From 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2018 10:54:45 -0700 Subject: Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 7ad226018f51..19de675d4504 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2296,6 +2296,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); isp->smk_inode = skp; + isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; } /* -- cgit v1.2.1 From 3619dec5103dd999a777e3e4ea08c8f40a6ddc57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 16:59:46 +0100 Subject: dh key: fix rounding up KDF output length Commit 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") changed kdf_ctr() to assume that the length of key material to derive is a multiple of the digest size. The length was supposed to be rounded up accordingly. However, the round_up() macro was used which only gives the correct result on power-of-2 arguments, whereas not all hash algorithms have power-of-2 digest sizes. In some cases this resulted in a write past the end of the 'outbuf' buffer. Fix it by switching to roundup(), which works for non-power-of-2 inputs. Reported-by: syzbot+486f97f892efeb2075a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29d17b7898b41ee120a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8a608baf8751184ec727@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d04e58bd384f1fe0b112@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 383203eff718 ("dh key: get rid of stack allocated array") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Tycho Andersen Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/keys/dh.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index f7403821db7f..b203f7758f97 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -142,6 +142,8 @@ static void kdf_dealloc(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc) * The src pointer is defined as Z || other info where Z is the shared secret * from DH and other info is an arbitrary string (see SP800-56A section * 5.8.1.2). + * + * 'dlen' must be a multiple of the digest size. */ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen, unsigned int zlen) @@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, { uint8_t *outbuf = NULL; int ret; - size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen, - crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); + size_t outbuf_len = roundup(buflen, + crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf) { -- cgit v1.2.1 From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; -- cgit v1.2.1