gss_krb5: add support for new token formats in rfc4121

This is a step toward support for AES encryption types which are
required to use the new token formats defined in rfc4121.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
[SteveD: Fixed a typo in gss_verify_mic_v2()]
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
[Trond: Got rid of the TEST_ROTATE/TEST_EXTRA_COUNT crap]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

5 files changed, 406 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
index db0522b4c4c9..0085a30fd204 100644
--- a/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
+++ b/include/linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
 /* Maximum blocksize for the supported crypto algorithms */
 #define GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE  (16)
 
+struct krb5_ctx;
+
 struct gss_krb5_enctype {
 	const u32		etype;		/* encryption (key) type */
 	const u32		ctype;		/* checksum type */
@@ -75,6 +77,12 @@ struct gss_krb5_enctype {
 	u32 (*mk_key) (const struct gss_krb5_enctype *gk5e,
 		       struct xdr_netobj *in,
 		       struct xdr_netobj *out);	/* complete key generation */
+	u32 (*encrypt_v2) (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+			   struct xdr_buf *buf, int ec,
+			   struct page **pages); /* v2 encryption function */
+	u32 (*decrypt_v2) (struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+			   struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 *headskip,
+			   u32 *tailskip);	/* v2 decryption function */
 };
 
 /* krb5_ctx flags definitions */
@@ -112,6 +120,18 @@ extern spinlock_t krb5_seq_lock;
 #define KG_TOK_MIC_MSG    0x0101
 #define KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG   0x0201
 
+#define KG2_TOK_INITIAL     0x0101
+#define KG2_TOK_RESPONSE    0x0202
+#define KG2_TOK_MIC         0x0404
+#define KG2_TOK_WRAP        0x0504
+
+#define KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR   0x01
+#define KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED           0x02
+#define KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY   0x04
+
+#define KG2_RESP_FLAG_ERROR             0x0001
+#define KG2_RESP_FLAG_DELEG_OK          0x0002
+
 enum sgn_alg {
 	SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5 = 0x0000,
 	SGN_ALG_MD2_5 = 0x0001,
@@ -136,6 +156,9 @@ enum seal_alg {
 #define CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5_DES		0x0008
 #define CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA		0x0009
 #define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3	0x000c
+#define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128   0x000f
+#define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256   0x0010
+#define CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR      -138 /* Microsoft md5 hmac cksumtype */
 
 /* from gssapi_err_krb5.h */
 #define KG_CCACHE_NOMATCH                        (39756032L)
@@ -212,6 +235,11 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
 		struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
 		struct xdr_netobj *cksumout);
 
+u32
+make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *, char *header, int hdrlen,
+		 struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *key,
+		 struct xdr_netobj *cksum);
+
 u32 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *, struct xdr_buf *,
 		struct xdr_netobj *);
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index bb76873aa019..ca52ac28a537 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -197,6 +197,80 @@ out:
 	return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * checksum the plaintext data and hdrlen bytes of the token header
+ * Per rfc4121, sec. 4.2.4, the checksum is performed over the data
+ * body then over the first 16 octets of the MIC token
+ * Inclusion of the header data in the calculation of the
+ * checksum is optional.
+ */
+u32
+make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
+		 struct xdr_buf *body, int body_offset, u8 *cksumkey,
+		 struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	int err;
+	u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	unsigned int checksumlen;
+
+	if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) {
+		dprintk("%s: expected keyed hash for %s\n",
+			__func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+	if (cksumkey == NULL) {
+		dprintk("%s: no key supplied for %s\n",
+			__func__, kctx->gk5e->name);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	desc.tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
+							CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(desc.tfm))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	checksumlen = crypto_hash_digestsize(desc.tfm);
+	desc.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+	err = crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, cksumkey, kctx->gk5e->keylength);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = crypto_hash_init(&desc);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = xdr_process_buf(body, body_offset, body->len - body_offset,
+			      checksummer, &desc);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	if (header != NULL) {
+		sg_init_one(sg, header, hdrlen);
+		err = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, hdrlen);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	err = crypto_hash_final(&desc, checksumdata);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+
+	switch (kctx->gk5e->ctype) {
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128:
+	case CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256:
+		/* note that this truncates the hash */
+		memcpy(cksumout->data, checksumdata, kctx->gk5e->cksumlength);
+		break;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+	return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
+}
+
 struct encryptor_desc {
 	u8 iv[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
 	struct blkcipher_desc desc;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
index 7ede900049a7..477a546d19bb 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_seal.c
@@ -91,6 +91,33 @@ setup_token(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
 	return (char *)krb5_hdr;
 }
 
+static void *
+setup_token_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+	__be16 *ptr, *krb5_hdr;
+	u8 *p, flags = 0x00;
+
+	if ((ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+		flags |= 0x01;
+	if (ctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY)
+		flags |= 0x04;
+
+	/* Per rfc 4121, sec 4.2.6.1, there is no header,
+	 * just start the token */
+	krb5_hdr = ptr = (__be16 *)token->data;
+
+	*ptr++ = KG2_TOK_MIC;
+	p = (u8 *)ptr;
+	*p++ = flags;
+	*p++ = 0xff;
+	ptr = (__be16 *)p;
+	*ptr++ = 0xffff;
+	*ptr++ = 0xffff;
+
+	token->len = GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + ctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
+	return krb5_hdr;
+}
+
 static u32
 gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
 		struct xdr_netobj *token)
@@ -133,6 +160,45 @@ gss_get_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
 }
 
