Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!

1 files changed, 1777 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a820cf88c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1777 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ *           James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ *	Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * 	Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
+unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
+#define POLICY_RDLOCK read_lock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRLOCK write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
+#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
+
+static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
+#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+
+static struct sidtab sidtab;
+struct policydb policydb;
+int ss_initialized = 0;
+
+/*
+ * The largest sequence number that has been used when
+ * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
+ * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static u32 latest_granting = 0;
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+				    u32 *scontext_len);
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast...  It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only.  For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+				struct context *tcontext,
+				struct context *xcontext,
+				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+	u32 val1, val2;
+	struct context *c;
+	struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+	struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+	struct constraint_expr *e;
+	int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+	int sp = -1;
+
+	for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+		switch (e->expr_type) {
+		case CEXPR_NOT:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+			s[sp] = !s[sp];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_AND:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_OR:
+			BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+			sp--;
+			s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_ATTR:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			switch (e->attr) {
+			case CEXPR_USER:
+				val1 = scontext->user;
+				val2 = tcontext->user;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_TYPE:
+				val1 = scontext->type;
+				val2 = tcontext->type;
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_ROLE:
+				val1 = scontext->role;
+				val2 = tcontext->role;
+				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				switch (e->op) {
+				case CEXPR_DOM:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								  val2 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								  val1 - 1);
+					continue;
+				case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+					s[++sp] = ( !ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+								     val2 - 1) &&
+						    !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+								     val1 - 1) );
+					continue;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_L1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1L2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_H1H2:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L1H1:
+				l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+			case CEXPR_L2H2:
+				l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+				l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+				goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOM:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+				s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+				continue;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CEXPR_NAMES:
+			if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+				return 0;
+			c = scontext;
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+				c = tcontext;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+				c = xcontext;
+				if (!c) {
+					BUG();
+					return 0;
+				}
+			}
+			if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+				val1 = c->user;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+				val1 = c->role;
+			else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+				val1 = c->type;
+			else {
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			switch (e->op) {
+			case CEXPR_EQ:
+				s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			case CEXPR_NEQ:
+				s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+				break;
+			default:
+				BUG();
+				return 0;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			BUG();
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+	return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
+ * the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
+				     struct context *tcontext,
+				     u16 tclass,
+				     u32 requested,
+				     struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	struct role_allow *ra;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+	 * to remain in the correct class.
+	 */
+	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized class %d\n",
+		       tclass);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
+	 */
+	avd->allowed = 0;
+	avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->auditallow = 0;
+	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+	 * this permission check, then use it.
+	 */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_AV);
+	if (avdatum) {
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+			avd->allowed = avtab_allowed(avdatum);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+			avd->auditdeny = avtab_auditdeny(avdatum);
+		if (avdatum->specified & AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+			avd->auditallow = avtab_auditallow(avdatum);
+	}
+
+	/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+	cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+	 * the MLS policy).
+	 */
+	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+					  constraint->expr)) {
+			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If checking process transition permission and the
+	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+	 * pair.
+	 */
+	if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS &&
+	    (avd->allowed & (PROCESS__TRANSITION | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION)) &&
+	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (!ra)
+			avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+			                                PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+                                           struct context *ncontext,
+                                           struct context *tcontext,
+                                           u16 tclass)
+{
+	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context,
+	          "security_validate_transition:  denied for"
+	          " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+	          o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+	kfree(o);
+	kfree(n);
+	kfree(t);
+
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+                                 u16 tclass)
+{
+	struct context *ocontext;
+	struct context *ncontext;
+	struct context *tcontext;
+	struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+	struct constraint_node *constraint;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap extended Netlink classes for old policy versions.
+	 * Do this here rather than socket_type_to_security_class()
+	 * in case a newer policy version is loaded, allowing sockets
+	 * to remain in the correct class.
