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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-17 19:13:15 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-01-17 19:13:15 -0800 |
commit | 5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4 (patch) | |
tree | 4ed1e647a0ae0f315db3b9066c9235020c439649 /security/keys/trusted.c | |
parent | 2d663b55816e5c1d211a77fff90687053fe78aac (diff) | |
parent | acb2cfdb316ddc3fac8183c0f71edd1680713b10 (diff) | |
download | blackbird-op-linux-5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4.tar.gz blackbird-op-linux-5807fcaa9bf7dd87241df739161c119cf78a6bc4.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
(EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.
- Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.
- Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.
- Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
KEYS: refcount bug fix
ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
IMA: policy can be updated zero times
selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
selinux: export validatetrans decisions
gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/trusted.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 56 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 16dec53184b6..0dcab20cdacd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt */ +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> @@ -710,7 +711,10 @@ enum { Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, - Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, + Opt_hash, + Opt_policydigest, + Opt_policyhandle, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -723,6 +727,9 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, + {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, + {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -736,11 +743,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, int res; unsigned long handle; unsigned long lock; + unsigned long token_mask = 0; + int i; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') continue; token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args); + if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; switch (token) { case Opt_pcrinfo: @@ -787,6 +806,41 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->pcrlock = lock; break; + case Opt_hash: + if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { + opt->hash = i; + opt->digest_len = + hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + break; + } + } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { + pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + break; + case Opt_policydigest: + if (!tpm2 || + strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len)) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + opt->digest_len); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_policyhandle: + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->policyhandle = handle; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } |