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* exec: do not sleep in TASK_TRACED under ->cred_guard_mutexOleg Nesterov2009-09-051-13/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Tom Horsley reports that his debugger hangs when it tries to read /proc/pid_of_tracee/maps, this happens since "mm_for_maps: take ->cred_guard_mutex to fix the race with exec" 04b836cbf19e885f8366bccb2e4b0474346c02d commit in 2.6.31. But the root of the problem lies in the fact that do_execve() path calls tracehook_report_exec() which can stop if the tracer sets PT_TRACE_EXEC. The tracee must not sleep in TASK_TRACED holding this mutex. Even if we remove ->cred_guard_mutex from mm_for_maps() and proc_pid_attr_write(), another task doing PTRACE_ATTACH should not hang until it is killed or the tracee resumes. With this patch do_execve() does not use ->cred_guard_mutex directly and we do not hold it throughout, instead: - introduce prepare_bprm_creds() helper, it locks the mutex and calls prepare_exec_creds() to initialize bprm->cred. - install_exec_creds() drops the mutex after commit_creds(), and thus before tracehook_report_exec()->ptrace_stop(). or, if exec fails, free_bprm() drops this mutex when bprm->cred != NULL which indicates install_exec_creds() was not called. Reported-by: Tom Horsley <tom.horsley@att.net> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* headers: smp_lock.h reduxAlexey Dobriyan2009-07-121-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * Remove smp_lock.h from files which don't need it (including some headers!) * Add smp_lock.h to files which do need it * Make smp_lock.h include conditional in hardirq.h It's needed only for one kernel_locked() usage which is under CONFIG_PREEMPT This will make hardirq.h inclusion cheaper for every PREEMPT=n config (which includes allmodconfig/allyesconfig, BTW) Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* cred_guard_mutex: do not return -EINTR to user-spaceOleg Nesterov2009-07-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | do_execve() and ptrace_attach() return -EINTR if mutex_lock_interruptible(->cred_guard_mutex) fails. This is not right, change the code to return ERESTARTNOINTR. Perhaps we should also change proc_pid_attr_write(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* trivial: fix comment typo in fs/compat.cNikanth Karthikesan2009-06-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | Fix a typo in fs/compat.c Signed-off-by: Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
* Push BKL into do_mount()Al Viro2009-06-111-2/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptraceDavid Howells2009-05-111-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another threadOleg Nesterov2009-04-241-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If do_execve() fails after check_unsafe_exec(), it clears fs->in_exec unconditionally. This is wrong if we race with our sub-thread which also does do_execve: Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same ->fs. T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since ->fs is shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec. P exits and decrements fs->users. T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not shared, we set fs->in_exec. T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and return to the user-space. T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */). T2 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with another process. Change check_unsafe_exec() to return res = 1 if we set ->in_exec, and change do_execve() to clear ->in_exec depending on res. When do_execve() suceeds, it is safe to clear ->in_exec unconditionally. It can be set only if we don't share ->fs with another process, and since we already killed all sub-threads either ->in_exec == 0 or we are the only user of this ->fs. Also, we do not need fs->lock to clear fs->in_exec. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill vfs_stat_fd / vfs_lstat_fdChristoph Hellwig2009-04-201-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | There's really no reason to keep vfs_stat_fd and vfs_lstat_fd with Oleg's vfs_fstatat. Use vfs_fstatat for the few cases having the directory fd, and switch all others to vfs_stat / vfs_lstat. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Separate out common fstatat code into vfs_fstatatOleg Drokin2009-04-201-14/+5
