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path: root/fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c
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* cifs: Use data structures to compute NTLMv2 response offsetsTim Gardner2013-11-111-16/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A bit of cleanup plus some gratuitous variable renaming. I think using structures instead of numeric offsets makes this code much more understandable. Also added a comment about current time range expected by the server. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: fix bad error handling in crypto codeJeff Layton2013-07-311-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jarod reported an Oops like when testing with fips=1: CIFS VFS: could not allocate crypto hmacmd5 CIFS VFS: could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc -2 CIFS VFS: Error -2 during NTLMSSP authentication CIFS VFS: Send error in SessSetup = -2 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000004e IP: [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver fscache kvm serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_net mperf i2c_piix4 cirrus drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_core virtio_blk ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 1 PID: 639 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 3.11.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc20.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007bf496e0 ti: ffff88007b080000 task.ti: ffff88007b080000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812b5c7a>] [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff88007b081d10 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000001f1f RBX: ffff880037422000 RCX: ffff88007b081fd8 RDX: 000000000000001f RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: fffffffffffffffe RBP: ffff88007b081d30 R08: ffff880037422000 R09: ffff88007c090100 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff880037422000 R14: ffff880037422000 R15: 00000000fffffffe FS: 00007fc322f4f780(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 000000000000004e CR3: 000000007bdaa000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffffffff81085845 ffff880037422000 ffff8800375e7400 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d48 ffffffffa0176022 ffff880037422000 ffff88007b081d60 ffffffffa015c07b ffff880037600600 ffff88007b081dc8 ffffffffa01610e1 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81085845>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x75/0xf0 [<ffffffffa0176022>] cifs_crypto_shash_release+0x82/0xf0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa015c07b>] cifs_put_tcp_session+0x8b/0xe0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa01610e1>] cifs_mount+0x9d1/0xad0 [cifs] [<ffffffffa014ff50>] cifs_do_mount+0xa0/0x4d0 [cifs] [<ffffffff811ab6e9>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0 [<ffffffff811c466f>] vfs_kern_mount+0x5f/0xf0 [<ffffffff811c6a9e>] do_mount+0x23e/0xa20 [<ffffffff811c66e6>] ? copy_mount_options+0x36/0x170 [<ffffffff811c7303>] SyS_mount+0x83/0xc0 [<ffffffff8165c8d9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: eb 9e 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 83 ec 08 48 85 ff 74 46 <48> 83 7e 48 00 48 8b 5e 50 74 4b 48 89 f7 e8 83 fc ff ff 4c 8b RIP [<ffffffff812b5c7a>] crypto_destroy_tfm+0x1a/0x90 RSP <ffff88007b081d10> CR2: 000000000000004e The cifs code allocates some crypto structures. If that fails, it returns an error, but it leaves the pointers set to their PTR_ERR values. Then later when it tries to clean up, it sees that those values are non-NULL and then passes them to the routine that frees them. Fix this by setting the pointers to NULL after collecting the error code in this situation. Cc: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: extend the buffer length enought for sprintf() usingChen Gang2013-07-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName' length may be "255 + '\0'". The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related buffer enough to hold all things. It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than 256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'. Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requiresSteve French2013-07-041-110/+85
| | | | | | | | | | | | Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto secmech structures unless needed. Currently cifs allocates all crypto mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and 4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs two, the rest of the dialects only need one). Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* [CIFS] SMB3 Signing enablementSteve French2013-06-261-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SMB3 uses a much faster method of signing (which is also better in other ways), AES-CMAC. With the kernel now supporting AES-CMAC since last release, we are overdue to allow SMB3 signing (today only CIFS and SMB2 and SMB2.1, but not SMB3 and SMB3.1 can sign) - and we need this also for checking secure negotation and also per-share encryption (two other new SMB3 features which we need to implement). This patch needs some work in a few areas - for example we need to move signing for SMB2/SMB3 from per-socket to per-user (we may be able to use the "nosharesock" mount option in the interim for the multiuser case), and Shirish found a bug in the earlier authentication overhaul (setting signing flags properly) - but those can be done in followon patches. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* Handle big endianness in NTLM (ntlmv2) authenticationSteve French2013-06-261-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is RH bug 970891 Uppercasing of username during calculation of ntlmv2 hash fails because UniStrupr function does not handle big endian wchars. Also fix a comment in the same code to reflect its correct usage. [To make it easier for stable (rather than require 2nd patch) fixed this patch of Shirish's to remove endian warning generated by sparse -- steve f.] Reported-by: steve <sanpatr1@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* move sectype to the cifs_ses instead of TCP_Server_InfoJeff Layton2013-06-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we track what sort of NEGOTIATE response was received, stop mandating that every session on a socket use the same type of auth. Push that decision out into the session setup code, and make the sectype a per-session property. This should allow us to mix multiple sectypes on a socket as long as they are compatible with the NEGOTIATE response. With this too, we can now eliminate the ses->secFlg field since that info is redundant and harder to work with than a securityEnum. