + return cached_ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..51ff36f3a913 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message. + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/asn1.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "public_key.h" +#include "pkcs7_parser.h" + +/* + * Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data + */ +static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + void *digest; + int ret; + + kenter(",%u,%u", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo); + + if (sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || + !hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) + return -ENOPKG; + + /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how + * big the hash operational data will be. + */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[sinfo->sig.pkey_hash_algo], + 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto error_no_desc; + + desc = digest + digest_size; + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */ + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest); + + /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a + * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the + * digest we just calculated. + */ + if (sinfo->msgdigest) { + u8 tag; + + if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) { + pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n", + sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len); + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error; + } + + if (memcmp(digest, sinfo->msgdigest, sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) { + pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n", + sinfo->index); + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + goto error; + } + + /* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes + * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to + * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we + * hash it. + */ + memset(digest, 0, sinfo->sig.digest_size); + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET; + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs, + sinfo->authattrs_len, digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, digest); + } + + sinfo->sig.digest = digest; + digest = NULL; + +error: + kfree(digest); +error_no_desc: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 + * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for + * matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not + * subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7]. + */ +static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) +{ + struct x509_certificate *x509; + unsigned certix = 1; + + kenter("%u,%u,%u", + sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size); + + for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) { + /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will + * encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the + * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's + * possible this will need element-by-element comparison. + */ + if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size || + memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial, + sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0) + continue; + pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", + sinfo->index, certix); + + if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size || + memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer, + sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) { + pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n", + sinfo->index); + continue; + } + + if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) { + pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", + sinfo->index); + continue; + } + + sinfo->signer = x509; + return 0; + } + pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n", + sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial); + return -ENOKEY; +} + +/* + * Verify the internal certificate chain as best we can. + */ +static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) +{ + struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p; + int ret; + + kenter(""); + + for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) + p->seen = false; + + for (;;) { + pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint); + x509->seen = true; + ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (x509->issuer) + pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); + if (x509->authority) + pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority); + + if (!x509->authority || + (x509->subject && + strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0)) { + /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then + * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root + * of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own + * authority. + */ + pr_debug("- no auth?\n"); + if (x509->raw_subject_size != x509->raw_issuer_size || + memcmp(x509->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, + x509->raw_issuer_size) != 0) + return 0; + + ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + x509->signer = x509; + pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); + return 0; + } + + /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's + * list to see if the next one is there. + */ + pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority); + for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { + pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint); + if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size && + strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 && + memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, + x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0) + goto found_issuer; + } + + /* We didn't find the root of this chain */ + pr_debug("- top\n"); + return 0; + + found_issuer: + pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject); + if (p->seen) { + pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n", + sinfo->index); + return 0; + } + ret = x509_check_signature(p->pub, x509); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + x509->signer = p; + if (x509 == p) { + pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); + return 0; + } + x509 = p; + might_sleep(); + } +} + +/* + * Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7 message. + */ +static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) +{ + int ret; + + kenter(",%u", sinfo->index); + + /* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the + * signed information block + */ + ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* Find the key for the signature */ + ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n", + sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index); + + /* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */ + ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index); + + /* Verify the internal certificate chain */ + return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo); +} + +/** + * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified + */ +int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; + struct x509_certificate *x509; + int ret, n; + + kenter(""); + + for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) { + ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority); + } + + for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { + ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); + if (ret < 0) { + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + kleave(" = 0"); + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..79175e6ea0b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ +/* Parse a signed PE binary + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PEFILE: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/pe.h> +#include <linux/asn1.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include "verify_pefile.h" + +/* + * Parse a PE binary. + */ +static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, + struct pefile_context *ctx) +{ + const struct mz_hdr *mz = pebuf; + const struct pe_hdr *pe; + const struct pe32_opt_hdr *pe32; + const struct pe32plus_opt_hdr *pe64; + const struct data_directory *ddir; + const struct data_dirent *dde; + const struct section_header *secs, *sec; + size_t cursor, datalen = pelen; + + kenter(""); + +#define chkaddr(base, x, s) \ + do { \ + if ((x) < base || (s) >= datalen || (x) > datalen - (s)) \ + return -ELIBBAD; \ + } while (0) + + chkaddr(0, 0, sizeof(*mz)); + if (mz->magic != MZ_MAGIC) + return -ELIBBAD; + cursor = sizeof(*mz); + + chkaddr(cursor, mz->peaddr, sizeof(*pe)); + pe = pebuf + mz->peaddr; + if (pe->magic != PE_MAGIC) + return -ELIBBAD; + cursor = mz->peaddr + sizeof(*pe); + + chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(pe32->magic)); + pe32 = pebuf + cursor; + pe64 = pebuf + cursor; + + switch (pe32->magic) { + case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32: + chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe32)); + ctx->image_checksum_offset = + (unsigned long)&pe32->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf; + ctx->header_size = pe32->header_size; + cursor += sizeof(*pe32); + ctx->n_data_dirents = pe32->data_dirs; + break; + + case PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS: + chkaddr(0, cursor, sizeof(*pe64)); + ctx->image_checksum_offset = + (unsigned long)&pe64->csum - (unsigned long)pebuf; + ctx->header_size = pe64->header_size; + cursor += sizeof(*pe64); + ctx->n_data_dirents = pe64->data_dirs; + break; + + default: + pr_debug("Unknown PEOPT magic = %04hx\n", pe32->magic); + return -ELIBBAD; + } + + pr_debug("checksum @ %x\n", ctx->image_checksum_offset); + pr_debug("header size = %x\n", ctx->header_size); + + if (cursor >= ctx->header_size || ctx->header_size >= datalen) + return -ELIBBAD; + + if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde)) + return -ELIBBAD; + + ddir = pebuf + cursor; + cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents; + + ctx->cert_dirent_offset = + (unsigned long)&ddir->certs - (unsigned long)pebuf; + ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size; + + if (!ddir->certs.virtual_address || !ddir->certs.size) { + pr_debug("Unsigned PE binary\n"); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + chkaddr(ctx->header_size, ddir->certs.virtual_address, + ddir->certs.size); + ctx->sig_offset = ddir->certs.virtual_address; + ctx->sig_len = ddir->certs.size; + pr_debug("cert = %x @%x [%*ph]\n", + ctx->sig_len, ctx->sig_offset, + ctx->sig_len, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset); + + ctx->n_sections = pe->sections; + if (ctx->n_sections > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*sec)) + return -ELIBBAD; + ctx->secs = secs = pebuf + cursor; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check and strip the PE wrapper from around the signature and check that the + * remnant looks something like PKCS#7. + */ +static int pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(const void *pebuf, + struct pefile_context *ctx) +{ + struct win_certificate wrapper; + const u8 *pkcs7; + + if (ctx->sig_len < sizeof(wrapper)) { + pr_debug("Signature wrapper too short\n"); + return -ELIBBAD; + } + + memcpy(&wrapper, pebuf + ctx->sig_offset, sizeof(wrapper)); + pr_debug("sig wrapper = { %x, %x, %x }\n", + wrapper.length, wrapper.revision, wrapper.cert_type); + + /* Both pesign and sbsign round up the length of certificate table + * (in optional header data directories) to 8 byte alignment. + */ + if (round_up(wrapper.length, 8) != ctx->sig_len) { + pr_debug("Signature wrapper len wrong\n"); + return -ELIBBAD; + } + if (wrapper.revision != WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0) { + pr_debug("Signature is not revision 2.0\n"); + return -ENOTSUPP; + } + if (wrapper.cert_type != WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) { + pr_debug("Signature certificate type is not PKCS\n"); + return -ENOTSUPP; + } + + /* Looks like actual pkcs signature length is in wrapper->length. + * size obtained from data dir entries lists the total size of + * certificate table which is also aligned to octawrod boundary. + * + * So set signature length field appropriately. + */ + ctx->sig_len = wrapper.length; + ctx->sig_offset += sizeof(wrapper); + ctx->sig_len -= sizeof(wrapper); + if (ctx->sig_len == 0) { + pr_debug("Signature data missing\n"); + return -EKEYREJECTED; + } + + /* What's left should a PKCS#7 cert */ + pkcs7 = pebuf + ctx->sig_offset; + if (pkcs7[0] == (ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SEQ)) { + if (pkcs7[1] == 0x82 && + pkcs7[2] == (((ctx->sig_len - 4) >> 8) & 0xff) && + pkcs7[3] == ((ctx->sig_len - 4) & 0xff)) + return 0; + if (pkcs7[1] == 0x80) + return 0; + if (pkcs7[1] > 0x82) + return -EMSGSIZE; + } + + pr_debug("Signature data not PKCS#7\n"); + return -ELIBBAD; +} + +/* + * Compare two sections for canonicalisation. + */ +static int pefile_compare_shdrs(const void *a, const void *b) +{ + const struct section_header *shdra = a; + const struct section_header *shdrb = b; + int rc; + + if (shdra->data_addr > shdrb->data_addr) + return 1; + if (shdrb->data_addr > shdra->data_addr) + return -1; + + if (shdra->virtual_address > shdrb->virtual_address) + return 1; + if (shdrb->virtual_address > shdra->virtual_address) + return -1; + + rc = strcmp(shdra->name, shdrb->name); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + + if (shdra->virtual_size > shdrb->virtual_size) + return 1; + if (shdrb->virtual_size > shdra->virtual_size) + return -1; + + if (shdra->raw_data_size > shdrb->raw_data_size) + return 1; + if (shdrb->raw_data_size > shdra->raw_data_size) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load the contents of the PE binary into the digest, leaving out the image + * checksum and the certificate data block. + */ +static int pefile_digest_pe_contents(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, + struct pefile_context *ctx, + struct shash_desc *desc) +{ + unsigned *canon, tmp, loop, i, hashed_bytes; + int ret; + + /* Digest the header and data directory, but leave out the image + * checksum and the data dirent for the signature. + */ + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf, ctx->image_checksum_offset); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + tmp = ctx->image_checksum_offset + sizeof(uint32_t); + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, + ctx->cert_dirent_offset - tmp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + tmp = ctx->cert_dirent_offset + sizeof(struct data_dirent); + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, pebuf + tmp, ctx->header_size - tmp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + canon = kcalloc(ctx->n_sections, sizeof(unsigned), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!canon) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* We have to canonicalise the section table, so we perform an + * insertion sort. + */ + canon[0] = 0; + for (loop = 1; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) { + for (i = 0; i < loop; i++) { + if (pefile_compare_shdrs(&ctx->secs[canon[i]], + &ctx->secs[loop]) > 0) { + memmove(&canon[i + 1], &canon[i], + (loop - i) * sizeof(canon[0])); + break; + } + } + canon[i] = loop; + } + + hashed_bytes = ctx->header_size; + for (loop = 0; loop < ctx->n_sections; loop++) { + i = canon[loop]; + if (ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size == 0) + continue; + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, + pebuf + ctx->secs[i].data_addr, + ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size); + if (ret < 0) { + kfree(canon); + return ret; + } + hashed_bytes += ctx->secs[i].raw_data_size; + } + kfree(canon); + + if (pelen > hashed_bytes) { + tmp = hashed_bytes + ctx->certs_size; + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, + pebuf + hashed_bytes, + pelen - tmp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Digest the contents of the PE binary, leaving out the image checksum and the + * certificate data block. + */ +static int pefile_digest_pe(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, + struct pefile_context *ctx) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + void *digest; + int ret; + + kenter(",%u", ctx->digest_algo); + + /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how + * big the hash operational data will be. + */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[ctx->digest_algo], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + if (digest_size != ctx->digest_len) { + pr_debug("Digest size mismatch (%zx != %x)\n", + digest_size, ctx->digest_len); + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error_no_desc; + } + pr_debug("Digest: desc=%zu size=%zu\n", desc_size, digest_size); + + ret = -ENOMEM; + desc = kzalloc(desc_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!desc) + goto error_no_desc; + + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = pefile_digest_pe_contents(pebuf, pelen, ctx, desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + digest = (void *)desc + desc_size; + ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + pr_debug("Digest calc = [%*ph]\n", ctx->digest_len, digest); + + /* Check that the PE file digest matches that in the MSCODE part of the + * PKCS#7 certificate. + */ + if (memcmp(digest, ctx->digest, ctx->digest_len) != 0) { + pr_debug("Digest mismatch\n"); + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + } else { + pr_debug("The digests match!\n"); + } + +error: + kfree(desc); +error_no_desc: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/** + * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image + * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image + * @pelen: Length of the binary image + * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points + * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise + * + * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE + * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust. + * + * Returns, in order of descending priority: + * + * (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or: + * + * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid + * key, or: + * + * (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust + * keyring, or: + * + * (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a + * chain. + * + * (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in + * the message. + * + * May also return -ENOMEM. + */ +int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, + struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted) +{ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + struct pefile_context ctx; + const void *data; + size_t datalen; + int ret; + + kenter(""); + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ret = pefile_parse_binary(pebuf, pelen, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ret = pefile_strip_sig_wrapper(pebuf, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(pebuf + ctx.sig_offset, ctx.sig_len); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) + return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); + ctx.pkcs7 = pkcs7; + + ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(ctx.pkcs7, &data, &datalen, false); + if (ret < 0 || datalen == 0) { + pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n"); + ret = -EBADMSG; + goto error; + } + + ret = mscode_parse(&ctx); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + pr_debug("Digest: %u [%*ph]\n", + ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest_len, ctx.digest); + + /* Generate the digest and check against the PKCS7 certificate + * contents. + */ + ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keyring, _trusted); + +error: + pkcs7_free_message(ctx.pkcs7); + return ret; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..55d5f7ebc45a --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* PE Binary parser bits + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/verify_pefile.h> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> + +struct pefile_context { + unsigned header_size; + unsigned image_checksum_offset; + unsigned cert_dirent_offset; + unsigned n_data_dirents; + unsigned n_sections; + unsigned certs_size; + unsigned sig_offset; + unsigned sig_len; + const struct section_header *secs; + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + + /* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */ + const void *digest; /* Digest */ + unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */ + enum hash_algo digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */ +}; + +#define kenter(FMT, ...) \ + pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#define kleave(FMT, ...) \ + pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__) + +/* + * mscode_parser.c + */ +extern int mscode_parse(struct pefile_context *ctx); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 index bf32b3dff088..aae0cde414e2 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { version [ 0 ] Version DEFAULT, - serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber, + serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ x509_note_serial }), signature AlgorithmIdentifier ({ x509_note_pkey_algo }), issuer Name ({ x509_note_issuer }), validity Validity, diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index 29893162497c..ac72348c186a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) kfree(cert); } } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate); /* * Parse an X.509 certificate @@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ error_no_ctx: error_no_cert: return ERR_PTR(ret); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_cert_parse); /* * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how @@ -211,6 +214,19 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen, } /* + * Note the certificate serial number + */ +int x509_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + ctx->cert->raw_serial = value; + ctx->cert->raw_serial_size = vlen; + return 0; +} + +/* * Note some of the name segments from which we'll fabricate a name. */ int x509_extract_name_segment(void *context, size_t hdrlen, @@ -322,6 +338,8 @@ int x509_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + ctx->cert->raw_issuer = value; + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size = vlen; return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->issuer, vlen); } @@ -330,6 +348,8 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen, const void *value, size_t vlen) { struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + ctx->cert->raw_subject = value; + ctx->cert->raw_subject_size = vlen; return x509_fabricate_name(ctx, hdrlen, tag, &ctx->cert->subject, vlen); } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 87d9cc26f630..1b76f207c1f3 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ struct x509_certificate { struct x509_certificate *next; + struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Certificate that signed this one */ struct public_key *pub; /* Public key details */ + struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */ @@ -25,7 +27,16 @@ struct x509_certificate { unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */ unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */ const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */ - struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ + const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */ + unsigned raw_serial_size; + unsigned raw_issuer_size; + const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ + const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ + unsigned raw_subject_size; + unsigned index; + bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ + bool verified; + bool trusted; }; /* diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 382ef0d2ff2e..a0f7cd196c9b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -18,11 +18,80 @@ #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> +#include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include "asymmetric_keys.h" #include "public_key.h" #include "x509_parser.h" +static bool use_builtin_keys; +static char *ca_keyid; + +#ifndef MODULE +static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) +{ + if (!str) /* default system keyring */ + return 1; + + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) + ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ + else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) + use_builtin_keys = true; + + return 1; +} +__setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); +#endif + +/* + * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority. + */ +static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, + const char *signer, + size_t signer_len, + const char *authority, + size_t auth_len) +{ + key_ref_t key; + char *id; + + /* Construct an identifier. */ + id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!id) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); + id[signer_len + 0] = ':'; + id[signer_len + 1] = ' '; + memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len); + id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0; + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); + + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, id); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n", + id, PTR_ERR(key)); + kfree(id); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(key); + } + } + + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, + key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); + return key_ref_to_ptr(key); +} + /* * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature. @@ -103,6 +172,40 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature); /* + * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of + * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the + * new certificate as being trusted. + * + * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't + * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there + * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails. + */ +static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, + struct key *trust_keyring) +{ + struct key *key; + int ret = 1; + + if (!trust_keyring) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid)) + return -EPERM; + + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, + cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer), + cert->authority, + strlen(cert->authority)); + if (!IS_ERR(key)) { + if (!use_builtin_keys + || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) + ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert); + key_put(key); + } + return ret; +} + +/* * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate. */ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) @@ -155,9 +258,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ if (!cert->authority || strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) { - ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); + ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */ if (ret < 0) goto error_free_cert; + } else if (!prep->trusted) { + ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring()); + if (!ret) + prep->trusted = 1; } /* Propose a description */ @@ -177,7 +284,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype; prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint; - prep->payload = cert->pub; + prep->payload[0] = cert->pub; prep->description = desc; prep->quotalen = 100; diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c index b7458d77f511..7dd55b745c4d 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c @@ -174,7 +174,9 @@ static int nfs_map_numeric_to_string(__u32 id, char *buf, size_t buflen) static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver = { .name = "id_resolver", - .instantiate = user_instantiate, + .preparse = user_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, @@ -396,7 +398,9 @@ static const struct rpc_pipe_ops idmap_upcall_ops = { static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy = { .name = "id_legacy", - .instantiate = user_instantiate, + .preparse = user_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..691c79172a26 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +struct key; +struct pkcs7_message; + +/* + * pkcs7_parser.c + */ +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, + size_t datalen); +extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); + +extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + const void **_data, size_t *_datalen, + bool want_wrapper); + +/* + * pkcs7_trust.c + */ +extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trust_keyring, + bool *_trusted); + +/* + * pkcs7_verify.c + */ +extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h index d69bc8af3292..e0970a578188 100644 --- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h +++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h @@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_big_key; -extern int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +extern int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +extern void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key); extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m); diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h index 8dabc399bd1d..72665eb80692 100644 --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h @@ -17,7 +17,15 @@ #include <linux/key.h> extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring; - +static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void) +{ + return system_trusted_keyring; +} +#else +static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void) +{ + return NULL; +} #endif #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index 5e452c84f1e6..3ab1873a4bfa 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_logon; struct key_preparsed_payload; -extern int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +extern int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +extern void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); extern int user_match(const struct key *key, const void *criterion); extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index a74c3a84dfdd..44792ee649de 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ struct key_construction { struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */ void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */ - void *payload; /* Proposed payload */ + void *payload[2]; /* Proposed payload */ const void *data; /* Raw data */ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ + time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ bool trusted; /* True if key is trusted */ }; @@ -159,5 +160,7 @@ static inline int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key, return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, instkey); } +extern int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); + #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #endif /* _LINUX_KEY_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index e37a4d807185..e1d4715f3222 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct key { #define KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED 7 /* set if key has been invalidated */ #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED 8 /* set if key is trusted */ #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY 9 /* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */ +#define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN 10 /* set if key is builtin */ #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL 11 /* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */ /* the key type and key description string diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h index 6926db724258..c2bbf672b84e 100644 --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h @@ -52,9 +52,15 @@ enum OID { OID_md4, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.4 */ OID_md5, /* 1.2.840.113549.2.5 */ - OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ + /* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */ + OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */ + OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */ + OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */ OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */ + + OID_certAuthInfoAccess, /* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 */ OID_sha1, /* 1.3.14.3.2.26 */ + OID_sha256, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 */ /* Distinguished Name attribute IDs [RFC 2256] */ OID_commonName, /* 2.5.4.3 */ diff --git a/include/linux/pe.h b/include/linux/pe.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e170b95e763b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/pe.h @@ -0,0 +1,448 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2011 Red Hat, Inc. + * All rights reserved. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; version 2 of the License. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + * + * Author(s): Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> + */ +#ifndef __LINUX_PE_H +#define __LINUX_PE_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define MZ_MAGIC 0x5a4d /* "MZ" */ + +struct mz_hdr { + uint16_t magic; /* MZ_MAGIC */ + uint16_t lbsize; /* size of last used block */ + uint16_t blocks; /* pages in file, 0x3 */ + uint16_t relocs; /* relocations */ + uint16_t hdrsize; /* header size in "paragraphs" */ + uint16_t min_extra_pps; /* .bss */ + uint16_t max_extra_pps; /* runtime limit for the arena size */ + uint16_t ss; /* relative stack segment */ + uint16_t sp; /* initial %sp register */ + uint16_t checksum; /* word checksum */ + uint16_t ip; /* initial %ip register */ + uint16_t cs; /* initial %cs relative to load segment */ + uint16_t reloc_table_offset; /* offset of the first relocation */ + uint16_t overlay_num; /* overlay number. set to 0. */ + uint16_t reserved0[4]; /* reserved */ + uint16_t oem_id; /* oem identifier */ + uint16_t oem_info; /* oem specific */ + uint16_t reserved1[10]; /* reserved */ + uint32_t peaddr; /* address of pe header */ + char message[64]; /* message to print */ +}; + +struct mz_reloc { + uint16_t offset; + uint16_t segment; +}; + +#define PE_MAGIC 0x00004550 /* "PE\0\0" */ +#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32 0x010b +#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32_ROM 0x0107 +#define PE_OPT_MAGIC_PE32PLUS 0x020b + +/* machine type */ +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_UNKNOWN 0x0000 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AM33 0x01d3 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_AMD64 0x8664 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARM 0x01c0 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_ARMV7 0x01c4 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_EBC 0x0ebc +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386 