+	 */
+	if (policydb_loaded_version < POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+		if (tclass >= SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET &&
+		    tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
+			tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition:  "
+		       "unrecognized class %d\n", tclass);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	if (!ocontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", oldsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	if (!ncontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", newsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_validate_transition: "
+		       " unrecognized SID %d\n", tasksid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+	while (constraint) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
+		                          constraint->expr)) {
+			rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
+			                                     tcontext, tclass);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		constraint = constraint->next;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
+ * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 requested,
+			struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		avd->allowed = requested;
+		avd->decided = requested;
+		avd->auditallow = 0;
+		avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+		avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
+				       requested, avd);
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size.  Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	char *scontextp;
+
+	*scontext = NULL;
+	*scontext_len = 0;
+
+	/* Compute the size of the context. */
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+
+	/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+	scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!scontextp) {
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	*scontext = scontextp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+	 */
+	sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+		policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
+		policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
+		policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+	scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
+	             1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
+	             1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
+
+	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+
+	*scontextp = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+	struct context *context;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+			char *scontextp;
+
+			*scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+			scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC);
+			strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
+			*scontext = scontextp;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context:  called before initial "
+		       "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	if (!context) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_sid_to_context:  unrecognized SID "
+		       "%d\n", sid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
+{
+	char *scontext2;
+	struct context context;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
+				*sid = i;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		*sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it.
+	   The string should already by null terminated, but we append a
+	   null suffix to the copy to avoid problems with the existing
+	   attr package, which doesn't view the null terminator as part
+	   of the attribute value. */
+	scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1,GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scontext2) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
+	scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
+
+	context_init(&context);
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	/* Parse the security context. */
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	scontextp = (char *) scontext2;
+
+	/* Extract the user. */
+	p = scontextp;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, scontextp);
+	if (!usrdatum)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	context.user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Extract role. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+
+	if (*p == 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	role = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, scontextp);
+	if (!role)
+		goto out_unlock;
+	context.role = role->value;
+
+	/* Extract type. */
+	scontextp = p;
+	while (*p && *p != ':')
+		p++;
+	oldc = *p;
+	*p++ = 0;
+
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, scontextp);
+	if (!typdatum)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	context.type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_context_to_sid(oldc, &p, &context);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	if ((p - scontext2) < scontext_len) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &context)) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the new sid. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	context_destroy(&context);
+	kfree(scontext2);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct context *scontext,
+	struct context *tcontext,
+	u16 tclass,
+	struct context *newcontext)
+{
+	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+
+	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	audit_log(current->audit_context,
+		  "security_compute_sid:  invalid context %s"
+		  " for scontext=%s"
+		  " tcontext=%s"
+		  " tclass=%s",
+		  n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
+out:
+	kfree(s);
+	kfree(t);
+	kfree(n);
+	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+				u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass,
+				u32 specified,
+				u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
+	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
+	struct avtab_key avkey;
+	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+	struct avtab_node *node;
+	unsigned int type_change = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		switch (tclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+			*out_sid = ssid;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*out_sid = tsid;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	if (!scontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       ssid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	if (!tcontext) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_sid:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
+		       tsid);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	context_init(&newcontext);
+
+	/* Set the user identity. */
+	switch (specified) {
+	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+		/* Use the process user identity. */
+		newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+		break;
+	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+		/* Use the related object owner. */
+		newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the role and type to default values. */
+	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+		/* Use the current role and type of process. */
+		newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+		newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Use the well-defined object role. */
+		newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+		/* Use the type of the related object. */
+		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+	}
+
+	/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+	avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+	avkey.target_class = tclass;
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey, AVTAB_TYPE);
+
+	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+	if(!avdatum) {
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, specified);
+		for (; node != NULL; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+			if (node->datum.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	type_change = (avdatum && (avdatum->specified & specified));
+	if (type_change) {
+		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+		switch (specified) {
+		case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_transition(avdatum);
+			break;
+		case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_member(avdatum);
+			break;
+		case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+			newcontext.type = avtab_change(avdatum);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
+	switch (tclass) {
+	case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
+		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+			/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+			for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
+			     roletr = roletr->next) {
+				if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
+				    roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
+					/* Use the role transition rule. */
+					newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the MLS attributes.