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: remove useless memset in LANMAN auth codeJeff Layton2013-06-241-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | It turns out that CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE == CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, so this memset doesn't do anything useful. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: store the real expected sequence number in the midJeff Layton2013-05-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the signing routines take a pointer to a place to store the expected sequence number for the mid response. It then stores a value that's one below what that sequence number should be, and then adds one to it when verifying the signature on the response. Increment the sequence number before storing the value in the mid, and eliminate the "+1" when checking the signature. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* [CIFS] cifs: Rename cERROR and cFYI to cifs_dbgJoe Perches2013-05-041-53/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's not obvious from reading the macro names that these macros are for debugging. Convert the names to a single more typical kernel style cifs_dbg macro. cERROR(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(VFS, ...) cFYI(1, ...) -> cifs_dbg(FYI, ...) cFYI(DBG2, ...) -> cifs_dbg(NOISY, ...) Move the terminating format newline from the macro to the call site. Add CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG function cifs_vfs_err to emit the "CIFS VFS: " prefix for VFS messages. Size is reduced ~ 1% when CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG is set (default y) $ size fs/cifs/cifs.ko* text data bss dec hex filename 265245 2525 132 267902 4167e fs/cifs/cifs.ko.new 268359 2525 132 271016 422a8 fs/cifs/cifs.ko.old Other miscellaneous changes around these conversions: o Miscellaneous typo fixes o Add terminating \n's to almost all formats and remove them from the macros to be more kernel style like. A few formats previously had defective \n's o Remove unnecessary OOM messages as kmalloc() calls dump_stack o Coalesce formats to make grep easier, added missing spaces when coalescing formats o Use %s, __func__ instead of embedded function name o Removed unnecessary "cifs: " prefixes o Convert kzalloc with multiply to kcalloc o Remove unused cifswarn macro Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: teach signing routines how to deal with arrays of pages in a smb_rqstJeff Layton2012-09-241-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | Use the smb_send_rqst helper function to kmap each page in the array and update the hash for that chunk. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: change signing routines to deal with smb_rqst structsJeff Layton2012-09-241-8/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We need a way to represent a call to be sent on the wire that does not require having all of the page data kmapped. Behold the smb_rqst struct. This new struct represents an array of kvecs immediately followed by an array of pages. Convert the signing routines to use these structs under the hood and turn the existing functions for this into wrappers around that. For now, we're just changing these functions to take different args. Later, we'll teach them how to deal with arrays of pages. Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilovsky@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Enable signing in SMB2Pavel Shilovsky2012-09-241-1/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use hmac-sha256 and rather than hmac-md5 that is used for CIFS/SMB. Signature field in SMB2 header is 16 bytes instead of 8 bytes. Automatically enable signing by client when requested by the server when signing ability is available to the client. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastryyy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: rename cifs_sign_smb2 to cifs_sign_smbvJeff Layton2012-07-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | "smb2" makes me think of the SMB2.x protocol, which isn't at all what this function is for... Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: remove extraneous newlines from cERROR and cFYI callsJeff Layton2012-07-231-24/+24
| | | | | | | | Those macros add a newline on their own, so there's not any need to embed one in the message itself. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* CIFS: Rename *UCS* functions to *UTF16*Steve French2012-01-181-6/+6
| | | | | | | | to reflect the unicode encoding used by CIFS protocol. Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
* cifs: sanitize username handlingJeff Layton2012-01-171-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Currently, it's not very clear whether you're allowed to have a NULL vol->username or ses->user_name. Some places check for it and some don't. Make it clear that a NULL pointer is OK in these fields, and ensure that all the callers check for that. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Assume passwords are encoded according to iocharset (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-10-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Re-posting a patch originally posted by Oskar Liljeblad after rebasing on 3.2. Modify cifs to assume that the supplied password is encoded according to iocharset. Before this patch passwords would be treated as raw 8-bit data, which made authentication with Unicode passwords impossible (at least passwords with characters > 0xFF). The previous code would as a side effect accept passwords encoded with ISO 8859-1, since Unicode < 0x100 basically is ISO 8859-1. Software which relies on that will no longer support password chars > 0x7F unless it also uses iocharset=iso8859-1. (mount.cifs does not care about the encoding so it will work as expected.) Signed-off-by: Oskar Liljeblad <oskar@osk.mine.nu> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Tested-by: A <nimbus1_03087@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: consolidate signature generating codeJeff Layton2011-10-121-82/+21