| | | | | | | | | | This is a version incorporating Christoph's suggestion. Separate out common *fstatat functionality into a single function instead of duplicating it all over the code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Make non-compat preadv/pwritev use native register sizeLinus Torvalds2009-04-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of always splitting the file offset into 32-bit 'high' and 'low' parts, just split them into the largest natural word-size - which in C terms is 'unsigned long'. This allows 64-bit architectures to avoid the unnecessary 32-bit shifting and masking for native format (while the compat interfaces will obviously always have to do it). This also changes the order of 'high' and 'low' to be "low first". Why? Because when we have it like this, the 64-bit system calls now don't use the "pos_high" argument at all, and it makes more sense for the native system call to simply match the user-mode prototype. This results in a much more natural calling convention, and allows the compiler to generate much more straightforward code. On x86-64, we now generate testq %rcx, %rcx # pos_l js .L122 #, movq %rcx, -48(%rbp) # pos_l, pos from the C source loff_t pos = pos_from_hilo(pos_h, pos_l); ... if (pos < 0) return -EINVAL; and the 'pos_h' register isn't even touched. It used to generate code like mov %r8d, %r8d # pos_low, pos_low salq $32, %rcx #, tmp71 movq %r8, %rax # pos_low, pos.386 orq %rcx, %rax # tmp71, pos.386 js .L122 #, movq %rax, -48(%rbp) # pos.386, pos which isn't _that_ horrible, but it does show how the natural word size is just a more sensible interface (same arguments will hold in the user level glibc wrapper function, of course, so the kernel side is just half of the equation!) Note: in all cases the user code wrapper can again be the same. You can just do #define HALF_BITS (sizeof(unsigned long)*4) __syscall(PWRITEV, fd, iov, count, offset, (offset >> HALF_BITS) >> HALF_BITS); or something like that. That way the user mode wrapper will also be nicely passing in a zero (it won't actually have to do the shifts, the compiler will understand what is going on) for the last argument. And that is a good idea, even if nobody will necessarily ever care: if we ever do move to a 128-bit lloff_t, this particular system call might be left alone. Of course, that will be the least of our worries if we really ever need to care, so this may not be worth really caring about. [ Fixed for lost 'loff_t' cast noticed by Andrew Morton ] Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-04-021-2/+14
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: Remove two unneeded exports and make two symbols static in fs/mpage.c Cleanup after commit 585d3bc06f4ca57f975a5a1f698f65a45ea66225 Trim includes of fdtable.h Don't crap into descriptor table in binfmt_som Trim includes in binfmt_elf Don't mess with descriptor table in load_elf_binary() Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h New helper - current_umask() check_unsafe_exec() doesn't care about signal handlers sharing New locking/refcounting for fs_struct Take fs_struct handling to new file (fs/fs_struct.c) Get rid of bumping fs_struct refcount in pivot_root(2) Kill unsharing fs_struct in __set_personality()
| * New locking/refcounting for fs_structAl Viro2009-03-311-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * all changes of current->fs are done under task_lock and write_lock of old fs->lock * refcount is not atomic anymore (same protection) * its decrements are done when removing reference from current; at the same time we decide whether to free it. * put_fs_struct() is gone * new field - ->in_exec. Set by check_unsafe_exec() if we are trying to do execve() and only subthreads share fs_struct. Cleared when finishing exec (success and failure alike). Makes CLONE_FS fail with -EAGAIN if set. * check_unsafe_exec() may fail with -EAGAIN if another execve() from subthread is in progress. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | preadv/pwritev: switch compat readv/preadv/writev/pwritev from fget to ↵Gerd Hoffmann2009-04-021-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fget_light Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | preadv/pwritev: Add preadv and pwritev system calls.Gerd Hoffmann2009-04-021-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds preadv and pwritev system calls. These syscalls are a pretty straightforward combination of pread and readv (same for write). They are quite useful for doing vectored I/O in threaded applications. Using lseek+readv instead opens race windows you'll have to plug with locking. Other systems have such system calls too, for example NetBSD, check here: http://www.daemon-systems.org/man/preadv.2.html The application-visible interface provided by glibc should look like this to be compatible to the existing implementations in the *BSD family: ssize_t preadv(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); ssize_t pwritev(int d, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset); This prototype has one problem though: On 32bit archs is the (64bit) offset argument unaligned, which the syscall ABI of several archs doesn't allow to do. At least s390 needs a wrapper in glibc to handle this. As we'll need a wrappers in glibc anyway I've decided to push problem to glibc entriely and use a syscall prototype which works without arch-specific wrappers inside the kernel: The offset argument is explicitly splitted into two 32bit values. The patch sports the actual system call implementation and the windup in the x86 system call tables. Other archs follow as separate patches. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | preadv/pwritev: create compat_writev()Gerd Hoffmann2009-04-021-7/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Factor out some code from compat_sys_writev() which can be shared with the upcoming compat_sys_pwritev(). Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | preadv/pwritev: create compat_readv()Gerd Hoffmann2009-04-021-8/+18