0x014c +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 0x0200 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_M32R 0x9041 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPS16 0x0266 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU 0x0366 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_MIPSFPU16 0x0466 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPC 0x01f0 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_POWERPCFP 0x01f1 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_R4000 0x0166 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3 0x01a2 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3DSP 0x01a3 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH3E 0x01a4 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH4 0x01a6 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_SH5 0x01a8 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_THUMB 0x01c2 +#define IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_WCEMIPSV2 0x0169 + +/* flags */ +#define IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED 0x0001 +#define IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE 0x0002 +#define IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED 0x0004 +#define IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED 0x0008 +#define IMAGE_FILE_AGGRESSIVE_WS_TRIM 0x0010 +#define IMAGE_FILE_LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE 0x0020 +#define IMAGE_FILE_16BIT_MACHINE 0x0040 +#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_LO 0x0080 +#define IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE 0x0100 +#define IMAGE_FILE_DEBUG_STRIPPED 0x0200 +#define IMAGE_FILE_REMOVABLE_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0400 +#define IMAGE_FILE_NET_RUN_FROM_SWAP 0x0800 +#define IMAGE_FILE_SYSTEM 0x1000 +#define IMAGE_FILE_DLL 0x2000 +#define IMAGE_FILE_UP_SYSTEM_ONLY 0x4000 +#define IMAGE_FILE_BYTES_REVERSED_HI 0x8000 + +struct pe_hdr { + uint32_t magic; /* PE magic */ + uint16_t machine; /* machine type */ + uint16_t sections; /* number of sections */ + uint32_t timestamp; /* time_t */ + uint32_t symbol_table; /* symbol table offset */ + uint32_t symbols; /* number of symbols */ + uint16_t opt_hdr_size; /* size of optional header */ + uint16_t flags; /* flags */ +}; + +#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_ROM_MAGIC 0x107 +#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_MAGIC 0x10b +#define IMAGE_FILE_OPT_PE32_PLUS_MAGIC 0x20b + +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_UNKNOWN 0 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_NATIVE 1 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_GUI 2 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CUI 3 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_POSIX_CUI 7 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI 9 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION 10 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER 11 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER 12 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_ROM_IMAGE 13 +#define IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_XBOX 14 + +#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_DYNAMIC_BASE 0x0040 +#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_FORCE_INTEGRITY 0x0080 +#define IMAGE_DLL_CHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT 0x0100 +#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_ISOLATION 0x0200 +#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_SEH 0x0400 +#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NO_BIND 0x0800 +#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_WDM_DRIVER 0x2000 +#define IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE 0x8000 + +/* the fact that pe32 isn't padded where pe32+ is 64-bit means union won't + * work right. vomit. */ +struct pe32_opt_hdr { + /* "standard" header */ + uint16_t magic; /* file type */ + uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */ + uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */ + uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */ + uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */ + uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */ + uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */ + uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */ + uint32_t data_base; /* relative data addr in ram */ + /* "windows" header */ + uint32_t image_base; /* preferred load address */ + uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */ + uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */ + uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */ + uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */ + uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */ + uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */ + uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */ + uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */ + uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */ + uint32_t image_size; /* image size */ + uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to + file_align */ + uint32_t csum; /* checksum */ + uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */ + uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */ + uint32_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */ + uint32_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */ + uint32_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */ + uint32_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */ + uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */ + uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */ +}; + +struct pe32plus_opt_hdr { + uint16_t magic; /* file type */ + uint8_t ld_major; /* linker major version */ + uint8_t ld_minor; /* linker minor version */ + uint32_t text_size; /* size of text section(s) */ + uint32_t data_size; /* size of data section(s) */ + uint32_t bss_size; /* size of bss section(s) */ + uint32_t entry_point; /* file offset of entry point */ + uint32_t code_base; /* relative code addr in ram */ + /* "windows" header */ + uint64_t image_base; /* preferred load address */ + uint32_t section_align; /* alignment in bytes */ + uint32_t file_align; /* file alignment in bytes */ + uint16_t os_major; /* major OS version */ + uint16_t os_minor; /* minor OS version */ + uint16_t image_major; /* major image version */ + uint16_t image_minor; /* minor image version */ + uint16_t subsys_major; /* major subsystem version */ + uint16_t subsys_minor; /* minor subsystem version */ + uint32_t win32_version; /* reserved, must be 0 */ + uint32_t image_size; /* image size */ + uint32_t header_size; /* header size rounded up to + file_align */ + uint32_t csum; /* checksum */ + uint16_t subsys; /* subsystem */ + uint16_t dll_flags; /* more flags! */ + uint64_t stack_size_req;/* amt of stack requested */ + uint64_t stack_size; /* amt of stack required */ + uint64_t heap_size_req; /* amt of heap requested */ + uint64_t heap_size; /* amt of heap required */ + uint32_t loader_flags; /* reserved, must be 0 */ + uint32_t data_dirs; /* number of data dir entries */ +}; + +struct data_dirent { + uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative to load address */ + uint32_t size; +}; + +struct data_directory { + struct data_dirent exports; /* .edata */ + struct data_dirent imports; /* .idata */ + struct data_dirent resources; /* .rsrc */ + struct data_dirent exceptions; /* .pdata */ + struct data_dirent certs; /* certs */ + struct data_dirent base_relocations; /* .reloc */ + struct data_dirent debug; /* .debug */ + struct data_dirent arch; /* reservered */ + struct data_dirent global_ptr; /* global pointer reg. Size=0 */ + struct data_dirent tls; /* .tls */ + struct data_dirent load_config; /* load configuration structure */ + struct data_dirent bound_imports; /* no idea */ + struct data_dirent import_addrs; /* import address table */ + struct data_dirent delay_imports; /* delay-load import table */ + struct data_dirent clr_runtime_hdr; /* .cor (object only) */ + struct data_dirent reserved; +}; + +struct section_header { + char name[8]; /* name or "/12\0" string tbl offset */ + uint32_t virtual_size; /* size of loaded section in ram */ + uint32_t virtual_address; /* relative virtual address */ + uint32_t raw_data_size; /* size of the section */ + uint32_t data_addr; /* file pointer to first page of sec */ + uint32_t relocs; /* file pointer to relocation entries */ + uint32_t line_numbers; /* line numbers! */ + uint16_t num_relocs; /* number of relocations */ + uint16_t num_lin_numbers; /* srsly. */ + uint32_t flags; +}; + +/* they actually defined 0x00000000 as well, but I think we'll skip that one. */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_0 0x00000001 +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_1 0x00000002 +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_2 0x00000004 +#define IMAGE_SCN_TYPE_NO_PAD 0x00000008 /* don't pad - obsolete */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_3 0x00000010 +#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE 0x00000020 /* .text */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000040 /* .data */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_CNT_UNINITIALIZED_DATA 0x00000080 /* .bss */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_OTHER 0x00000100 /* reserved */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_INFO 0x00000200 /* .drectve comments */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_4 0x00000400 +#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_REMOVE 0x00000800 /* .o only - scn to be rm'd*/ +#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_COMDAT 0x00001000 /* .o only - COMDAT data */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_5 0x00002000 /* spec omits this */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_RESERVED_6 0x00004000 /* spec omits this */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_GPREL 0x00008000 /* global pointer referenced data */ +/* spec lists 0x20000 twice, I suspect they meant 0x10000 for one of them */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_PURGEABLE 0x00010000 /* reserved for "future" use */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_16BIT 0x00020000 /* reserved for "future" use */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_LOCKED 0x00040000 /* reserved for "future" use */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_PRELOAD 0x00080000 /* reserved for "future" use */ +/* and here they just stuck a 1-byte integer in the middle of a bitfield */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1BYTES 0x00100000 /* it does what it says on the box */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2BYTES 0x00200000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4BYTES 0x00300000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8BYTES 0x00400000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_16BYTES 0x00500000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_32BYTES 0x00600000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_64BYTES 0x00700000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_128BYTES 0x00800000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_256BYTES 0x00900000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_512BYTES 0x00a00000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_1024BYTES 0x00b00000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_2048BYTES 0x00c00000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_4096BYTES 0x00d00000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_ALIGN_8192BYTES 0x00e00000 +#define IMAGE_SCN_LNK_NRELOC_OVFL 0x01000000 /* extended relocations */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE 0x02000000 /* scn can be discarded */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_CACHED 0x04000000 /* cannot be cached */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_NOT_PAGED 0x08000000 /* not pageable */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_SHARED 0x10000000 /* can be shared */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE 0x20000000 /* can be executed as code */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ 0x40000000 /* readable */ +#define IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE 0x80000000 /* writeable */ + +enum x64_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ABSOLUTE = 0, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR64, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_ADDR32N, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_1, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_2, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_3, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_4, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_REL32_5, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SECREL7, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_TOKEN, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SREL32, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_PAIR, + IMAGE_REL_AMD64_SSPAN32, +}; + +enum arm_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_ARM_ABSOLUTE, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_ADDR32N, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH2, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_BRANCH1, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_ARM_SECREL, +}; + +enum sh_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_SH3_ABSOLUTE, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT16, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_WORD, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT8_LONG, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_WORD, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT4_LONG, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_WORD, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL8_LONG, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_PCREL12_WORD, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_STARTOF_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_SIZEOF_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_SECREL, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_DIRECT32_NB, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_GPREL4_LONG, + IMAGE_REL_SH3_TOKEN, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_PCRELPT, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFLO, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_REFHALF, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELLO, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_RELHALF, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_PAIR, + IMAGE_REL_SHM_NOMODE, +}; + +enum ppc_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ABSOLUTE, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR64, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR24, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR16, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR14, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL24, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_REL14, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_ADDR32N, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECREL16, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFHI, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_REFLO, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_PAIR, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_SECRELLO, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_GPREL, + IMAGE_REL_PPC_TOKEN, +}; + +enum x86_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_I386_ABSOLUTE, + IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR16, + IMAGE_REL_I386_REL16, + IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32, + IMAGE_REL_I386_DIR32NB, + IMAGE_REL_I386_SEG12, + IMAGE_REL_I386_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL, + IMAGE_REL_I386_TOKEN, + IMAGE_REL_I386_SECREL7, + IMAGE_REL_I386_REL32, +}; + +enum ia64_coff_reloc_type { + IMAGE_REL_IA64_ABSOLUTE, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM14, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM22, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMM64, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR64, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21B, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21M, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL21F, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL22, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_LTOFF22, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECTION, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL22, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL64I, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SECREL32, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_DIR32NB, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL14, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL22, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_SREL32, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_UREL32, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60X, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60B, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60F, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60I, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_PCREL60M, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_IMMGPREL6, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_TOKEN, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_GPREL32, + IMAGE_REL_IA64_ADDEND, +}; + +struct coff_reloc { + uint32_t virtual_address; + uint32_t symbol_table_index; + union { + enum x64_coff_reloc_type x64_type; + enum arm_coff_reloc_type arm_type; + enum sh_coff_reloc_type sh_type; + enum ppc_coff_reloc_type ppc_type; + enum x86_coff_reloc_type x86_type; + enum ia64_coff_reloc_type ia64_type; + uint16_t data; + }; +}; + +/* + * Definitions for the contents of the certs data block + */ +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002 +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_OKCS115 0x0EF0 +#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID 0x0EF1 + +#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_1_0 0x0100 +#define WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0 0x0200 + +struct win_certificate { + uint32_t length; + uint16_t revision; + uint16_t cert_type; +}; + +#endif /* __LINUX_PE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ac34819214f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* Signed PE file verification + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H +#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H + +extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, + struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted); + +#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c index 52ebc70263f4..875f64e8935b 100644 --- a/kernel/system_keyring.c +++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void) pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key)); } else { + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key_ref_to_ptr(key)->flags); pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n", key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); key_ref_put(key); diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c index 6e7a236525b6..ffeba8f9dda9 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <keys/ceph-type.h> +#include <keys/user-type.h> #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include "crypto.h" @@ -423,8 +424,7 @@ int ceph_encrypt2(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, void *dst, size_t *dst_len, } } -static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -435,10 +435,6 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) goto err; - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - ret = -ENOMEM; ckey = kmalloc(sizeof(*ckey), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ckey) @@ -450,7 +446,8 @@ static int ceph_key_instantiate(struct key *key, if (ret < 0) goto err_ckey; - key->payload.data = ckey; + prep->payload[0] = ckey; + prep->quotalen = datalen; return 0; err_ckey: @@ -459,12 +456,15 @@ err: return ret; } -static int ceph_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) +static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - return strcmp(key->description, description) == 0; + struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload[0]; + ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey); + kfree(ckey); } -static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) { +static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) +{ struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data; ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey); @@ -473,8 +473,10 @@ static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) { struct key_type key_type_ceph = { .name = "ceph", - .instantiate = ceph_key_instantiate, - .match = ceph_key_match, + .preparse = ceph_key_preparse, + .free_preparse = ceph_key_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .match = user_match, .destroy = ceph_key_destroy, }; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index bf8584339048..f380b2c58178 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; #define DNS_ERRORNO_OPTION "dnserror" /* - * Instantiate a user defined key for dns_resolver. + * Preparse instantiation data for a dns_resolver key. * * The data must be a NUL-terminated string, with the NUL char accounted in * datalen. @@ -58,17 +58,15 @@ const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; * "ip1,ip2,...#foo=bar" */ static int -dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload; unsigned long derrno; int ret; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0; + int datalen = prep->datalen, result_len = 0; const char *data = prep->data, *end, *opt; - kenter("%%%d,%s,'%*.*s',%zu", - key->serial, key->description, - (int)datalen, (int)datalen, data, datalen); + kenter("'%*.*s',%u", datalen, datalen, data, datalen); if (datalen <= 1 || !data || data[datalen - 1] != '\0') return -EINVAL; @@ -95,8 +93,7 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) opt_len = next_opt - opt; if (!opt_len) { printk(KERN_WARNING - "Empty option to dns_resolver key %d\n", - key->serial); + "Empty option to dns_resolver key\n"); return -EINVAL; } @@ -125,30 +122,28 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto bad_option_value; kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno); - key->type_data.x[0] = -derrno; + prep->type_data[0] = ERR_PTR(-derrno); continue; } bad_option_value: printk(KERN_WARNING - "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key %d:" + "Option '%*.