| | | | | | | | | | We have two versions of signature generating code. A vectorized and non-vectorized version. Eliminate a large chunk of cut-and-paste code by turning the non-vectorized version into a wrapper around the vectorized one. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: use memcpy for magic string in cifs signature generation BSRSPYLJeff Layton2011-10-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | ...it's more efficient since we know the length. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* cifs: Fix broken sec=ntlmv2/i sec option (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-09-191-43/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix sec=ntlmv2/i authentication option during mount of Samba shares. cifs client was coding ntlmv2 response incorrectly. All that is needed in temp as specified in MS-NLMP seciton 3.3.2 "Define ComputeResponse(NegFlg, ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM, CHALLENGE_MESSAGE.ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge, Time, ServerName) as Set temp to ConcatenationOf(Responserversion, HiResponserversion, Z(6), Time, ClientChallenge, Z(4), ServerName, Z(4)" is MsvAvNbDomainName. For sec=ntlmsspi, build_av_pair is not used, a blob is plucked from type 2 response sent by the server to use in authentication. I tested sec=ntlmv2/i and sec=ntlmssp/i mount options against Samba (3.6) and Windows - XP, 2003 Server and 7. They all worked. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: don't start signing too earlyJeff Layton2011-07-311-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sniffing traffic on the wire shows that windows clients send a zeroed out signature field in a NEGOTIATE request, and send "BSRSPYL" in the signature field during SESSION_SETUP. Make the cifs client behave the same way. It doesn't seem to make much difference in any server that I've tested against, but it's probably best to follow windows behavior as closely as possible here. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Cleanup: check return codes of crypto api callsShirish Pargaonkar2011-07-251-21/+89
| | | | | | | | Check return codes of crypto api calls and either log an error or log an error and return from the calling function with error. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: silence printk when establishing first session on socketJeff Layton2011-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When signing is enabled, the first session that's established on a socket will cause a printk like this to pop: CIFS VFS: Unexpected SMB signature This is because the key exchange hasn't happened yet, so the signature field is bogus. Don't try to check the signature on the socket until the first session has been established. Also, eliminate the specific check for SMB_COM_NEGOTIATE since this check covers that case too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Rename three structures to avoid camel caseSteve French2011-05-271-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | secMode to sec_mode and cifsTconInfo to cifs_tcon and cifsSesInfo to cifs_ses Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* consistently use smb_buf_length as be32 for cifs (try 3)Steve French2011-05-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is one big endian field in the cifs protocol, the RFC1001 length, which cifs code (unlike in the smb2 code) had been handling as u32 until the last possible moment, when it was converted to be32 (its native form) before sending on the wire. To remove the last sparse endian warning, and to make this consistent with the smb2 implementation (which always treats the fields in their native size and endianness), convert all uses of smb_buf_length to be32. This version incorporates Christoph's comment about using be32_add_cpu, and fixes a typo in the second version of the patch. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Use ecb des kernel crypto APIs instead ofSteve French2011-05-191-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | local cifs functions (repost) Using kernel crypto APIs for DES encryption during LM and NT hash generation instead of local functions within cifs. Source file smbdes.c is deleted sans four functions, one of which uses ecb des functionality provided by kernel crypto APIs. Remove function SMBOWFencrypt. Add return codes to various functions such as calc_lanman_hash, SMBencrypt, and SMBNTencrypt. Includes fix noticed by Dan Carpenter. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> CC: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: wrap received signature check in srv_mutexJeff Layton2011-04-121-6/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While testing my patchset to fix asynchronous writes, I hit a bunch of signature problems when testing with signing on. The problem seems to be that signature checks on receive can be running at the same time as a process that is sending, or even that multiple receives can be checking signatures at the same time, clobbering the same data structures. While we're at it, clean up the comments over cifs_calculate_signature and add a note that the srv_mutex should be held when calling this function. This patch seems to fix the problems for me, but I'm not clear on whether it's the best approach. If it is, then this should probably go to stable too. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Allow user names longer than 32 bytesSteve French2011-04-121-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | We artificially limited the user name to 32 bytes, but modern servers handle larger. Set the maximum length to a reasonable 256, and make the user name string dynamically allocated rather than a fixed size in session structure. Also clean up old checkpatch warning. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: No need to check crypto blockcipher allocationShirish Pargaonkar2011-01-311-2/+3