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series: Implement the preadv() and pwritev() syscalls. *BSD has this syscall for quite some time. Test code: #if 0 set -x gcc -Wall -O2 -o preadv $0 exit 0 #endif /* * preadv demo / test * * (c) 2008 Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> * * build with "sh $thisfile" */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <sys/uio.h> /* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* syscall windup */ #include <sys/syscall.h> #if 0 /* WARNING: Be sure you know what you are doing if you enable this. * linux syscall code isn't upstream yet, syscall numbers are subject * to change */ # ifndef __NR_preadv # ifdef __i386__ # define __NR_preadv 333 # define __NR_pwritev 334 # endif # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_preadv 295 # define __NR_pwritev 296 # endif # endif #endif #ifndef __NR_preadv # error preadv/pwritev syscall numbers are unknown #endif static ssize_t preadv(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset) { uint32_t pos_high = (offset >> 32) & 0xffffffff; uint32_t pos_low = offset & 0xffffffff; return syscall(__NR_preadv, fd, iov, iovcnt, pos_high, pos_low); } static ssize_t pwritev(int fd, const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt, off_t offset) { uint32_t pos_high = (offset >> 32) & 0xffffffff; uint32_t pos_low = offset & 0xffffffff; return syscall(__NR_pwritev, fd, iov, iovcnt, pos_high, pos_low); } /* ----------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* demo/test app */ static char filename[] = "/tmp/preadv-XXXXXX"; static char outbuf[11] = "0123456789"; static char inbuf[11] = "----------"; static struct iovec ovec[2] = {{ .iov_base = outbuf + 5, .iov_len = 5, },{ .iov_base = outbuf + 0, .iov_len = 5, }}; static struct iovec ivec[3] = {{ .iov_base = inbuf + 6, .iov_len = 2, },{ .iov_base = inbuf + 4, .iov_len = 2, },{ .iov_base = inbuf + 2, .iov_len = 2, }}; void cleanup(void) { unlink(filename); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd, rc; fd = mkstemp(filename); if (-1 == fd) { perror("mkstemp"); exit(1); } atexit(cleanup); /* write to file: "56789-01234" */ rc = pwritev(fd, ovec, 2, 0); if (rc < 0) { perror("pwritev"); exit(1); } /* read from file: "78-90-12" */ rc = preadv(fd, ivec, 3, 2); if (rc < 0) { perror("preadv"); exit(1); } printf("result : %s\n", inbuf); printf("expected: %s\n", "--129078--"); exit(0); } This patch: Factor out some code from compat_sys_readv() which can be shared with the upcoming compat_sys_preadv(). Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fix setuid sometimes doesn'tHugh Dickins2009-03-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely, a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way, they have a health check running lsof every few minutes. Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid. But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count. There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check. [Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().] Reported-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com> Narrowed-down-by: Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com> Tested-by: Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* compat_do_execve should unshare_filesHugh Dickins2009-03-281-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2.6.26's commit fd8328be874f4190a811c58cd4778ec2c74d2c05 "sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()" moved the unshare_files() from flush_old_exec() and several binfmts to the head of do_execve(); but forgot to make the same change to compat_do_execve(), leaving a CLONE_FILES files_struct shared across exec from a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel. It's arguable whether the files_struct really ought to be unshared across exec; but 2.6.1 made that so to stop the loading binary's fd leaking into other threads, and a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel ought to behave in the same way as 32 on 32 and 64 on 64. Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2009-03-271-0/+28
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (37 commits) fs: avoid I_NEW inodes Merge code for single and multiple-instance mounts Remove get_init_pts_sb() Move common mknod_ptmx() calls into caller Parse mount options just once and copy them to super block Unroll essentials of do_remount_sb() into devpts vfs: simple_set_mnt() should return void fs: move bdev code out of buffer.c constify dentry_operations: rest constify dentry_operations: configfs constify dentry_operations: sysfs constify dentry_operations: JFS constify dentry_operations: OCFS2 constify dentry_operations: GFS2 constify dentry_operations: FAT constify dentry_operations: FUSE constify dentry_operations: procfs constify dentry_operations: ecryptfs constify dentry_operations: CIFS constify dentry_operations: AFS ...
