[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key

The attached patch makes the following changes:

 (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".

     This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
     another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
     created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.

     Authorisation keys hold two references:

     (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
     	 constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
     	 rendering it of no further use.

     (b) The "authorising process". This is either:

     	 (i) the process that called request_key(), or:

     	 (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
     	      authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
     	      process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
     	      referred to by the new authorisation key.

	 This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
	 will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
	 the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.

 (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
     /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.

 (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
     it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
     calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
     specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
     (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
     credentials.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
     direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
     keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
     calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
     credentials of the authorising process.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
     KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
     than the process doing the instantiation.

 (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
     request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
     done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
     constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.

 (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
     process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
     a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

1 files changed, 59 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index c9a5de197487..90a551e4da66 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* keyring.c: keyring handling
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2004 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
 			    uid, gid, KEY_USR_ALL, not_in_quota);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(keyring)) {
-		ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest);
+		ret = key_instantiate_and_link(keyring, NULL, 0, dest, NULL);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			key_put(keyring);
 			keyring = ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -326,11 +326,12 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
  * - we only find keys on which we have search permission
  * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
  *   feature of interest) matches
- * - we readlock the keyrings as we search down the tree
+ * - we rely on RCU to prevent the keyring lists from disappearing on us
  * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
  * - we return -ENOKEY if we only found negative matching keys
  */
 struct key *keyring_search_aux(struct key *keyring,
+			       struct task_struct *context,
 			       struct key_type *type,
 			       const void *description,
 			       key_match_func_t match)
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ struct key *keyring_search_aux(struct key *keyring,
 
 	/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
 	key = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
-	if (!key_permission(keyring, KEY_SEARCH))
+	if (!key_task_permission(keyring, context, KEY_SEARCH))
 		goto error;
 
 	key = ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
@@ -392,7 +393,7 @@ struct key *keyring_search_aux(struct key *keyring,
 			continue;
 
 		/* key must have search permissions */
-		if (!key_permission(key, KEY_SEARCH))
+		if (!key_task_permission(key, context, KEY_SEARCH))
 			continue;
 
 		/* we set a different error code if we find a negative key */
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ struct key *keyring_search_aux(struct key *keyring,
 		if (sp >= KEYRING_SEARCH_MAX_DEPTH)
 			continue;
 
-		if (!key_permission(key, KEY_SEARCH))
+		if (!key_task_permission(key, context, KEY_SEARCH))
 			continue;
 
 		/* stack the current position */
@@ -468,7 +469,11 @@ struct key *keyring_search(struct key *keyring,
 			   struct key_type *type,
 			   const char *description)
 {
-	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, type, description, type->match);
+	if (!type->match)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+
+	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current,
+				  type, description, type->match);
 
 } /* end keyring_search() */
 
@@ -496,7 +501,8 @@ struct key *__keyring_search_one(struct key *keyring,
 			key = klist->keys[loop];
 
 			if (key->type == ktype &&
-			    key->type->match(key, description) &&
+			    (!key->type->match ||
+			     key->type->match(key, description)) &&
 			    key_permission(key, perm) &&
 			    !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &key->flags)
 			    )
@@ -517,6 +523,51 @@ struct key *__keyring_search_one(struct key *keyring,
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
+ * search for an instantiation authorisation key matching a target key
+ * - the RCU read lock must be held by the caller
+ * - a target_id of zero specifies any valid token
+ */
+struct key *keyring_search_instkey(struct key *keyring,
+				   key_serial_t target_id)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	struct keyring_list *klist;
+	struct key *instkey;
+	int loop;
+
+	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+	if (klist) {
+		for (loop = 0; loop < klist->nkeys; loop++) {
+			instkey = klist->keys[loop];
+
+			if (instkey->type != &key_type_request_key_auth)
+				continue;
+
+			rka = instkey->payload.data;
+			if (target_id && rka->target_key->serial != target_id)
+				continue;
+
+			/* the auth key is revoked during instantiation */
+			if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &instkey->flags))
+				goto found;
+
+			instkey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	instkey = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+	goto error;
+
+found:
+	atomic_inc(&instkey->usage);
+error:
+	return instkey;
+
+} /* end keyring_search_instkey() */
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+/*
  * find a keyring with the specified name
  * - all named keyrings are searched
  * - only find keyrings with search permission for the process