+	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+							tcontext,
+							tclass,
+							&newcontext);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
+			    u32 tsid,
+			    u16 tclass,
+			    u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+			u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass,
+			u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each permission that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same value
+ * in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_perm(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct hashtab *h;
+	struct perm_datum *perdatum, *perdatum2;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+
+	h = p;
+	perdatum = datum;
+
+	perdatum2 = hashtab_search(h, key);
+	if (!perdatum2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  permission %s disappeared",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (perdatum->value != perdatum2->value) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of permission %s changed",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that each class that is defined under the
+ * existing policy is still defined with the same
+ * attributes in the new policy.
+ */
+static int validate_class(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct policydb *newp;
+	struct class_datum *cladatum, *cladatum2;
+	int rc;
+
+	newp = p;
+	cladatum = datum;
+
+	cladatum2 = hashtab_search(newp->p_classes.table, key);
+	if (!cladatum2) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  class %s disappeared\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cladatum->value != cladatum2->value) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the value of class %s changed\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((cladatum->comdatum && !cladatum2->comdatum) ||
+	    (!cladatum->comdatum && cladatum2->comdatum)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the inherits clause for the access "
+		       "vector definition for class %s changed\n", (char *)key);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cladatum->comdatum) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->comdatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+		                 cladatum2->comdatum->permissions.table);
+		if (rc) {
+			printk(" in the access vector definition for class "
+			       "%s\n", (char *)key);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = hashtab_map(cladatum->permissions.table, validate_perm,
+	                 cladatum2->permissions.table);
+	if (rc)
+		printk(" in access vector definition for class %s\n",
+		       (char *)key);
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
+static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
+		     struct context *context,
+		     void *arg)
+{
+	struct sidtab *s = arg;
+
+	return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (selinux_enforcing) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		char *s;
+		u32 len;
+
+		context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  context %s is invalid\n", s);
+		kfree(s);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+	struct policydb *oldp;
+	struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `c' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp'.  Verify that the
+ * context is valid under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(u32 key,
+			   struct context *c,
+			   void *p)
+{
+	struct convert_context_args *args;
+	struct context oldc;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct type_datum *typdatum;
+	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+	char *s;
+	u32 len;
+	int rc;
+
+	args = p;
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Convert the user. */
+	usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
+	                          args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
+	if (!usrdatum) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+	/* Convert the role. */
+	role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
+	                      args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
+	if (!role) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->role = role->value;
+
+	/* Convert the type. */
+	typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
+	                          args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
+	if (!typdatum) {
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	c->type = typdatum->value;
+
+	rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
+	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
+	}
+
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+out:
+	return rc;
+bad:
+	context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	context_destroy(&oldc);
+	printk(KERN_ERR "security:  invalidating context %s\n", s);
+	kfree(s);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
+	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
+	struct convert_context_args args;
+	u32 seqno;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+	LOAD_LOCK;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		avtab_cache_init();
+		if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+			LOAD_UNLOCK;
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+			LOAD_UNLOCK;
+			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
+			avtab_cache_destroy();
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+		ss_initialized = 1;
+
+		LOAD_UNLOCK;
+		selinux_complete_init();
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+#endif
+
+	if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
+		LOAD_UNLOCK;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	sidtab_init(&newsidtab);
+
+	/* Verify that the existing classes did not change. */
+	if (hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, validate_class, &newpolicydb)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "security:  the definition of an existing "
+		       "class changed\n");
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Clone the SID table. */
+	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+	if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert the internal representations of contexts
+	   in the new SID table and remove invalid SIDs. */
+	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.newp = &newpolicydb;
+	sidtab_map_remove_on_error(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
+
+	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
+	memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+
+	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
+	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+	memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
+	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
+	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	LOAD_UNLOCK;
+
+	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
+	policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
+	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
+
+	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+
+	return 0;
+
+err:
+	LOAD_UNLOCK;
+	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
+	policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
+	return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(u16 domain,
+		      u16 type,
+		      u8 protocol,
+		      u16 port,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	while (c) {