| * generic compat_sys_ustatChristoph Hellwig2009-03-271-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Due to a different size of ino_t ustat needs a compat handler, but currently only x86 and mips provide one. Add a generic compat_sys_ustat and switch all architectures over to it. Instead of doing various user copy hacks compat_sys_ustat just reimplements sys_ustat as it's trivial. This was suggested by Arnd Bergmann. Found by Eric Sandeen when running xfstests/017 on ppc64, which causes stack smashing warnings on RHEL/Fedora due to the too large amount of data writen by the syscall. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge branch 'master' into nextJames Morris2009-03-241-1/+1
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| * CRED: Fix SUID exec regressionDavid Howells2009-02-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The patch: commit a6f76f23d297f70e2a6b3ec607f7aeeea9e37e8d CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials moved the place in which the 'safeness' of a SUID/SGID exec was performed to before de_thread() was called. This means that LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE is now calculated incorrectly. This flag is set if any of the usage counts for fs_struct, files_struct and sighand_struct are greater than 1 at the time the determination is made. All of which are true for threads created by the pthread library. However, since we wish to make the security calculation before irrevocably damaging the process so that we can return it an error code in the case where we decide we want to reject the exec request on this basis, we have to make the determination before calling de_thread(). So, instead, we count up the number of threads (CLONE_THREAD) that are sharing our fs_struct (CLONE_FS), files_struct (CLONE_FILES) and sighand_structs (CLONE_SIGHAND/CLONE_THREAD) with us. These will be killed by de_thread() and so can be discounted by check_unsafe_exec(). We do have to be careful because CLONE_THREAD does not imply FS or FILES. We _assume_ that there will be no extra references to these structs held by the threads we're going to kill. This can be tested with the attached pair of programs. Build the two programs using the Makefile supplied, and run ./test1 as a non-root user. If successful, you should see something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=0 suid=0 SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID and if unsuccessful, something like: [dhowells@andromeda tmp]$ ./test1 --TEST1-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 exec ./test2 --TEST2-- uid=4043, euid=4043 suid=4043 ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID! The non-root user ID you see will depend on the user you run as. [test1.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <pthread.h> static void *thread_func(void *arg) { while (1) {} } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pthread_t tid; uid_t uid, euid, suid; printf("--TEST1--\n"); getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (pthread_create(&tid, NULL, thread_func, NULL) < 0) { perror("pthread_create"); exit(1); } printf("exec ./test2\n"); execlp("./test2", "test2", NULL); perror("./test2"); _exit(1); } [test2.c] #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { uid_t uid, euid, suid; getresuid(&uid, &euid, &suid); printf("--TEST2--\n"); printf("uid=%d, euid=%d suid=%d\n", uid, euid, suid); if (euid != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "ERROR - Incorrect effective user ID!\n"); exit(1); } printf("SUCCESS - Correct effective user ID\n"); exit(0); } [Makefile] CFLAGS = -D_GNU_SOURCE -Wall -Werror -Wunused all: test1 test2 test1: test1.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test1 test1.c -lpthread test2: test2.c gcc $(CFLAGS) -o test2 test2.c sudo chown root.root test2 sudo chmod +s test2 Reported-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Add in_execve flag into task_struct.Kentaro Takeda2009-02-121-0/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows LSM modules to determine whether current process is in an execve operation or not so that they can behave differently while an execve operation is in progress. This patch is needed by TOMOYO. Please see another patch titled "LSM adapter functions." for backgrounds. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* [CVE-2009-0029] Make sys_pselect7 staticHeiko Carstens2009-01-141-3/+3
| | | | | | | | Not a single architecture has wired up sys_pselect7 plus it is the only system call with seven parameters. Just make it static and rename it to do_pselect which will do the work for sys_pselect6. Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
* add missing accounting calls to compat_sys_{readv,writev}Gerd Hoffmann2009-01-061-0/+6
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@engr.sgi.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-18/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* select: deal with math overflow from borderline valid userland dataArjan van de Ven2008-10-261-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some userland apps seem to pass in a "0" for the seconds, and several seconds worth of usecs to select(). The old kernels accepted this just fine, so the new kernels must too. However, due to the upscaling of the microseconds to nanoseconds we had some cases where we got math overflow, and depending on the GCC version (due to inlining decisions) that actually resulted in an -EINVAL return. This patch fixes this by adding the excess microseconds to the seconds field. Also with thanks to Marcin Slusarz for spotting some implementation bugs in the diagnostics patches. Reported-by: Carlos R. Mafra <crmafra2@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'v28-range-hrtimers-for-linus-v2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-10-231-116/+71
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'v28-range-hrtimers-for-linus-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (37 commits) hrtimers: add missing docbook comments to struct hrtimer hrtimers: simplify hrtimer_peek_ahead_timers() hrtimers: fix docbook comments DECLARE_PER_CPU needs linux/percpu.h hrtimers: fix typo rangetimers: fix the bug reported by Ingo for real rangetimer: fix BUG_ON reported by Ingo rangetimer: fix x86 build failure for the !HRTIMERS case select: fix alpha OSF wrapper select: fix alpha OSF wrapper hrtimer: peek at the timer queue just before going idle hrtimer: make the futex() system call use the per process slack value hrtimer: make the nanosleep() syscall use the per process slack hrtimer: fix signed/unsigned bug in slack estimator hrtimer: show the timer ranges in /proc/timer_list hrtimer: incorporate feedback from Peter Zijlstra hrtimer: add a hrtimer_start_range() function hrtimer: another build fix hrtimer: fix build bug found by Ingo hrtimer: make select() and poll() use the hrtimer range feature ...
