kvm: mmu: track read permission explicitly for shadow EPT page tables

To support execute only mappings on behalf of L1 hypervisors,
reuse ACC_USER_MASK to signify if the L1 hypervisor has the R bit
set.

For the nested EPT case, we assumed that the U bit was always set
since there was no equivalent in EPT page tables.  Strictly
speaking, this was not necessary because handle_ept_violation
never set PFERR_USER_MASK in the error code (uf=0 in the
parlance of update_permission_bitmask).  We now have to set
both U and UF correctly, respectively in FNAME(gpte_access)
and in handle_ept_violation.

Also in handle_ept_violation bit 3 of the exit qualification is
not enough to detect a present PTE; all three bits 3-5 have to
be checked.

Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 7 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index b8628e905806..3041902ec827 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2522,6 +2522,12 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 	if (set_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, pfn, pte_access))
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
+	 * supports exec-only page table entries.  In that case,
+	 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
+	 * read access.  See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
+	 */
 	spte |= shadow_present_mask;
 	if (!speculative)
 		spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
@@ -3915,9 +3921,7 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 *   clearer.
 				 */
 				smap = cr4_smap && u && !uf && !ff;
-			} else
-				/* Not really needed: no U/S accesses on ept  */
-				u = 1;
+			}
 
 			fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) ||
 				(smapf && smap);