+		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+		    c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ * @msg_sid: default SID for received packets
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(char *name,
+		       u32 *if_sid,
+		       u32 *msg_sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						  &c->context[0],
+						  &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[1],
+						   &c->sid[1]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*if_sid = c->sid[0];
+		*msg_sid = c->sid[1];
+	} else {
+		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+		*msg_sid = SECINITSID_NETMSG;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+	int i, fail = 0;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		if(addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+			fail = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+		      void *addrp,
+		      u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	switch (domain) {
+	case AF_INET: {
+		u32 addr;
+
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		while (c) {
+			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		while (c) {
+			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+						c->u.node6.mask))
+				break;
+			c = c->next;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*out_sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs.  Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+	                   char *username,
+			   u32 **sids,
+			   u32 *nel)
+{
+	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+	u32 *mysids, *mysids2, sid;
+	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+	struct user_datum *user;
+	struct role_datum *role;
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc = 0, i, j;
+
+	if (!ss_initialized) {
+		*sids = NULL;
+		*nel = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	if (!fromcon) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	if (!user) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	usercon.user = user->value;
+
+	mysids = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!mysids) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	memset(mysids, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids));
+
+	for (i = ebitmap_startbit(&user->roles); i < ebitmap_length(&user->roles); i++) {
+		if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&user->roles, i))
+			continue;
+		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		usercon.role = i+1;
+		for (j = ebitmap_startbit(&role->types); j < ebitmap_length(&role->types); j++) {
+			if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, j))
+				continue;
+			usercon.type = j+1;
+
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+				continue;
+
+			rc = context_struct_compute_av(fromcon, &usercon,
+						       SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+						       PROCESS__TRANSITION,
+						       &avd);
+			if (rc ||  !(avd.allowed & PROCESS__TRANSITION))
+				continue;
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(mysids);
+				goto out_unlock;
+			}
+			if (mynel < maxnel) {
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			} else {
+				maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+				mysids2 = kmalloc(maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+				if (!mysids2) {
+					rc = -ENOMEM;
+					kfree(mysids);
+					goto out_unlock;
+				}
+				memset(mysids2, 0, maxnel*sizeof(*mysids2));
+				memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+				kfree(mysids);
+				mysids = mysids2;
+				mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*sids = mysids;
+	*nel = mynel;
+
+out_unlock:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+	               char *path,
+		       u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid)
+{
+	int len;
+	struct genfs *genfs;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+	int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!genfs || cmp) {
+		*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+		len = strlen(c->u.name);
+		if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+		    (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (!c) {
+		*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+		rc = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!c->sid[0]) {
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+					   &c->context[0],
+					   &c->sid[0]);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	*sid = c->sid[0];
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @behavior: labeling behavior
+ * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ */
+int security_fs_use(
+	const char *fstype,
+	unsigned int *behavior,
+	u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ocontext *c;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	while (c) {
+		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+			break;
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	if (c) {
+		*behavior = c->v.behavior;
+		if (!c->sid[0]) {
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+						   &c->context[0],
+						   &c->sid[0]);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		*sid = c->sid[0];
+	} else {
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+		if (rc) {
+			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+			rc = 0;
+		} else {
+			*behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+	int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+	*names = NULL;
+	*values = NULL;
+
+	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (!*len) {
+		rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	*names = (char**)kmalloc(sizeof(char*) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*names)
+		goto err;
+	memset(*names, 0, sizeof(char*) * *len);
+
+	*values = (int*)kmalloc(sizeof(int) * *len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!*values)
+		goto err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+		size_t name_len;
+		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
+		(*names)[i] = (char*)kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!(*names)[i])
+			goto err;
+		strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
+		(*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+err:
+	if (*names) {
+		for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+			if ((*names)[i])
+				kfree((*names)[i]);
+	}
+	if (*values)
+		kfree(*values);
+	goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+{
+	int i, rc = 0;
+	int lenp, seqno = 0;
+	struct cond_node *cur;
+
+	POLICY_WRLOCK;
+
+	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (len != lenp) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (values[i]) {
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+		} else {
+			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+		}
+		if (i != 0)
+			printk(", ");
+		printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+		       policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
+	}
+	printk(" }\n");
+
+	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+
+out:
+	POLICY_WRUNLOCK;
+	if (!rc) {
+		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	int len;
+
+	POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	if (bool >= len) {
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
+out:
+	POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+	return rc;
+}