 u32
+gss_get_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
+		struct xdr_netobj *token)
+{
+	char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = { .len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+				       .data = cksumdata};
+	void *krb5_hdr;
+	s32 now;
+	u64 seq_send;
+	u8 *cksumkey;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	krb5_hdr = setup_token_v2(ctx, token);
+
+	/* Set up the sequence number. Now 64-bits in clear
+	 * text and w/o direction indicator */
+	spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+	seq_send = ctx->seq_send64++;
+	spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+	*((u64 *)(krb5_hdr + 8)) = cpu_to_be64(seq_send);
+
+	if (ctx->initiate)
+		cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign;
+	else
+		cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+
+	if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, krb5_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+			     text, 0, cksumkey, &cksumobj))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	memcpy(krb5_hdr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, cksumobj.data, cksumobj.len);
+
+	now = get_seconds();
+
+	return (ctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
 gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
 		     struct xdr_netobj *token)
 {
@@ -144,6 +210,9 @@ gss_get_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx, struct xdr_buf *text,
 	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
 	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
 		return gss_get_mic_v1(ctx, text, token);
+	case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+	case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+		return gss_get_mic_v2(ctx, text, token);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
index 3e15bdb5a9eb..4ede4cc4391f 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -141,6 +141,64 @@ gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
+static u32
+gss_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+		struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+	char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+	struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+				      .data = cksumdata};
+	s32 now;
+	u64 seqnum;
+	u8 *ptr = read_token->data;
+	u8 *cksumkey;
+	u8 flags;
+	int i;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_MIC)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	flags = ptr[2];
+	if ((!ctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+	    (ctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	if (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) {
+		dprintk("%s: token has unexpected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 3; i < 8; i++)
+		if (ptr[i] != 0xff)
+			return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	if (ctx->initiate)
+		cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+	else
+		cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign;
+
+	if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, ptr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, message_buffer, 0,
+			     cksumkey, &cksumobj))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	if (memcmp(cksumobj.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+				ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	/* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
+	now = get_seconds();
+	if (now > ctx->endtime)
+		return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+	/* do sequencing checks */
+
+	seqnum = be64_to_cpup((__be64 *)ptr + 8);
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
 u32
 gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
 			struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
@@ -154,6 +212,9 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
 	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
 	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
 		return gss_verify_mic_v1(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+	case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+	case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+		return gss_verify_mic_v2(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
index 1c8ebd3dbd3c..4aa46b28298c 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c
@@ -340,6 +340,174 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
+/*
+ * We cannot currently handle tokens with rotated data.  We need a
+ * generalized routine to rotate the data in place.  It is anticipated
+ * that we won't encounter rotated data in the general case.
+ */
+static u32
+rotate_left(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, u16 rrc)
+{
+	unsigned int realrrc = rrc % (buf->len - offset - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+
+	if (realrrc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	dprintk("%s: cannot process token with rotated data: "
+		"rrc %u, realrrc %u\n", __func__, rrc, realrrc);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, u32 offset,
+		     struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
+{
+	int		blocksize;
+	u8		*ptr, *plainhdr;
+	s32		now;
+	u8		flags = 0x00;
+	__be16		*be16ptr, ec = 0;
+	__be64		*be64ptr;
+	u32		err;
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2 == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* make room for gss token header */
+	if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/* construct gss token header */
+	ptr = plainhdr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+	*ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff);
+	*ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff);
+
+	if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0)
+		flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR;
+	if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0)
+		flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY;
+	/* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */
+	flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED;
+
+	*ptr++ = flags;
+	*ptr++ = 0xff;
+	be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr;
+
+	blocksize = crypto_blkcipher_blocksize(kctx->acceptor_enc);
+	*be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(ec);
+	/* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */
+	*be16ptr++ = cpu_to_be16(0);
+
+	be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr;
+	spin_lock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+	*be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(kctx->seq_send64++);
+	spin_unlock(&krb5_seq_lock);
+
+	err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf, ec, pages);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	now = get_seconds();
+	return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static u32
+gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+	s32		now;
+	u64		seqnum;
+	u8		*ptr;
+	u8		flags = 0x00;
+	u16		ec, rrc;
+	int		err;
+	u32		headskip, tailskip;
+	u8		decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN];
+	unsigned int	movelen;
+
+
+	dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2 == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset;
+
+	if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	flags = ptr[2];
+	if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+	    (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+		return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+	if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) {
+		dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+	}
+
+	if (ptr[3] != 0xff)
+		return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+	ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4));
+	rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6));
+
+	seqnum = be64_to_cpup((__be64 *)(ptr + 8));
+
+	if (rrc != 0) {
+		err = rotate_left(kctx, offset, buf, rrc);
+		if (err)
+			return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt_v2)(kctx, offset, buf,
+					&headskip, &tailskip);
+	if (err)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify
+	 * it against the original
+	 */
+	err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf,
+				buf->len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip,
+				decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN);
+	if (err) {
+		dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6)
+				|| memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) {
+		dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__);
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/* do sequencing checks */
+
+	/* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
+	now = get_seconds();
+	if (now > kctx->endtime)
+		return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf.
+	 * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or
+	 * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it.
+	 * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available
+	 * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied.
+	 */
+	movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, buf->len);
+	movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+	BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen >
+							buf->head[0].iov_len);
+	memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen);
+	buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+	buf->len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
 u32
 gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
 		  struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages)
@@ -352,6 +520,9 @@ gss_wrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset,
 	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
 	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
 		return gss_wrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
+	case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+	case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+		return gss_wrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf, pages);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -366,6 +537,9 @@ gss_unwrap_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf)
 	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
 	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
 		return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v1(kctx, offset, buf);
+	case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+	case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+		return gss_unwrap_kerberos_v2(kctx, offset, buf);
 	}
 }