From b2812d031dea86926e9c10f7714af33ac2f6b43d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederic Weisbecker Date: Sun, 18 Apr 2010 18:11:53 +0200 Subject: hw-breakpoints: Change/Enforce some breakpoints policies The current policies of breakpoints in x86 and SH are the following: - task bound breakpoints can only break on userspace addresses - cpu wide breakpoints can only break on kernel addresses The former rule prevents ptrace breakpoints to be set to trigger on kernel addresses, which is good. But as a side effect, we can't breakpoint on kernel addresses for task bound breakpoints. The latter rule simply makes no sense, there is no reason why we can't set breakpoints on userspace while performing cpu bound profiles. We want the following new policies: - task bound breakpoint can set userspace address breakpoints, with no particular privilege required. - task bound breakpoints can set kernelspace address breakpoints but must be privileged to do that. - cpu bound breakpoints can do what they want as they are privileged already. To implement these new policies, this patch checks if we are dealing with a kernel address breakpoint, if so and if the exclude_kernel parameter is set, we tell the user that the breakpoint is invalid, which makes a good generic ptrace protection. If we don't have exclude_kernel, ensure the user has the right privileges as kernel breakpoints are quite sensitive (risk of trap recursion attacks and global performance impacts). [ Paul Mundt: keep addr space check for sh signal delivery and fix double function declaration] Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Will Deacon Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar Cc: K. Prasad Cc: Paul Mundt Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Jason Wessel Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt --- arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 41 ++++++----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel') diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c index d6cc065f519f..a8f1b803d2fd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c @@ -188,26 +188,17 @@ static int get_hbp_len(u8 hbp_len) return len_in_bytes; } -/* - * Check for virtual address in user space. - */ -int arch_check_va_in_userspace(unsigned long va, u8 hbp_len) -{ - unsigned int len; - - len = get_hbp_len(hbp_len); - - return (va <= TASK_SIZE - len); -} - /* * Check for virtual address in kernel space. */ -static int arch_check_va_in_kernelspace(unsigned long va, u8 hbp_len) +int arch_check_bp_in_kernelspace(struct perf_event *bp) { unsigned int len; + unsigned long va; + struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(bp); - len = get_hbp_len(hbp_len); + va = info->address; + len = get_hbp_len(info->len); return (va >= TASK_SIZE) && ((va + len - 1) >= TASK_SIZE); } @@ -300,8 +291,7 @@ static int arch_build_bp_info(struct perf_event *bp) /* * Validate the arch-specific HW Breakpoint register settings */ -int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp, - struct task_struct *tsk) +int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp) { struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(bp); unsigned int align; @@ -314,16 +304,6 @@ int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp, ret = -EINVAL; - if (info->type == X86_BREAKPOINT_EXECUTE) - /* - * Ptrace-refactoring code - * For now, we'll allow instruction breakpoint only for user-space - * addresses - */ - if ((!arch_check_va_in_userspace(info->address, info->len)) && - info->len != X86_BREAKPOINT_EXECUTE) - return ret; - switch (info->len) { case X86_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1: align = 0; @@ -350,15 +330,6 @@ int arch_validate_hwbkpt_settings(struct perf_event *bp, if (info->address & align) return -EINVAL; - /* Check that the virtual address is in the proper range */ - if (tsk) { - if (!arch_check_va_in_userspace(info->address, info->len)) - return -EFAULT; - } else { - if (!arch_check_va_in_kernelspace(info->address, info->len)) - return -EFAULT; - } - return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.1