| | | | | | | | Missed one change as per earlier suggestion. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: More crypto cleanup (try #2)Shirish Pargaonkar2011-01-271-12/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replaced md4 hashing function local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. As a result, md4 hashing function and its supporting functions in file md4.c are not needed anymore. Cleaned up function declarations, removed forward function declarations, and removed a header file that is being deleted from being included. Verified that sec=ntlm/i, sec=ntlmv2/i, and sec=ntlmssp/i work correctly. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] Replace cifs md5 hashing functions with kernel crypto APIsSteve French2011-01-251-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Replace remaining use of md5 hash functions local to cifs module with kernel crypto APIs. Remove header and source file containing those local functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: remove unnecessary locking around sequence_numberJeff Layton2011-01-091-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | The server->sequence_number is already protected by the srv_mutex. The GlobalMid_lock is unneeded here. Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: Cleanup and thus reduce smb session structure and fields used during ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-291-24/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | authentication Removed following fields from smb session structure cryptkey, ntlmv2_hash, tilen, tiblob and ntlmssp_auth structure is allocated dynamically only if the auth mech in NTLMSSP. response field within a session_key structure is used to initially store the target info (either plucked from type 2 challenge packet in case of NTLMSSP or fabricated in case of NTLMv2 without extended security) and then to store Message Authentication Key (mak) (session key + client response). Server challenge or cryptkey needed during a NTLMSSP authentication is now part of ntlmssp_auth structure which gets allocated and freed once authenticaiton process is done. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Use appropriate server challengeShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-291-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Need to have cryptkey or server challenge in smb connection (struct TCP_Server_Info) for ntlm and ntlmv2 auth types for which cryptkey (Encryption Key) is supplied just once in Negotiate Protocol response during an smb connection setup for all the smb sessions over that smb connection. For ntlmssp, cryptkey or server challenge is provided for every smb session in type 2 packet of ntlmssp negotiation, the cryptkey provided during Negotiation Protocol response before smb connection does not count. Rename cryptKey to cryptkey and related changes. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - minor error corrections and cleanupShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-271-9/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Minor cleanup - Fix spelling mistake, make meaningful (goto) label In function setup_ntlmv2_rsp(), do not return 0 and leak memory, let the tiblob get freed. For function find_domain_name(), pass already available nls table pointer instead of loading and unloading the table again in this function. For ntlmv2, the case sensitive password length is the length of the response, so subtract session key length (16 bytes) from the .len. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Use kernel crypto apis to calculate hashes and smb ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-261-59/+136
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | signatures Use kernel crypto sync hash apis insetead of cifs crypto functions. The calls typically corrospond one to one except that insead of key init, setkey is used. Use crypto apis to generate smb signagtures also. Use hmac-md5 to genereate ntlmv2 hash, ntlmv2 response, and HMAC (CR1 of ntlmv2 auth blob. User crypto apis to genereate signature and to verify signature. md5 hash is used to calculate signature. Use secondary key to calculate signature in case of ntlmssp. For ntlmv2 within ntlmssp, during signature calculation, only 16 bytes key (a nonce) stored within session key is used. during smb signature calculation. For ntlm and ntlmv2 without extended security, 16 bytes key as well as entire response (24 bytes in case of ntlm and variable length in case of ntlmv2) is used for smb signature calculation. For kerberos, there is no distinction between key and response. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Define crypto hash functions and create and send keys ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-261-0/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | needed for key exchange Mark dependency on crypto modules in Kconfig. Defining per structures sdesc and cifs_secmech which are used to store crypto hash functions and contexts. They are stored per smb connection and used for all auth mechs to genereate hash values and signatures. Allocate crypto hashing functions, security descriptiors, and respective contexts when a smb/tcp connection is established. Release them when a tcp/smb connection is taken down. md5 and hmac-md5 are two crypto hashing functions that are used throught the life of an smb/tcp connection by various functions that calcualte signagure and ntlmv2 hash, HMAC etc. structure ntlmssp_auth is defined as per smb connection. ntlmssp_auth holds ciphertext which is genereated by rc4/arc4 encryption of secondary key, a nonce using ntlmv2 session key and sent in the session key field of the type 3 message sent by the client during ntlmssp negotiation/exchange A key is exchanged with the server if client indicates so in flags in type 1 messsage and server agrees in flag in type 2 message of ntlmssp negotiation. If both client and agree, a key sent by client in type 3 message of ntlmssp negotiation in the session key field. The key is a ciphertext generated off of secondary key, a nonce, using ntlmv2 hash via rc4/arc4. Signing works for ntlmssp in this patch. The sequence number within the server structure needs to be zero until session is established i.e. till type 3 packet of ntlmssp exchange of a to be very first smb session on that smb connection is sent. Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM auth and sign - Allocate session key/client response dynamicallyShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-261-48/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculating auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copy/make its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. sequence_number within server is set to 0x2. The authentication Message Authentication Key (mak) which consists of session key followed by client response within structure session_key is now dynamic. Every authentication type allocates the key + response sized memory within its session structure and later either assigns or frees it once the client response is sent and if session's session key becomes connetion's session key. ntlm/ntlmi authentication functions are rearranged. A function named setup_ntlm_resp(), similar to setup_ntlmv2_resp(), replaces function cifs_calculate_session_key(). size of CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE is changed to 16, to reflect the byte size of the key it holds. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* NTLM authentication and signing - Calculate auth response per smb sessionShirish Pargaonkar2010-10-141-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Start calculation auth response within a session. Move/Add pertinet data structures like session key, server challenge and ntlmv2_hash in a session structure. We should do the calculations within a session before copying session key and response over to server data structures because a session setup can fail. Only after a very first smb session succeeds, it copies/makes its session key, session key of smb connection. This key stays with the smb connection throughout its life. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* CIFS ntlm authentication and signing - Build a proper av/ti pair blob for ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-10-121-11/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | ntlmv2 without extended security authentication Build an av pair blob as part of ntlmv2 (without extended security) auth request. Include netbios and dns names for domain and server and a timestamp in the blob. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs: fix module refcount leak in find_domain_nameJeff Layton2010-10-081-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | find_domain_name() uses load_nls_default which takes a module reference on the appropriate NLS module, but doesn't put it. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Cc: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication codeShirish Pargaonkar2010-09-291-6/+115
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of ntlmv2 authentication. Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs. So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic. For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can vary. Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract (netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair blob. Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication. So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp), there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent. Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined. To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob. For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved, if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations. For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob. The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error, this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response) and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed. The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer, 5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible 10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user, workstation names etc. Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it, over the other security mechanisms. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP Change variable name mac_key to session key to reflect ↵Shirish Pargaonkar2010-09-291-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | the key it holds Change name of variable mac_key to session key. The reason mac_key was changed to session key is, this structure does not hold message authentication code, it holds the session key (for ntlmv2, ntlmv1 etc.). mac is generated as a signature in cifs_calc* functions. Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* [CIFS] ntlmv2/ntlmssp remove-unused-function CalcNTLMv2_partial_mac_keySteve French2010-09-081-57/+0
| | | | | | | | This function is not used, so remove the definition and declaration. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "[CIFS] Fix ntlmv2 auth with ntlmssp"Steve French2010-09-081-294/+122
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 9fbc590860e75785bdaf8b83e48fabfe4d4f7d58. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "missing changes during ntlmv2/ntlmssp auth and sign"Steve French2010-09-081-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 3ec6bbcdb4e85403f2c5958876ca9492afdf4031. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* Revert "Eliminate sparse warning - bad constant expression"Steve French2010-09-081-121/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 2d20ca835867d93ead6ce61780d883a4b128106d. The change to kernel crypto and fixes to ntlvm2 and ntlmssp series, introduced a regression. Deferring this patch series to 2.6.37 after Shirish fixes it. Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> CC: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishp@us.ibm.com>
* Eliminate sparse warning - bad constant expressionshirishpargaonkar@gmail.com2010-08-241-72/+121
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Eliminiate sparse warning during usage of crypto_shash_* APIs error: bad constant expression Allocate memory for shash descriptors once, so that we do not kmalloc/kfree it for every signature generation (shash descriptor for md5 hash). From ed7538619817777decc44b5660b52268077b74f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 11:47:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] eliminate sparse warnings during crypto_shash_* APis usage Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
* missing changes during ntlmv2/ntlmssp auth and signShirish Pargaonkar2010-08-231-0/+2
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
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