*s' to dns_resolver key:" " bad/missing value\n", - opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt, key->serial); + opt_nlen, opt_nlen, opt); return -EINVAL; } while (opt = next_opt + 1, opt < end); } /* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no * result */ - if (key->type_data.x[0]) { - kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", key->type_data.x[0]); + if (prep->type_data[0]) { + kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->type_data[0])); return 0; } kdebug("store result"); - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, result_len); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; + prep->quotalen = result_len; upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + result_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!upayload) { @@ -159,13 +154,23 @@ dns_resolver_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) upayload->datalen = result_len; memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len); upayload->data[result_len] = '\0'; - rcu_assign_pointer(key->payload.data, upayload); + prep->payload[0] = upayload; kleave(" = 0"); return 0; } /* + * Clean up the preparse data + */ +static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); + + kfree(prep->payload[0]); +} + +/* * The description is of the form "[<type>:]<domain_name>" * * The domain name may be a simple name or an absolute domain name (which @@ -234,7 +239,9 @@ static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key, struct key_type key_type_dns_resolver = { .name = "dns_resolver", - .instantiate = dns_resolver_instantiate, + .preparse = dns_resolver_preparse, + .free_preparse = dns_resolver_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = dns_resolver_match, .revoke = user_revoke, .destroy = user_destroy, diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c index 0ad080790a32..3907add75932 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c @@ -26,8 +26,10 @@ #include "ar-internal.h" static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *); -static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); -static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); @@ -39,7 +41,9 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); */ struct key_type key_type_rxrpc = { .name = "rxrpc", - .instantiate = rxrpc_instantiate, + .preparse = rxrpc_preparse, + .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = user_match, .destroy = rxrpc_destroy, .describe = rxrpc_describe, @@ -54,7 +58,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_type_rxrpc); struct key_type key_type_rxrpc_s = { .name = "rxrpc_s", .vet_description = rxrpc_vet_description_s, - .instantiate = rxrpc_instantiate_s, + .preparse = rxrpc_preparse_s, + .free_preparse = rxrpc_free_preparse_s, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = user_match, .destroy = rxrpc_destroy_s, .describe = rxrpc_describe, @@ -81,13 +87,13 @@ static int rxrpc_vet_description_s(const char *desc) * parse an RxKAD type XDR format token * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, - unsigned int toklen) +static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, + size_t datalen, + const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen) { struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken; size_t plen; u32 tktlen; - int ret; _enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%u", ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]), @@ -103,9 +109,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, return -EKEYREJECTED; plen = sizeof(*token) + sizeof(*token->kad) + tktlen; - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + plen); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + prep->quotalen = datalen + plen; plen -= sizeof(*token); token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -146,16 +150,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, token->kad->ticket[6], token->kad->ticket[7]); /* count the number of tokens attached */ - key->type_data.x[0]++; + prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1); /* attach the data */ - for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data; + for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; *pptoken; pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next) continue; *pptoken = token; - if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry) - key->expiry = token->kad->expiry; + if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry) + prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry; _leave(" = 0"); return 0; @@ -418,8 +422,9 @@ static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_ticket(u8 **_ticket, u16 *_tktlen, * parse an RxK5 type XDR format token * - the caller guarantees we have at least 4 words */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, - unsigned int toklen) +static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, + size_t datalen, + const __be32 *xdr, unsigned int toklen) { struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pptoken; struct rxk5_key *rxk5; @@ -432,9 +437,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, /* reserve some payload space for this subkey - the length of the token * is a reasonable approximation */ - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, key->datalen + toklen); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + prep->quotalen = datalen + toklen; token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL); if (!token) @@ -520,14 +523,14 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(struct key *key, const __be32 *xdr, if (toklen != 0) goto inval; - /* attach the payload to the key */ - for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data; + /* attach the payload */ + for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; *pptoken; pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next) continue; *pptoken = token; - if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry) - key->expiry = token->kad->expiry; + if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry) + prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry; _leave(" = 0"); return 0; @@ -545,16 +548,17 @@ error: * attempt to parse the data as the XDR format * - the caller guarantees we have more than 7 words */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) +static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - const __be32 *xdr = data, *token; + const __be32 *xdr = prep->data, *token; const char *cp; unsigned int len, tmp, loop, ntoken, toklen, sec_ix; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret; _enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%zu", ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]), - datalen); + prep->datalen); if (datalen > AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX) goto not_xdr; @@ -635,13 +639,13 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datal switch (sec_ix) { case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: - ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxkad(key, xdr, toklen); + ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen); if (ret != 0) goto error; break; case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5: - ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr_rxk5(key, xdr, toklen); + ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(prep, datalen, xdr, toklen); if (ret != 0) goto error; break; @@ -665,8 +669,9 @@ error: } /* - * instantiate an rxrpc defined key - * data should be of the form: + * Preparse an rxrpc defined key. + * + * Data should be of the form: * OFFSET LEN CONTENT * 0 4 key interface version number * 4 2 security index (type) @@ -678,7 +683,7 @@ error: * * if no data is provided, then a no-security key is made */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { const struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 *v1; struct rxrpc_key_token *token, **pp; @@ -686,7 +691,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep u32 kver; int ret; - _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); + _enter("%zu", prep->datalen); /* handle a no-security key */ if (!prep->data && prep->datalen == 0) @@ -694,7 +699,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep /* determine if the XDR payload format is being used */ if (prep->datalen > 7 * 4) { - ret = rxrpc_instantiate_xdr(key, prep->data, prep->datalen); + ret = rxrpc_preparse_xdr(prep); if (ret != -EPROTO) return ret; } @@ -743,9 +748,7 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep goto error; plen = sizeof(*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length; - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, plen + sizeof(*token)); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; + prep->quotalen = plen + sizeof(*token); ret = -ENOMEM; token = kzalloc(sizeof(*token), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -762,15 +765,16 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep memcpy(&token->kad->session_key, &v1->session_key, 8); memcpy(&token->kad->ticket, v1->ticket, v1->ticket_length); - /* attach the data */ - key->type_data.x[0]++; + /* count the number of tokens attached */ + prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1); - pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&key->payload.data; + /* attach the data */ + pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; while (*pp) pp = &(*pp)->next; *pp = token; - if (token->kad->expiry < key->expiry) - key->expiry = token->kad->expiry; + if (token->kad->expiry < prep->expiry) + prep->expiry = token->kad->expiry; token = NULL; ret = 0; @@ -781,20 +785,55 @@ error: } /* - * instantiate a server secret key - * data should be a pointer to the 8-byte secret key + * Free token list. */ -static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token) +{ + struct rxrpc_key_token *next; + + for (; token; token = next) { + next = token->next; + switch (token->security_index) { + case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: + kfree(token->kad); + break; + case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5: + if (token->k5) + rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5); + break; + default: + printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n", + token->security_index); + BUG(); + } + + kfree(token); + } +} + +/* + * Clean up preparse data. + */ +static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload[0]); +} + +/* + * Preparse a server secret key. + * + * The data should be the 8-byte secret key. + */ +static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct crypto_blkcipher *ci; - _enter("{%x},,%zu", key_serial(key), prep->datalen); + _enter("%zu", prep->datalen); if (prep->datalen != 8) return -EINVAL; - memcpy(&key->type_data, prep->data, 8); + memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8); ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(ci)) { @@ -805,36 +844,26 @@ static int rxrpc_instantiate_s(struct key *key, if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0) BUG(); - key->payload.data = ci; + prep->payload[0] = ci; _leave(" = 0"); return 0; } /* + * Clean up preparse data. + */ +static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + if (prep->payload[0]) + crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload[0]); +} + +/* * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a rxrpc key */ static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct rxrpc_key_token *token; - - while ((token = key->payload.data)) { - key->payload.data = token->next; - switch (token->security_index) { - case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD: - kfree(token->kad); - break; - case RXRPC_SECURITY_RXK5: - if (token->k5) - rxrpc_rxk5_free(token->k5); - break; - default: - printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown token type %x on rxrpc key\n", - token->security_index); - BUG(); - } - - kfree(token); - } + rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data); } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index b4af4ebc5be2..8d4fbff8b87c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/rbtree.