| * Merge commit 'linus/master' into merge-linusArjan van de Ven2008-10-171-1/+40
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/i8254.c
| * | select: switch select() and poll() over to hrtimersArjan van de Ven2008-09-051-116/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With lots of help, input and cleanups from Thomas Gleixner This patch switches select() and poll() over to hrtimers. The core of the patch is replacing the "s64 timeout" with a "struct timespec end_time" in all the plumbing. But most of the diffstat comes from using the just introduced helpers: poll_select_set_timeout poll_select_copy_remaining timespec_add_safe which make manipulating the timespec easier and less error-prone. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
| * | select: add poll_select_set_timeout() and poll_select_copy_remaining() helpersThomas Gleixner2008-09-051-0/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds 2 helpers that will be used for the hrtimer based select/poll: poll_select_set_timeout() is a helper that takes a timeout (as a second, nanosecond pair) and turns that into a "struct timespec" that represents the absolute end time. This is a common operation in the many select() and poll() variants and needs various, common, sanity checks. poll_select_copy_remaining() is a helper that takes care of copying the remaining time to userspace, as select(), pselect() and ppoll() do. This function comes in both a natural and a compat implementation (due to datastructure differences). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
* | | [PATCH] prepare vfs_readdir() callers to returning filldir resultAl Viro2008-10-231-14/+8
| |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | It's not the final state, but it allows moving ->readdir() instances to passing filldir return value to caller of vfs_readdir(). Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | compat: move cp_compat_stat to common codeChristoph Hellwig2008-10-161-0/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct stat / compat_stat is the same on all architectures, so cp_compat_stat should be, too. Turns out it is, except that various architectures have slightly and some high2lowuid/high2lowgid or the direct assignment instead of the SET_UID/SET_GID that expands to the correct one anyway. This patch replaces the arch-specific cp_compat_stat implementations with a common one based on the x86-64 one. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [ sparc bits ] Acked-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> [ parisc bits ] Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | exec.c, compat.c: fix count(), compat_count() bounds checkingJason Baron2008-10-161-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With MAX_ARG_STRINGS set to 0x7FFFFFFF, and being passed to 'count()' and compat_count(), it would appear that the current max bounds check of fs/exec.c:394: if(++i > max) return -E2BIG; would never trigger. Since 'i' is of type int, so values would wrap and the function would continue looping. Simple fix seems to be chaning ++i to i++ and checking for '>='. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: "Ollie Wild" <aaw@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] fix regular readdir() and friendsAl Viro2008-08-251-2/+6
| | | | | | Handling of -EOVERFLOW. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.Al Viro2008-07-261-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want. * switch to new helpers: user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path) user_path(pathname, &path) user_lpath(pathname, &path) user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory) The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one. * remove nameidata in callers. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* flag parameters: signalfdUlrich Drepper2008-07-241-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the new signalfd4 syscall. It extends the old signalfd syscall by one parameter which is meant to hold a flag value. In this patch the only flag support is SFD_CLOEXEC which causes the close-on-exec flag for the returned file descriptor to be set. A new name SFD_CLOEXEC is introduced which in this implementation must have the same value as O_CLOEXEC. The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ #include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #ifndef __NR_signalfd4 # ifdef __x86_64__ # define __NR_signalfd4 289 # elif defined __i386__ # define __NR_signalfd4 327 # else # error "need __NR_signalfd4" # endif #endif #define SFD_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC int main (void) { sigset_t ss; sigemptyset (&ss); sigaddset (&ss, SIGUSR1); int fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, 0); if (fd == -1) { puts ("signalfd4(0) failed"); return 1; } int coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC) { puts ("signalfd4(0) set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); fd = syscall (__NR_signalfd4, -1, &ss, 8, SFD_CLOEXEC); if (fd == -1) { puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) failed"); return 1; } coe = fcntl (fd, F_GETFD); if (coe == -1) { puts ("fcntl failed"); return 1; } if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0) { puts ("signalfd4(SFD_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exec flag"); return 1; } close (fd); puts ("OK"); return 0; } ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub] Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs: check for statfs overflowJon Tollefson2008-07-241-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0. Acked-by: Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] get rid of leak in compat_execve()Al Viro2008-05-161-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Even though copy_compat_strings() doesn't cache the pages, copy_strings_kernel() and stuff indirectly called by e.g. ->load_binary() is doing that, so we need to drop the cache contents in the end. [found by WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro2008-05-011-0/+1
| | | | | | Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* signals: use HAVE_SET_RESTORE_SIGMASKRoland McGrath2008-04-301-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change all the #ifdef TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK conditionals in non-arch code to #ifdef HAVE_SET_RESTORE_SIGMASK. If arch code defines it first, the generic set_restore_sigmask() using TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK is not defined. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* signals: add set_restore_sigmaskRoland McGrath2008-04-301-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds the set_restore_sigmask() inline in <linux/thread_info.h> and replaces every set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK) with a call to it. No change, but abstracts the details of the flag protocol from all the calls. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'linus_origin' into hotfixesTrond Myklebust2008-02-151-4/+4
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| * Introduce path_put()Jan Blunck2008-02-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and vfsmount of a struct path in the right order * Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path) * Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional() [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
| * Embed a struct path into struct nameidata instead of nd->{dentry,mnt}Jan Blunck2008-02-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata. Together with the other patches of this series - it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on <dentry,vfsmount> pairs - it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed - it reduces the overall code size: without patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux with patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux This patch: Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack] Signed-off-by: Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | NFS: Allow text-based mounts via compat_sys_mountChuck Lever2008-02-131-3/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The compat_sys_mount() system call throws EINVAL for text-based NFSv4 mounts. The text-based mount interface assumes that any mount option blob that doesn't set the version field to "1" is a C string (ie not a legacy mount request). The compat_sys_mount() call treats blobs that don't set the version field to "1" as an error. We just relax the check in compat_sys_mount() a bit to allow C strings to be passed down to the NFSv4 client. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
* fs: remove dead config CONFIG_HAS_COMPAT_EPOLL_EVENT symbolJiri Olsa2008-02-061-49/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove dead config CONFIG_HAS_COMPAT_EPOLL_EVENT symbol. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* timerfd: new timerfd APIDavide Libenzi2008-02-051-5/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is the new timerfd API as it is implemented by the following patch: int timerfd_create(int clockid, int flags); int timerfd_settime(int ufd, int flags, const struct itimerspec *utmr, struct itimerspec *otmr); int timerfd_gettime(int ufd, struct itimerspec *otmr); The timerfd_create() API creates an un-programmed timerfd fd. The "clockid" parameter can be either CLOCK_MONOTONIC or CLOCK_REALTIME. The timerfd_settime() API give new settings by the timerfd fd, by optionally retrieving the previous expiration time (in case the "otmr" parameter is not NULL). The time value specified in "utmr" is absolute, if the TFD_TIMER_ABSTIME bit is set in the "flags" parameter. Otherwise it's a relative time. The timerfd_gettime() API returns the next expiration time of the timer, or {0, 0} if the timerfd has not been set yet. Like the previous timerfd API implementation, read(2) and poll(2) are supported (with the same interface). Here's a simple test program I used to exercise the new timerfd APIs: http://www.xmailserver.org/timerfd-test2.c [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix ia64 build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix m68k build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mips build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix alpha, arm, blackfin, cris, m68k, s390, sparc and sparc64 builds] [heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: fix s390] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix powerpc build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix sparc64 more] Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk-manpages@gmx.net> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: call security_file_permission from rw_verify_areaJames Morris2008-01-251-4/+0
| | | | | | | | All instances of rw_verify_area() are followed by a call to security_file_permission(), so just call the latter from the former. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* mm: variable length argument supportOllie Wild2007-07-191-75/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the arg+env limit of MAX_ARG_PAGES by copying the strings directly from the old mm into the new mm. We create the new mm before the binfmt code runs, and place the new stack at the very top of the address space. Once the binfmt code runs and figures out where the stack should be, we move it downwards. It is a bit peculiar in that we have one task with two mm's, one of which is inactive. [a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl: limit stack size] Signed-off-by: Ollie Wild <aaw@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> [bunk@stusta.de: unexport bprm_mm_init] Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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