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/digsig.h> @@ -24,7 +26,11 @@ static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX]; static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { "_evm", "_module", +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING "_ima", +#else + ".ima", +#endif }; int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, @@ -56,3 +62,25 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) +{ + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + int err = 0; + + keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0), + KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | + KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); + if (!IS_ERR(keyring[id])) + set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &keyring[id]->flags); + else { + err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); + pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n", + keyring_name[id], err); + keyring[id] = NULL; + } + return err; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 81a27971d884..08758fbd496f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -123,3 +123,13 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE For more information on integrity appraisal refer to: <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net> If unsure, say N. + +config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING + bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS + default y + help + This option requires that all keys added to the .ima + keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index f79fa8be203c..c42056edfc97 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -249,4 +249,16 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, return -EINVAL; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING +static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) +{ + return integrity_init_keyring(id); +} +#else +static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index d3113d4aaa3c..59ac90275070 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, hash_start = 1; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { - cause = "IMA signature required"; + cause = "IMA-signature-required"; status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index ccd0ac8fa9a0..0bd732843fe7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> @@ -25,7 +27,45 @@ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include "ima.h" +struct ahash_completion { + struct completion completion; + int err; +}; + +/* minimum file size for ahash use */ +static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize; +module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_minsize, "Minimum file size for ahash use"); + +/* default is 0 - 1 page. */ +static int ima_maxorder; +static unsigned int ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE; + +static int param_set_bufsize(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + unsigned long long size; + int order; + + size = memparse(val, NULL); + order = get_order(size); + if (order >= MAX_ORDER) + return -EINVAL; + ima_maxorder = order; + ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE << order; + return 0; +} + +static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bufsize = { + .set = param_set_bufsize, + .get = param_get_uint, +}; +#define param_check_bufsize(name, p) __param_check(name, p, unsigned int) + +module_param_named(ahash_bufsize, ima_bufsize, bufsize, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size"); + static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm; +static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm; /** * ima_kernel_read - read file content @@ -93,9 +133,246 @@ static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm) crypto_free_shash(tfm); } -/* - * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest +/** + * ima_alloc_pages() - Allocate contiguous pages. + * @max_size: Maximum amount of memory to allocate. + * @allocated_size: Returned size of actual allocation. + * @last_warn: Should the min_size allocation warn or not. + * + * Tries to do opportunistic allocation for memory first trying to allocate + * max_size amount of memory and then splitting that until zero order is + * reached. Allocation is tried without generating allocation warnings unless + * last_warn is set. Last_warn set affects only last allocation of zero order. + * + * By default, ima_maxorder is 0 and it is equivalent to kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL) + * + * Return pointer to allocated memory, or NULL on failure. + */ +static void *ima_alloc_pages(loff_t max_size, size_t *allocated_size, + int last_warn) +{ + void *ptr; + int order = ima_maxorder; + gfp_t gfp_mask = __GFP_WAIT | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY; + + if (order) + order = min(get_order(max_size), order); + + for (; order; order--) { + ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, order); + if (ptr) { + *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE << order; + return ptr; + } + } + + /* order is zero - one page */ + + gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL; + + if (!last_warn) + gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOWARN; + + ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, 0); + if (ptr) { + *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE; + return ptr; + } + + *allocated_size = 0; + return NULL; +} + +/** + * ima_free_pages() - Free pages allocated by ima_alloc_pages(). + * @ptr: Pointer to allocated pages. + * @size: Size of allocated buffer. */ +static void ima_free_pages(void *ptr, size_t size) +{ + if (!ptr) + return; + free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, get_order(size)); +} + +static struct crypto_ahash *ima_alloc_atfm(enum hash_algo algo) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ima_ahash_tfm; + int rc; + + if ((algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) || !tfm) { + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0); + if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) { + if (algo == ima_hash_algo) + ima_ahash_tfm = tfm; + } else { + rc = PTR_ERR(tfm); + pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n", + hash_algo_name[algo], rc); + } + } + return tfm; +} + +static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm) +{ + if (tfm != ima_ahash_tfm) + crypto_free_ahash(tfm); +} + +static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err) +{ + struct ahash_completion *res = req->data; + + if (err == -EINPROGRESS) + return; + res->err = err; + complete(&res->completion); +} + +static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res) +{ + switch (err) { + case 0: + break; + case -EINPROGRESS: + case -EBUSY: + wait_for_completion(&res->completion); + reinit_completion(&res->completion); + err = res->err; + /* fall through */ + default: + pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err); + } + + return err; +} + +static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, + struct ima_digest_data *hash, + struct crypto_ahash *tfm) +{ + loff_t i_size, offset; + char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, }; + int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0; + struct ahash_request *req; + struct scatterlist sg[1]; + struct ahash_completion res; + size_t rbuf_size[2]; + + hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); + + req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + return -ENOMEM; + + init_completion(&res.completion); + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + ahash_complete, &res); + + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res); + if (rc) + goto out1; + + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + + if (i_size == 0) + goto out2; + + /* + * Try to allocate maximum size of memory. + * Fail if even a single page cannot be allocated. + */ + rbuf[0] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size, &rbuf_size[0], 1); + if (!rbuf[0]) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out1; + } + + /* Only allocate one buffer if that is enough. */ + if (i_size > rbuf_size[0]) { + /* + * Try to allocate secondary buffer. If that fails fallback to + * using single buffering. Use previous memory allocation size + * as baseline for possible allocation size. + */ + rbuf[1] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size - rbuf_size[0], + &rbuf_size[1], 0); + } + + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { + file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ; + read = 1; + } + + for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) { + if (!rbuf[1] && offset) { + /* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first + * read/request, wait for the completion of the + * previous ahash_update() request. + */ + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + if (rc) + goto out3; + } + /* read buffer */ + rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]); + rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len); + if (rc != rbuf_len) + goto out3; + + if (rbuf[1] && offset) { + /* Using two buffers, and it is not the first + * read/request, wait for the completion of the + * previous ahash_update() request. + */ + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + if (rc) + goto out3; + } + + sg_init_one(&sg[0], rbuf[active], rbuf_len); + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, rbuf_len); + + ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req); + + if (rbuf[1]) + active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */ + } + /* wait for the last update request to complete */ + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); +out3: + if (read) + file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; + ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]); + ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]); +out2: + if (!rc) { + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res); + } +out1: + ahash_request_free(req); + return rc; +} + +static int ima_calc_file_ahash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; + int rc; + + tfm = ima_alloc_atfm(hash->algo); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + rc = ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(file, hash, tfm); + + ima_free_atfm(tfm); + + return rc; +} + static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash, struct crypto_shash *tfm) @@ -156,7 +433,7 @@ out: return rc; } -int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) +static int ima_calc_file_shash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) { struct crypto_shash *tfm; int rc; @@ -173,6 +450,35 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) } /* + * ima_calc_file_hash - calculate file hash + * + * Asynchronous hash (ahash) allows using HW acceleration for calculating + * a hash. ahash performance varies for different data sizes on different + * crypto accelerators. shash performance might be better for smaller files. + * The 'ima.ahash_minsize' module parameter allows specifying the best + * minimum file size for using ahash on the system. + * + * If the ima.ahash_minsize parameter is not specified, this function uses + * shash for the hash calculation. If ahash fails, it falls back to using + * shash. + */ +int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) +{ + loff_t i_size; + int rc; + + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + + if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) { + rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash); + if (!rc) + return 0; + } + + return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash); +} + +/* * Calculate the hash of template data */ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 09baa335ebc7..0d696431209c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized) return; - mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */ - if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -104,8 +102,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) send_writers = true; } - mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); - if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) return; @@ -163,7 +159,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; char *pathbuf = NULL; const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func; @@ -207,6 +203,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename, goto out_digsig; } + template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) xattr_ptr = &xattr_value; @@ -328,8 +325,14 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH); error = ima_init(); - if (!error) - ima_initialized = 1; + if (error) + goto out; + + error = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); + if (error) + goto out; + ima_initialized = 1; +out: return error; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 40a7488f6721..cea84d8bd7be 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) void ima_update_policy(void) { static const char op[] = "policy_update"; - const char *cause = "already exists"; + const char *cause = "already-exists"; int result = 1; int audit_info = 0; @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, - NULL, op, "already exists", + NULL, op, "already-exists", -EACCES, audit_info); return -EACCES; } @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) if (result) { kfree(entry); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, - NULL, op, "invalid policy", result, + NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result, audit_info); return result; } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 33c0a70f6b15..09c440d9aaee 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen); +int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id); #else static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, @@ -133,6 +134,10 @@ static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, return -EOPNOTSUPP; } +static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 8137b27d641d..c2f91a0cf889 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .name = "big_key", .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, - .instantiate = big_key_instantiate, + .preparse = big_key_preparse, + .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .match = user_match, .revoke = big_key_revoke, .destroy = big_key_destroy, @@ -43,11 +45,11 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { }; /* - * Instantiate a big key + * Preparse a big key */ -int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; struct file *file; ssize_t written; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -58,11 +60,9 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto error; /* Set an arbitrary quota */ - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; + prep->quotalen = 16; - key->type_data.x[1] = datalen; + prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { ret = PTR_ERR(file); - goto err_quota; + goto error; } written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0); @@ -93,24 +93,33 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) } else { /* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!data) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err_quota; - } + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; - key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); + prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); } return 0; err_fput: fput(file); -err_quota: - key_payload_reserve(key, 0); error: return ret; } /* + * Clear preparsement. + */ +void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; + path_put(path); + } else { + kfree(prep->payload[0]); + } +} + +/* * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring * - called with the key sem write-locked */ diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 5fe443d120af..d252c5704f8a 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload); + prep->payload[0] = epayload; out: kfree(datablob); return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 2048a110e7f1..b90a68c4e2c4 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, /* disable the authorisation key */ if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); + + if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + key->expiry = prep->expiry; + key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); + } } } @@ -479,6 +484,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -488,7 +494,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (keyring) { ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit); if (ret < 0) - goto error_free_preparse; + goto error; } ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit); @@ -496,10 +502,9 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (keyring) __key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit); -error_free_preparse: +error: if (key->type->preparse) key->type->free_preparse(&prep); -error: return ret; } @@ -811,11 +816,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED; + prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto error_put_type; + goto error_free_prep; } if (!index_key.description) index_key.description = prep.description; @@ -941,6 +947,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; + prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -956,9 +963,9 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) up_write(&key->sem); +error: if (key->type->preparse) key->type->free_preparse(&prep); -error: return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); @@ -1024,6 +1031,38 @@ void key_invalidate(struct key *key) EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate); /** + * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data + * @key: The key to be instantiated + * @prep: The preparsed data to load. + * + * Instantiate a key from preparsed data. We assume we can just copy the data + * in directly and clear the old pointers. + * + * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer. + */ +int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); + if (ret == 0) { + key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; + key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]); + key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1]; + prep->type_data[0] = NULL; + prep->type_data[1] = NULL; + prep->payload[0] = NULL; + prep->payload[1] = NULL; + } + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate); + +/** * register_key_type - Register a type of key. * @ktype: The new key type. * diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 609f8d326ddc..e26f860e5f2e 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, return ret; if (ret == 0 || ret >= len) return -EINVAL; - if (type[0] == '.') - return -EPERM; type[len - 1] = '\0'; return 0; } @@ -86,6 +84,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, if (!*description) { kfree(description); description = NULL; + } else if ((description[0] == '.') && + (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto error2; } } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 9cf2575f0d97..8314a7d2104d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc) * can be treated as ordinary keys in addition to having their own special * operations. */ +static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring); @@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, struct key_type key_type_keyring = { .name = "keyring", .def_datalen = 0, + .preparse = keyring_preparse, + .free_preparse = keyring_free_preparse, .instantiate = keyring_instantiate, .match = user_match, .revoke = keyring_revoke, @@ -123,6 +127,21 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) } /* + * Preparse a keyring payload + */ +static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + return prep->datalen != 0 ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + +/* + * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload + */ +static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ +} + +/* * Initialise a keyring. * * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data. @@ -130,17 +149,10 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - int ret; - - ret = -EINVAL; - if (prep->datalen == 0) { - assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys); - /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ - keyring_publish_name(keyring); - ret = 0; - } - - return ret; + assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys); + /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */ + keyring_publish_name(keyring); + return 0; } /* diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 7495a93b4b90..842e6f410d50 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ #include "internal.h" #include <keys/user-type.h> +static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); +static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *); static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, struct key_preparsed_payload *); static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); @@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { .name = ".request_key_auth", .def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth), + .preparse = request_key_auth_preparse, + .free_preparse = request_key_auth_free_preparse, .instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate, .describe = request_key_auth_describe, .revoke = request_key_auth_revoke, @@ -40,6 +44,15 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = { .read = request_key_auth_read, }; +int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + return 0; +} + +void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ +} + /* * Instantiate a request-key authorisation key. */ diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index faa2caeb593f..eee340011f2b 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc); struct key_type key_type_user = { .name = "user", .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, - .instantiate = user_instantiate, + .preparse = user_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .update = user_update, .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, @@ -47,7 +49,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user); struct key_type key_type_logon = { .name = "logon", .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, - .instantiate = user_instantiate, + .preparse = user_preparse, + .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, + .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, .update = user_update, .match = user_match, .revoke = user_revoke, @@ -58,38 +62,37 @@ struct key_type key_type_logon = { EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon); /* - * instantiate a user defined key + * Preparse a user defined key payload */ -int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { struct user_key_payload *upayload; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - int ret; - ret = -EINVAL; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - goto error; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; + return -EINVAL; - ret = -ENOMEM; upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!upayload) - goto error; + return -ENOMEM; /* attach the data */ + prep->quotalen = datalen; + prep->payload[0] = upayload; upayload->datalen = datalen; memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); - ret = 0; - -error: - return ret; + return 0; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate); +/* + * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload + */ +void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + kfree(prep->payload[0]); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse); /* * update a user defined key |
